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SYNOPSIS 
This study sets out to find the reasons why the level of consolidation by the 
target beneficiaries of the World Bank assisted Sites and Services project in 
Makama Bauchi was low. 
The World Bank assisted Sites and Services strategy is one of the more recent 
public sector solutions to the low income housing problems adopted by many 
countries of the Developing World in the last two decades. The World Bank 
assisted Projects normally take two approaches: (1) Sites and Services where 
land is provided with physical infrastructure (e.g. roads, electricity and water 
supply) and community facilities (e.g. schools, health clinics), and divided into 
individual plots and allocated to specified target groups who are expected to 
build their houses through self-help, and live in them. (2) Settlement 
Upgrading where physical infrastructure is provided in an already existing 
settlement and land ownership are legalised where they were illegal, 
improvements of individual dwellings is expected to follow. With both 
approaches, the guiding principles are those of affordability, cost recovery and 
replicability 
The Nigerian Government had adopted this strategy since the late 
seventies. Two pilot projects have so far been planned and executed. One in 
Bauchi Town (Bauchi state) and the other in Imo (Owerri state). The Bauchi 
project, which is the more mature of the two projects, was chosen as a case 
study in this research. The focus of this study is on the Sites and Services 
component whose major objective was to ensure house ownership by low 
income groups through this strategy thereby increasing substantially the 
housing stock for these groups. 
In the Bauchi Sites and Services project, 80% of the plots were to be 
allocated to the low income group who qualified by reason as the criteria laid 
down, while the remaining 20% went to a higher income group. The plot 
allottees were expected to consolidate their plots by building a completed basic 
xix 
unit within two years of allocation. A minimum basic unit of two rooms and a 
parlour built with a combination of imported and local, but permanent, 
building materials was required in the first instance and expansion could take 
place when and if resources were available. 
However evidence of what actually happened in the project, revealed in 
the progress report, tells a different story. Though it was reported that by 1987, 
when this project was declared completed, nearly all demarcated plots were 
allocated to prospective beneficiaries, an assessment of the consolidation 
showed the level to be lower than expected. Furthermore a survey of the 
completed houses revealed that those owned by the target lower income 
beneficiaries were smaller in number than those owned by a higher income 
non-target group despite the initial plot allocation being the other way round. 
This means the level of plot consolidation by the original target group is lower 
than expected. This study will therefore attempt to find the reasons Why the 
level of plot consolidation by the target allottees was lower than expected. In 
order to find the reasons, some hypotheses were put forward and tested. The 
key hypothesis is that the problem is caused by the inaccurate estimates and 
assumptions made by the project planners regarding the housing affordability, 
needs and preferences of the target beneficiaries of the project. 
To get the required information to test this hypothesis, a field survey 
was conducted between December 1991 and May 1992. The data were 
analysed using the SPSS/PC+/ (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). The 
results of the data analysis showed that there is a mismatch between the cost of 
building according to the standards required by the project and what the target 
beneficiaries could afford. This mismatch was attributed to the project's 
requirement to use high priced building materials, cost of hired labour which it 
had been assumed would be free, the absence of assumed savings and non-
project borrowing sources to supplement project loan .. Another factor revealed 
by the analysis was the mismatch between the size of the recommended basic 
unit and that which the beneficiaries require. The number of rooms in the 
recommended basic unit was far short of beneficiaries requirements. As a 
XX 
result, many target plot allottees either did not consolidate or could not finish 
the houses they started. Hence consolidation remains low in the project. Also 
further analysis has shown that the target beneficiaries who have not 
consolidated are worse off in terms of their current housing situations. This 
situation will remain the same indefinitely unless some measures are taken to 
revert it. 
It is therefore hoped that the findings of this study, and the suggestions 
made based on the findings, will contribute towards a permanent solution to 
this problem in the Mak~a project and in similar projects in Nigeria and 
elsewhere in the Developing World. · 
\ 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce the study by briefly discussing 
the research problem, outlining the study framework and summarising its 
methodology. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section covers 
the research problem, its statement, nature, extent, and consequences, the 
second section is the background to the research problem, beginning by tracing 
the low income housing problem in the developing countries with reference to 
Nigeria in particular and moving on to discuss the Nigerian government's earlier 
response to the problems, why they have failed and the need to adopt the World 
Bank aided Sites and Services strategy; the third section outlines the study 
framework, starting by stating the purpose of the study followed by the research 
question, hypothesis and objectives; the fourth section is a brief summary of the 
research methodology ; the fifth outlines the organisation of the thesis report 
with a brief summary of the content of each of the remaining chapters of the 
thesis; the last section contains summary and conclusion. 
1.1 Statement of research problem 
The main problem this study addresses is the low level of plot consolidation by 
the target beneficiaries of the World Bank aided Makama Sites and Services 
housing project in Bauchi, Nigeria. For the better understanding and 
appreciation of the problem, its nature, extent and consequences are discussed in 
the following subsections. 
1.1.1 Nature of the problem 
To understand the nature of the problem, it is very necessary to understand the 
concepts of the key words in the problem statement. The key words which 
appear to underpin the problem include: housing, self-help and aided self-help 
housing, sites and services, settlement upgrading, target group and consolidation. 
1 
The term housing means both a dwelling stock (a noun) and the process by 
which the stock is created ( verb) (Turner 1976). In the past most housing policy 
makers tended to define housing as a noun or a product and were more 
concerned about its physical qualities, and hence policy responses to housing 
problems were largely influenced by this definition. According to them, a useful 
and decent house is that which satisfied certain officially determined standards 
of construction. So both government and privately provided houses must satisfy 
this definition. 
In the more recent years however, this definition was seriously challenged by a 
number of housing experts. Turner (1972: 158) for instance, after a series of 
studies on housing came tip with the conclusion that the definition of housing as 
a product tends to put more emphasis on the physical quality of the house and 
neglect its user values. In his studies, Turner found that, for most people, what a 
house does is as important as what it is. He went on to say that housing problems 
should be restated in terms of the human values that must be placed on the 
housing process, only then can a reasonable interpretation, and feasible and 
desirable actions be indicated. This argument has contributed to the recognition 
acceptance and encouragement of self-help housing. Vershure ( 1989) also argues 
that housing is more than just a mere product, it is a complicated and unique 
phenomenon, being a shelter, a symbolic act and a service, a process by which 
people all over the world express themselves. For the purpose of this study the 
definition of housing as a product as well as a process which is particularly 
relevant in describing the Sites Services housing strategy is adopted. 
Self-help housing, the origin of the idea of Sites and Services, is defined as the 
use of ones own efforts to build a house for oneself and ones family. While self-
help housing settlements are defined by many authorities in Developing 
Countries as illegal, spontaneous, undesirable developments or slums, for people 
like J.F.C. Turner the story is different. He defines self-help housing as a Self 
organised, Self built and managed housing development. Although self-help 
housing is a very old concept, the role played by families in the contemporary 
self-help differs. While, traditionally self-help housing put more emphasis on the 
use of free family labour to gather and assemble materials and build a house, the 
2 
contemporary version of self-help is about decision making and control by 
families in housing investment. The result of the contemporary self-help efforts 
range from squatter settlements to well established and standards 
neighbourhood (Rodell and Skinner 1983). 
Aided self-help housing refers to some form of assistance given to households 
who are involved in the process of self-help housing. Normally this assistance 
comes from the authorities, aid organisations and financial institutions. The idea 
of aided self-help housing emerged as a result of the observation that the 
conventional housing provided in the 1950s and 1960s in the majority of the 
Developing Countries was not affordable by the poor (Swan 1983), and that the 
poor do make tremendous efforts to provide their own houses, most of which 
are classed as squatter settlements and slums. It was also reported that many of 
the poor do not invest in slum dwellings up to desired standards for fear of 
being relocated or lack of essential services and not mainly as a result of poverty 
(Turner 1972). 
Turner (1966,1972), Abrams 1964 and 1971 Venez 1974 have reported that 
the replacement of slum dwellings with conventional housing has failed to meet 
low income housing needs. Slums dwellings, Turner (1972) argues, are an 
expression of the desire and ability of the low income to provide for themselves. 
If these energies and efforts are harnessed with some investment on the part of 
the authorities, a lot more could be achieved with far less investment than that 
required by conventional housing. 
Rodell 1983, voiced the same opinion when he pointed out that "Governments 
can develop between two to five Sites and Services plots with the resources 
needed to build a single house in the conventional housing project. 
So the basic message behind aided self-help, is for the government to help poor 
families make up the shortfalls in their efforts to provide for themselves. It was 
agreed by a number of experts (Turner 1972, Swan et al 1983 Laquian 1983, 
Rodell J and Skinner J 1983 etc.) that if government efforts and those of 
households, are put together, more could be achieved. Furthermore, government 
could reduce their investment per family and so reach a larger number. 
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The other important issue addressed by aided self-help is the redress of the 
balance of power and control in housing investment decision maldng between 
authorities and the recipient. Traditionally the authorities, or government, had 
total power in planning and providing housing. With aided self-help, the 
authorities are to play a supportive role, while the major power and decision 
making should be left in the hands of the community. This new idea was 
psychologically not an easy one for the housing professionals and bureaucrats to 
deal with. The idea of allowing the poor to take legal responsibilities for building 
and maintaining their own houses did not appeal to them for fear of being made 
redundant and losing the control and power which they have been accustomed 
to. However as Swan (1983) have written, these fears are unfounded because 
the professionals and bureaucrats will still have "an important role to play in 
terms of planning for and supporting the efforts of the poor in housing and 
infrastructure." He went on to argue that the professionals also have many 
physical, social, as well as economic issues in the housing environment on 
which to redirect their efforts. For instance, a lot of work still needs to be done in 
terms of research, new innovations and control to resolve the issues surrounding 
land. 
The sites and services and Settlement upgrading which the World Bank has 
adopted in the last two decades, are both approaches of aided self-help housing 
strategy. 
Sites and Services is a form of aided self-help housing strategy where a variety 
of projects initiated and designed on newly acquired land are meant to provide 
serviced plots for housing for a low income target group. The level of services 
provided depends on the local circumstance ranging from minimally serviced 
plots to an intermediate level and a maximum level, of core units complete with 
full access to community based services (Mayo and Gross 1987). The sites and 
services projects are normally undertaken by authorities and housing agents. 
This approach is a shift of housing policy focus from providing a finished house 
to providing serviced plots for self-help housing. 
Settlement upgrading is another form of aided self-help where authorities take 
the initiative in the extension of essential services and community facilities to 
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an old settlement, legalising the land holdings where they are illegal. This in 
some cases, also includes provision of assistance for house improvements in the 
form of loans to a household. 
This study is, however, more concerned with the sites and services component of 
the World Bank Aided Projects where serviced plots are allocated to a target 
beneficiary group who are expected to consolidate the plot fully through self-
help efforts. 
Target beneficiaries of the Sites and Services projects are a low income group 
to whom the benefit of the projects were directed . The definition of the low 
income group however, varies from country to country. In the Makama project in 
Nigeria, the group was defined as those earning between 104 to 282 Naira 
($150-$320 at 1978 rate of exchange) per month in 1978 when the projects were 
planned. However in recent years, due to the deep economic recession and 
inflation in the country, the low income group definition has been revised to 
include all those earning 500 Naira and below in the low income category 
(National Housing Policy 1991). Consolidation refers to the process by which 
families allocated plots on the sites and services sites progressively develop them 
over a period of time (Laquian 1984). Though progressive development here 
means a gradual process of consolidation which could take many years, a 
minimum consolidation level at which households could move in while the 
process proceeds is expected over a definite period in most projects. In the 
Makama sites and services projects a minimum built up unit, which the plot 
allottees were expected to achieve within two years of plot allocation, was 
defined by the project planners as a basic unit. The unit specified is of two 
bedrooms and a parlour, with a service core comprising of kitchen and toilet. It 
is to be built of concrete foundations, concrete block /burnt bricks walls, and 
timber/azara roof with a corrugated zinc/iron sheets cover. It was the minimum 
acceptable consolidated unit. However, anyone who wished to build bigger units 
was allowed to do so if they could afford it. 
The term plot allottees refers to all the households who were allocated plots on 
the project site for the purpose of building houses. 
5 
Low level of consolidation is used here to mean that the amount of houses 
completed to the minimum accepted standards is below that which is expected at 
the time of measurement. The full level of consolidation expected is 100% of the 
total plots allocated. Therefore a figure below this is lower than expected. The 
extent of how low is determined by how close or far from the full level, the 
actual level is. 
1.1.2 Extent of problem 
The plot allocation process in the Makama project started in 1983, by the end of 
1985, according to the project progress report CW orld Bank inspection mission 
1985), a total of 1,174 plots representing 60 per cent of the total serviced plots, 
were allocated to the beneficiaries and certificates of occupancy issued. The 
project was declared officially completed in 1987, when all serviced residential 
plots were allocated and the World Bank disbursed all its loans. By 1988, a year 
later, a survey of the project revealed that only 483 plots were consolidated out 
of the total 2000 plots allocated Project Implementation Unit (1988) reports. 
The survey also revealed that another 471 were at various stages of construction 
but a majority of them looked abandoned. Onibokun also reported that during his 
study of the following year ( 1989) his team counted up to 400 started buildings 
which appear to have been abandoned. The most recent survey of the project 
(1992) by this study reveals that only 60 per cent of the total 2099 plots allocated 
have been fully consolidated. Although this is an increase over the earlier 
reports, it is still far below expectations which were for 100% consolidation. 
Furthermore, a breakdown of income categories of the owners of the completed 
house revealed that less than 20% came from the target group. This further 
demonstrates the magnitude of the problems for the target group with whom this 
study is concerned. More detailed analysis of the extent of the problem is 
provided in chapter three - the case study chapter. 
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1.1.3 Consequences of the problem 
The following are some of the consequences of the low level of consolidation in 
the Makama sites and services project. 
i) The empty plots which have not been consolidated are being used as dumping 
grounds for solid waste in most of the neighbourhoods, providing breeding 
grounds for flies and mosquitoes. 
ii) The abandoned buildings, especially those at lintel or roofing level, make 
good hide-outs for thieves, and cause major security problems for the whole 
area. 
iii) Illegal sales of plots and uncompleted buildings have become common place. 
Some households who are unable to consolidate are persuaded to sell their plots 
usually to higher income earners. Some sell to repay their mortgage loan, the 
interest on which keeps rising, without realising any benefit from it. 
iv) Many households are experiencing increased economic hardship due to their 
failure to consolidate. For instance most of them have to pay mortgage loan 
instalments and at the same time meet their rent obligation in their current 
housing every month from their meagre earnings. The little they are left with is 
not enough to buy food for the family hence malnutrition may result. 
Investigations of their current housing situations (presented in Chapter 7) also 
revealed that they are living in worse housing situations than those living in 
project houses. They pay higher rent for lower quality houses. 
v) The lack of consolidation by some households has made the project unit take 
some drastic measures to the disadvantage of the lower income groups. These 
measures include, the enforcement of one of the conditions governing the 
allocation of plots which is that any one who is allocated a plot and fails to start 
consolidation within two years, shall have his ownership revoked and the plot is 
allocated to someone else. Most of the plots revoked have been reallocated to a 
higher income group. Also, the Mortgage Bank stopped the policy of automatic 
issuance of a loan with plot allocation. The plot allotee is required to complete 
the foundation of his buildings using his own resources before he qualifies for 
the initial loan instalment and subsequent instalments depended on his progress. 
This was with the pretext that low income participants were diverting the loan to 
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uses other than consolidation. This meant that the low income allottees who do 
not have the resources to start building do not qualify for the project loan and 
therefore will not be able to consolidate. They are left with the option of selling 
out their plots to a higher income household or waiting for project authorities to 
revoke their allocations. The consequence of this is that the original plot 
allottees, who are the legitimate target groups for the projects, are gradually 
being edged out of the project. 
This is made obvious by the records which show a reduction in the proportion of 
the target income group over the years. The project records of 1985 for instance 
showed that 80% of the plot allottees were within the specified income group. 
By 1988 a survey of consolidated plots revealed only 47% (PIU 1988) of the 
houses belonged to those within the bracket, and by the following year (1989) 
the percentage had fallen to 38 (Onibokun 1989). By the time this survey was 
conducted, the proportion of the legitimate target group was only 20%. 
vi) The low level of consolidation by the target group means that one of the 
major objectives of the project, which is to significantly increase the housing 
stock owned by the low income groups, would not be achieved. 
1.2 Background of problem 
The background of the research problem can be traced back to the low-income 
housing problems in the Developing Countries, and in Nigeria in particular. 
The housing problems in Nigeria, and government intervention have been well 
documented (Onibokun, 1982; Adeniyi, 1972; Abiodun, 1976; Awotona, 1990; 
Mabogunje, 982; Abrams; 1966 Kobe; Koenigsberger, Wheeler,1980). 
1.2.1 Housing Problems in Developing Countries. 
The housing problem is a Universal issue. There is not a single major city in the 
World that is devoid of housing problems (Wallace 1971). This is irrespective of 
whether the country is in the developed or developing world. However a major 
difference does exist between the problem in the developed and the developing 
world. While in the former the problems are being progressively and 
successfully dealt with by effective policies, in the latter, problems are getting 
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worse. Patton (1988), for instance, has noted that while people in the developed 
countries are living in better housing conditions now than they were at the tum 
of the century, in developing countries people are, in worse housing conditions 
now. The UN CHS 1981 also reported that the housing situation in the 
developing countries has been getting progressively worse over the last two 
decades. 
It was estimated that between 1/5 and 1/2 of the urban population of the 
developing countries live in makeshift and substandard housing and that 1/2 a 
billion housing units are needed by the end of this century to meet the housing 
need of the Developing Countries (UNCHS 1982:2 UN 1976). 
The housing shortage in the Developing Countries in the past three decades has 
been mainly attributed to a combination of factors mostly stemming from the 
urbanisation process. 
The rapid population explosion in the cities resulting from massive rural/urban 
migration, and improved medication leading to low death rates and improved 
fertility, are some of the major causes of the housing problems which many 
Writers including Dwyer 1978, Hauser and Gardener 1982 have pointed out. The 
problem is further compounded by the low purchasing power of both the 
governments as well as individual making them lack the ability to provide 
adequate shelter and services to cater for the ever rising demand (Dwyer 1975; 
Payne 1977, 984 Ross 1973; Ward 1982; Hardey and Satterthwaite 1981). The 
World Bank estimated in 1980 that over 2000 million people in the Developing 
Countries are living below the poverty line. 
The immediate consequences of these problems are the growth of illegal 
substandard housing settlements in most major cities of the developing 
countries. For instance, Most South American cities are characterised by 
'favelors·, 'rancheros' and 'villas miserias'. These are settlements which grew 
spontaneously as people attempted to house themselves. Most of them were built 
on illegally occupied public spaces and are constructed of temporary materials 
with very minimal or no basic services and sanitation. While the UN ( 1960) 
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estimated that 10 housing units per 1000 of the population must be built every 
year to satisfy the demand by the end of the century the actual rate was only rate 
of production was only 3/1000 (Mabogunje, Hardoy and Misra 1974). 
The situation in Asian countries is not much different. For instance in major 
Indian cities like Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay and Madras, over 65% of the families 
were reported to be living in a one roomed unit or even sharing with other 
families, with an average person per room varying between 2.9 and 3.7 (Dwyer 
1981: 105). 
The United Nations estimates show that the dwelling deficit for Asia is a total of 
147 million out of which 22 million is urban and 125 in rural. 
In African countries, the problems are similar, but certain factors are thought to 
have compounded their magnitude and nature. These factors include extremely 
low average income and the wide gap between the rich and poor, multiplicity of 
culture and the imposition of foreign building codes and standards (Mabogunje, 
Hardoy and Misra 1978). This unfortunate circumstance has led to the growth of 
poor quality housing manifested by overcrowding, poor sanitation and 
inadequate infrastructure and services as Okpala ( 1986 : 206) has rightly put it. 
It is very important to note here that though some of the figures given regarding 
the magnitude of the housing problems may seem obsolete because of dates 
when they were compiled, they are still very relevant today. This is because the 
situation has only got worse over the decades and not improved. The United 
Nations (1987) has also pointed out that the housing problems in most 
developing countries particularly in Africa are getting worse due to the 
increasing impact of the cause of the problems, one example is that the rate of 
population growth in urban centres is still increasing and the purchasing power 
of both individuals and governments is diminishing with a worsening economic 
situation characterised by swelling debts and high inflation rates. 
Nigeria, the nature and extent of whose housing problems are examined in 
greater detail, is not an exception to this phenomenon. 
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1.2.2 The nature and extent of low income housing problems in Nigeria 
Housing problems in Nigeria like in most other developing countries are 
essentially urban as many observers (Awotona 1988, National Housing Policy 
1991) have reported. Nigeria being the largest country in Africa with a 
population one fifth of that of the whole of African, has enormous housing 
problems commensurate to its size. The magnitude and nature of the problem 
also exhibit marked regional differences. In most urban centres, the problem is 
not only of quantity but also quality (National Housing Policy 1991). 
Like all other cities of the developing countries, Nigeria's major cities have 
grown rapidly in the past three decades; so much so that all efforts towards 
housing the populace are outstripped by the demand. Between 1952 and 1963, 
Nigerian urban centres had an average growth rate of 5 % While Lagos had 8.6% 
during the same period, but by 1970, metropolitan Lagos was estimated to be 
growing at 13.5% annually (FMWH 1991 ). 
This problem is manifested by overcrowding, growth of squatter settlements, 
inadequacy of infrastructure and services and generally poor housing 
environment, high cost of building as well as high rented accommodation. This 
is worse in the southern part of the country where land is a major problem and its 
legal acquisition is beyond most people. 
I) Over crowding and poor quality housing 
In Lagos for instance, the average number of persons per room is 4, and 74% of 
households occupy single room units. In some areas like Ajagunle and parts of 
Surulere, the situation is worsen by substandard houses and absence of basic 
facilities and sanitation (Adegunleye 1988; Tettey 1988 : 55-57). Exposed 
gutters and dumps of solid waste are a common sight. In some areas rooms are 
used as shops in the day and sleeping place for a family at night. All other 
conveniences are undertaken outside the house. However, in the· Northern part 
of the country, there is a slight difference in the nature of the problem because 
the cities are less congested, land is still easier to acquire and rural-urban 
migration has less impact. 
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Although house sharing in traditional cities like Zaria, Kano, Bauchi and Y ola is 
very common, overcrowding in real terms is not a major problem. This is 
because most traditional houses are the compound type with lots of space and 
courtyards which are also used for many activities including sleeping, cooking 
and washing (Dar al Handersah 1978). 
Unlike in most South American and Asian cities, land invasion is less commonly 
practised in Nigeria. Apart from a few isolated cases in Lagos, where the 
practice becomes inevitable due to the high rate of rural-urban migration 
especially during the oil boom era of the seventies. Land invasion is generally 
less common in Africa (Gilbert, and Gugler 1982: 4). 
In most traditional towns particularly in the northern part of Nigeria, land 
invasion is totally non-existent. Though so-called substandard houses exist, they 
are not in the form of squatter or illegal settlements but rather traditional 
settlements, that are badly adapted to the modem urban planning. Most of them 
were built by self-help or by a traditional master builder, with local materials, on 
traditionally purchased or inherited land long before modem planning was 
introduced in the areas. Some of them, because of the nature of materials used 
and lack of constant maintenance, have deteriorated over the years to become 
slums and constitute a problem to the inhabitants. 
ii) Inadequacy of infrastructure and services 
In Nigeria many cities and villages are not adequately provided with essential 
services and infrastructure. While in the urban cities the problem is that of 
inadequacy, in most villages, it is that of total absence. Facilities like good 
roads, electricity and portable water supply and proper sanitation are not 
provided at all in many rural villages. However in the major urban centres of 
Lagos, Kano, Ibadan and Kaduna on the other hand, facilities extend to nearly all 
parts of the city, which is one of the major attractions of the city to the villagers. 
But because of rapid population growth and a resulting lack of expansion of the 
facilities, these have become over-stretched and therefore inadequate. 
A survey of the availability of electricity, water supply and sanitation facilities 
has shown that they vary considerably. For instance generally people have better 
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access to electricity (average of 83.1 % ) than tap water supply (74.8%) and 
sanitation (53.9%) (Adeakun & Onibokun 1990: 89-140). Also the more 
metropolitan southern states are better served with facilities than the less 
developed northern states. While in the south, Anambra, Bendel Lagos and 
Ondo states are served nearly 100% (Average of 97%) with electricity, in the 
north, states like Bauchi, Adamawa, Kaduna and Borno are served with 
electricity only 75.6%, 71.6%, 65.6% and 63.6% respectively. 
The access to tap water is similar. While Anambra, Bendel and Rivers states 
have 99.3% ,95 % and 98 % such access respectively, 48.7 % of houses in 
Bauchi, 41.4% in Benue, and 41.5 % in Kano draw their water from wells 
(Adeakun and Onibokun 1990). Also only 35.2% of urban houses in Nigeria use 
flush toilets, the rest use either an earth pit or pail . Similarly the average for the 
South is higher than the North. 
iii) High cost of building relative to incomes 
The cost of building houses relative to incomes is a major compounding factor to 
the Nigerian housing problems. The cost of all the major inputs/components for 
housing such as materials, land and labour is beyond the reach of the ordinary 
citizen in Nigeria today. Inflation which has led to the continuous rise in prices, 
is a major factor. A bag of cement which cost 86 kobo in 1968 rose to 7.5 Naira 
by 1978, 25 by 1982 and by 1988 it had risen to 73 Naira and in 1992 cost over 
100 Naira Other materials also rose in prices at the same rate or even higher. 
Consequently, the cost of building rose accordingly. It is important to note that 
rises in income in this period were almost negligible compared to the cost of 
housing. For instance a low income earner who was paid 125 Naira in the civil 
service in 1974 was only earning 250 Naira a decade later (100% rise only). 
When this is compared to the 600% rise in cost of building over the same period, 
the extent of the gap becomes very clear. Onibokun reported that during the 
decade between 1975 and 1985, rents increased by almost 200 per cent in most 
areas of the country. This means that the poor can neither afford to build nor 
rent a decent house. 
13 
1.2.3 Nigerian government responses to housing problems 
The Nigerian Government's earlier response to housing problems involved two 
main strategies. First was the Clearance of slums and substandard houses and 
the second, the provision of subsidised new houses to government employees. 
The magnitude of the response varied according to the particular period over the 
last three decades. This is because the country has had several government 
changes since independence, and each government had different commitments 
and hence different levels of investment in housing. 
In the most recent government document on housing, the National Housing 
Policy (1991), past government responses are classified under the following 
periods: the Colonial period, being the pre-independence (pre- 1960); the two 
post independence decades i.e. 1960 to 1979; the second civilian Administration 
between 1979 and 1983; the present military era from 1984 to date. 
i) The colonial period ( Before 1960) 
During this period, the colonial government's activities in housing were limited 
to providing staff quarters for colonial masters and specialised indigenous 
workers like police and railway staff (National Housing Policy 1991: 2). These 
were only provided in large cities like lbadan, Lagos, Kano, Enugu and 
PortHarcourt (Fadahunsi 1980: 112). 
In addition to this, various other programmes of land clearance and reclamation 
were undertaken in Apapa, Yaba and Otto Awa, some of which land was to be 
used for more housing development. In 1955 when the country was only five 
years away from attainment of independence, the central Lagos clearance and 
resettlement schemes were initiated to prepare the town for the big event 
(Fadahunsi 1980 : 114). Hence the temporary resettlement housing units in 
Surulere were built and remained permanent to date. It is important to note that 
only a few of those displaced by the clearance schemes were · rehoused, the 
majority moved to other locations and created new slums (Fadahunsi 1990). 
Also there were various moves towards facilitating the housing finance. In 1956, 
the Nigerian Building Society was established to make housing loans available 
to prospective builders. In 1959, housing corporations were established in the 
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different regions of the country, charged with the responsibility for high class 
residential schemes. Also state housing corporations were established by the 
regional governments following the creation of states. The state housing 
corporations were responsible for the nuclei of modem housing estates in all 
parts of Nigeria (National Housing Policy 1991). Some examples of these 
include the Northern Nigerian Housing Corporation estates in Kaduna and Zaria. 
ii) The post independence period (1960- 1979) 
The period after independence saw the introduction of the five yearly National 
Development Plans. Housing development had however suffered almost total 
neglect in the first two development plans (National Housing Policy 1991). 
Housing did not have any place or separate budget, and was merely mentioned 
under the Town and Country Planning section. The rapid urbanisation process 
during this period, coupled with the aftermath of the civil war ( 1957) has further 
led to the deterioration of housing condition in the major cities of Nigeria. In 
response, the Federal Government initiated the first National Housing 
programme in 1972 and proposed to build 59,000 housing units; 15,000 in the 
Lagos and 4,000 in each of the other states (NHP 1991). To this effect, the 
Federal Housing Authority was created in 1973 to co-ordinate the programme. 
In the third National Development Plan (1975-1980), government commitment 
to housing increased. For the first time, it came to accept housing as part of its 
social responsibilities towards all Nigerians (NHP 1991: 3). 
The following table reveals the overall budget for housing and planning during 
the plan periods of 1970-1974 and 1975-1980. 
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Tablel.1 Nigerian Government Planned Expenditure on Housing and 
Planning 
Development Amount in the Amount allocated to % of budget allocated 
Plan Period development plan housing & planning to housing & planning 
(Naira) 
1970-1974 3 billion 0.038 billion 1.26 
1975-1980 43 billion 1.5 billion 3.49 
Source: Adapted from Housing In Nigeria edited by Onibokun P.(1985) 
During the plan period of 1975-80, the Nigerian Government's financial strength 
increased with the increase in oil revenue, hence a further 2.6 billion Naira was 
earmarked for a gigantic nation-wide housing programme. This was to provide 
200,000 housing units 50,000 in Lagos and 8,000 in each of the remaining states. 
Also in 1975, a Federal Ministry of Housing, was created and charged with the 
responsibilities of initiating and co-ordinating housing policies and related 
matters. 
In 1976, the former Nigerian Building Society was converted to the Federal 
Mortgage Bank with an initial capital of 20 million Naira, later expanded to 150 
million in 1979 (NHP 1991 ). In addition to these moves from the federal 
Government, the various state governments were also involved in provision of 
housing (Awotona 1990). Again Lagos state was reported to have made the 
greatest efforts in this regard. In most of the northern states, the popular state 
low-cost houses are a living example of the states' efforts. 
In 1979, the military government handed over responsibility to a civilian 
Administration. 
iii) The second civilian administration (1979-1983). 
The civilian administration gave a higher priority to provision of housing which 
was one of their campaign slogans. By now housing was totally detached from 
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planning and had a budget of its own. In 1980, another nation-wide housing 
programme was embarked upon, but this time targeted directly at the low and 
medium income earners. It is important to note that for the first time, the low 
income group were being put first in the National Housing Programme. A total 
of 40,000 housing units were to be built annually, 2,000 in each state including 
the federal Capital Territory. Eighty percent (80%) of the units were to be one 
bedroom units intended for the low income group earning not more than 5,000 
N aira ($7,500 at the 1980 exchange rate) per annum and the remaining 20% 
two bedroom units for a middle income group earning not more than 8,000 Naira 
($12,000) per annum. A second phase of this scheme was also initiated to 
provide an additional 20,000 two bedroom units for the low income group. To 
this effect, the Civilian administration voted about 1.9 billion Naira ($2.9 
billion) for housing in the fourth National Development Plan for 1980-1985, out 
of which six hundred million would be used for implementation of the low-
income housing scheme. The rest of the budget was to be used to provide staff 
housing loans for the high income group and the implementation of the Sites 
and Services low income housing projects in collaboration with the World Bank. 
This civilian administration did not live long enough to witness the final 
outcome of their scheme as the military took over by a coup d' etat in 1984. 
iv) The military period (1984 to present date) 
This period, for most observers, was the era of the decline and final collapse of 
mass housing in Nigeria. The first military administration (1983-1985) 
encouraged the continuation of mass housing but at the state level with less 
involvement of the central government. However, on ousting the former regime 
in 1985, the present military administration put a total stop to what remained of 
the mass housing efforts in the country. The Housing Minister was reported to 
have said that, "the military administration could no longer afford the luxury of 
providing housing for Nigerians under the present economic crises" 
(Ogunshakin and Olayiwola 1992: 46). 
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He added that the major focus of their administration would therefore shift from 
provision to assisting the hard-working Nigerians to provide their own housing 
by facilitating the major housing inputs of land, finance and building materials. 
1.2.4 Why the earlier responses failed in Nigeria 
The above review has made it clear that particularly in the decade between 1975 
and 1985, the government of Nigeria had shown a tremendous commitment to 
housing and housing related matters. This commitment has been vindicated by 
the various housing programmes proposed and implemented with large amounts 
of finance expended. ( e.g. 1.9 billion Naira between 1980 and 1985). There is 
no doubt these efforts have achieved much towards alleviating housing problems 
in Nigeria. However, there still remains a major concern among housing experts 
as to the effectiveness of these efforts. Awotona (1990), for instance, is of the 
opinion that the low income housing problems are still largely unsolved. 
Evaluations of these efforts by many Nigerian housing experts (Onibokun 
1985,1990, Fadahunsi 1985, Agbola 1990 Awotona 1984,1987, 1990) have 
revealed that they were inadequate, and the strategy adopted was very ineffective 
in solving the housing problems. Furthermore, the low income group still 
remains largely uncatered for (Onibokun 1988). The failure of the strategies has 
been attributed to a number of factors some of which include the following: 
i) Improper planning of Housing Programmes 
Often housing programmes are not planned on the basis of estimates of 
shortfalls, therefore targets often fall far short of the needs of the population. 
Ozo (1990: 41), for instance, reported that while it was estimated that during the 
plan period 1980-1985, Nigeria needed to produce 8-10 housing units per 1000 
to meet the demand, the actual figure was 2-3 units. 
This is partly because public housing projects include heavy subsidies which 
make it impossible financially for them to provide a substantial number of 
houses and achieve a wider coverage. Ultimately, it is the low income who do 
not get housed and the project end up subsidising for people who could afford 
the full cost. 
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Furthennore, even the targets announced are hardly achieved. For instance, the 
civilian administration's massive low income housing programme already 
discussed, achieved only 20% of its target, and less than 50% of this actually 
went to the intended group. These failures were attributed to factors which 
include, budget cuts by the government, corruption and mismanagement of the 
funds. Though large sums of money are announced in the budget allocated to 
housing, often only a small proportion is released. For instance out of the 3.6 
million Naira budgeted for housing development in 1971n2, only half of it (1.8 
million Naira) was actually spent (Awotona 1990 :18). Similarly in the following 
year only 2.2 out of 4.2 million Naira budgeted was spent. This coupled with 
delayed implementation leading to rises in prices of building materials, made it 
impossible for the stated targets to be achieved. Also, the award of contracts, 
particularly during the civilian regimes was heavily politicised. Contracts are 
awarded based on party loyalty rather than merit. Many of the contractors were 
more interested in maximising their profits and paid less attention to the standard 
of their work. They put up substandard units with weaker and cheaper 
foundations, some of which started collapsing before they were occupied. The 
roofs got blown off and walls cracked beyond habitability. 
ii) The affordability problems. 
The low income groups often can not afford the cost of building officially 
accepted standards of housing units. The cost of land, labour, building materials 
and infrastructure have soared and are beyond the majority of the low incomed. 
The Government low-cost housing schemes have been found not to be 
affordable by the low income (Onibokun 1985, Awotona 1990), for instance the 
Western Nigerian Housing Corporation provided only houses affordable to the 
middle and high income groups (Onibokun 1985). Similarly the states so called 
low-cost houses also turned out to be too costly for the low -incomed It is 
important to note that the housing affordability problems is not only limited to 
the low income but also the middle and high income. The majority of the middle 
income group can not afford the cost of providing for themselves at the market 
19 
price, which is why the end up invading the low cost houses meant for the low-
income. 
iii) Application of a universal solution 
This solution was the adoption of a single strategy, and even the same prototype 
housing, for the whole country irrespective of the varied cultural and climate 
variations. The core housing strategy adopted by the Shagari government during 
the second republic was implemented nation-wide with a single prototype 
design, i.e. one bedroom units for the poor and three for the middle incomed. 
This was one of the major causes of the failure of these schemes. They were 
totally rejected in some parts of the country. In Sokoto states for instance more 
than 2,000 finished one bedroom units were not taken up by the low incomed 
(Popoola 1985). As a result, the units were allocated to middle and high incomed 
individuals who could expand the single bedroomed units into two and three 
bedroomed before moving in. The low income do that have the wherewithal to 
undertake this expansion even though most of them do need the extra rooms. 
Their family sizes and general life styles do not fit in with the imposed western 
style single bedroom units, for instance most of these are used to living in 
compound type houses with walling and courtyard spaces which are used for 
various purposes including sleeping, cooking and washing up. This contrasts 
very much with the design of the single unit where everything is put together in 
form of a box and people are shoved into it to live day and night. 
This reveals the project's Architects' and Planners' narrow conception of 
housing need. Housing provision should not only cater for peoples' physical 
dwelling needs but also look at how these dwellings meet their psychological 
and cultural requirements. 
iv) Lack of co-ordination between the State and Federal government 
programmes 
This lack of - co-ordination was particularly bad during the civilian 
administration, for instance, when the State Government failed to convince the 
Federal Government to allow them to implement the large housing programme 
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announced in 1980, they embarked on their own separate programmes, voting 
money and targeting the same group as the federal programme. This duplication 
of efforts shown by Onibokun ( 1990) satisfied nobody's interest, except the 
party loyalist, who were awarded the contracts to execute the programmes. 
v) Remote locations of housing projects 
These schemes were located in remote areas of the city and away from the 
central business districts where many of the low incomed work. This makes it 
unattractive to them because of the cost of transportation which could be more 
than the cost of rent in town centres. Also the remote location meant that they 
had to move away from the friends and relatives in their established 
communities who were vital to their day to day lives. 
vi) Ineffective housing distribution system 
The houses allocation procedures were characterised by fraudulent and corrupt 
practices. For instance the allocation of the Shagari low-cost housing schemes 
was heavily politicised in most states. The allocation process was based on party 
loyalty, it therefore excluded the labour unions, mass organisations and local 
authorities (Ogunshakin & Olayiwole 1992: 42). It was also a common practice 
to allocate two, three or more units to individuals from the upper income group 
who then turned them into rental accommodation for the poor. They charged 
rents in the range of 100 to 300 Naira per month as opposed to the 37 to 90 
Naira amortisation paid on each unit by owner occupiers (Ogunshakin & 
Olayiwole 1992). 
The earlier strategies have not only failed to provide finished houses for the low 
income but have also failed to facilitate the availability of housing loans, and the 
accessibility of urban land to them. The Federal Mortgage Ban1c, and other 
housing corporations established to provide housing loans, failed to benefit the 
low income groups who could not satisfy their loan conditions and did not have 
sufficient collateral in the form of adequate income or assets. Also the interest on 
the loans was too high and not affordable to the low income group. 
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A survey conducted in Calabar Cross Rivers State, by R.A Olu Sule (1983) for 
instance revealed that most (57.58%) of the loan applications rejected by the 
Bank in 1982 were as a result of the beneficiaries' low income. 
This situation is the same in the rest of the country. This evidence implies that 
only the rich benefit from the loans while the poor have no access. 
The urban land is also beyond the reach of the poor. The Land Use decree of 
1978 which vested Nigerian land in the hands of the states, was supposed to 
facilitate land acquisition by all Nigerians, equal rights to land for both poor and 
rich and eliminate speculative activities and illegal land deals. This decree has 
become more of a statement of intent than a complete resolution (Sada 1984). 
The lengthy and sophisticated procedures which accompany land allocation are 
discouraging to most people, particularly the poor. More so, the land officers 
became corrupt and collaborate with middlemen to speculate in the government 
lands after taking huge bribes from them. The poor can neither afford to pay 
land officers bribes nor buy the speculated land in the market. 
1.2.5 The need for the Sites and Services Strategy. 
The above discussion has shown that earlier policy interventions have failed to 
solve the low income housing problems in Nigeria. 
Similar observations have been made in the majority of the Third World 
countries by many housing experts since the late 1960s (like Van Huyck 
1971:10; Van der Linden 1977: 294-8). They came to the conclusion that most 
attempts to either limit the rate of urbanisation, control the growth of squatter 
settlement or provide low income housing in the developing countries have 
failed, or at best touched only a fraction of the problem. 
It was believed that sites and services and upgrading will increase the access of 
the poor to government housing investment in three different ways (Rodell and 
Skinner 1983); 
( 1) the money needed by the government to provide a conventional house for 
one family could provide many serviced plots or provide services to many 
families in an old established neighbourhood , thereby benefiting many; (2) the 
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cutting of standards and costs will increase access for housing to the poor. 
Cutting standards here refers to the initial standards of the units, which could be 
improved and expanded to the general overall standards by the time the house is 
completely finished; (3) lower rates of subsidy, which would mean less 
government investment and higher cost recovery from projects. This argument is 
not generally accepted because of the inverse relationship of subsidy to 
affordability of housing projects. Very low subsidy or no subsidy on low income 
housing project may decrease the affordability for them by the low income. 
It was these arguments that convinced the government of Nigeria, like many 
other governments of the Third World countries to adopted the World Bank 
Aided Sites and Services Strategy which was directed at the low incomed group. 
The aim being to help the target group build and own houses through facilitating, 
services, land and construction loans. How far this aim has been achieved is one 
of the issues this study has addressed. The research problem, which has been 
identified as the low level of consolidation by the target beneficiaries, already 
point to the fact that not enough houses are being built in the project. Finding the 
causes of this problem is the main purpose of this study. 
1.3 Research purpose, question and hypothesis 
1.3.1 Research purpose 
Having identified the research problem as the low level of consolidation by the 
target beneficiaries of the Makama Project, the purpose of this study as stated 
above is to find the causes of this problem. 
1.3.2 Research questions 
The main question the study seeks to answer is "Why has there been a low level 
of consolidation by the target plot allottees of the World Bank assisted Makama 
Sites and Services project? " 
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1.3.3 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this study is that the low level of consolidation by the target 
beneficiaries in the Makama project is cause by the inaccurate estimates and 
false assumptions made by the planners regarding their housing affordability, 
needs and preferences. 
The main hypothesis is broken down into testable forms as follows: 
1. The cost of building a basic unit to the standard required by the project is 
significantly greater than that the target beneficiaries can pay for. 
2. The target beneficiaries preferred hired labour for building to the self-built 
method assumed by the project planners. 
3. The size of the basic unit which the target beneficiaries needed is 
significantly greater than that the project planners assumed. 
1.3.4 Objectives 
To achieve the main aim of the research which is to find the causes of the low 
level of consolidation in the Makama Sites and Services projects, the following 
specific objectives have to be pursued. 
1. To establish that the target beneficiaries could not afford the cost of building a 
basic unit with the required building materials standard and show the effect of 
this on consolidation. 
2. To establish that the use of hired labour was preferred by the target 
beneficiaries, and determine how this affects consolidation level. 
3. To establish that the target beneficiaries needed a bigger basic unit than that 
assumed by planners, and find its effect on consolidation. 
4. To establish that one of the consequences of the lack of consolidation is that 
the nonconsolidators are in a worse housing situation than the consolidators. 
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1.4 Research methodology. 
Toe Research process began with identification of the problem, which raises the 
main research question. The answers to the question in the form of hypotheses 
were then put forward and tested. The results of the test enabled the researcher to 
accept the hypothesis, and therefore confirm that the problem is caused by the 
factors tested. 
The research problem was identified from both the physical knowledge of the 
project and the existing literature on it and on similar projects (presented in 
Chapters 2 &3), including the literature on the concepts and background of the 
Sites and Services strategy in general, and World Bank projects in particular. 
The information provided a proper understanding of the research problem, its 
origin and its context. 
The hypothesis put forward and tested by the study was formulated from the 
review of literature on the concepts of consolidation, factors affecting it and the 
causes of the low level of consolidation in similar projects ( discussed in Chapter 
Four). The major source of primary data used to test the hypothesis came from a 
case study of the project. Data sources here include, field survey, project 
documents and officials. 
Different techniques were used to collect the required data to test the study 
hypothesis including: a questionnaire-based survey, observations techniques, 
photography, formal and informal interviews. 
The Survey which was carried out on a representative sample of 300 households 
was coded and analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences at the 
Cripps Computing Centre of the University of Nottingham. For descriptive 
analysis, simple frequency tables and crosstabulation procedures were 
conducted. For the statistical analysis, the main techniques used include, the 
Chi-square and chi-square based Statistics, and the t-test (comparison of group 
means). The results of the analysis were presented in form of tables, charts and 
graphs. Details of the methods and techniques used in collecting and analysing 
the data are presented in Chapter Five. 
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1.5 Organisation of the rest of the Thesis Report 
The rest of the thesis report is organised and presented in seven chapters,. 
Chapter Two is the review of the background and context of the research 
problem. This include the review of literature on the background and reasons for 
the adoption of sites and services strategy, its underlying concepts of self-help 
and aided self-help, including the self-help housing debates; and the World 
Bank's adoption of the strategy and the extent of its involvement with the 
strategy. The evaluation of World Bank assisted Sites and Services projects, 
which this study is mainly interested in, is also discussed. 
Chapter Three is the case study from which the primary information of the thesis 
was drawn. The chapter briefly discusses the background information on the 
case study which includes; the characteristics of study area, the planning and 
implementation of the project. It also discusses the preliminary findings on the 
performance of the project in terms of achieving its stated objectives, while 
outlining its' major problems. One of the main problems, the low level of 
consolidation which is the subject of this study, is highlighted here and the 
detailed survey findings on its extent also presented. 
Chapter four is a literature review on the causes of the research problem. It 
investigates from the literature, the existing explanation for the low level of 
consolidation in the Sites and Services Projects. The chapter starts by discussing 
the concepts and definitions of consolidation in Sites and Services projects and 
the factors affecting it. The information in this chapter was used to formulate the 
hypotheses for the study. 
Chapter Five discusses the methods of data collection and the analytic 
techniques used to test the hypotheses. 
Chapter Six presents the general findings on the socio-economic and housing 
characteristics of the surveyed sample. 
Chapter seven presents the results of the specific hypothesis tests. 
Chapter Eight is on the summary of findings, discussions and conclusions. 
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1.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The research problem has been identified and its nature, extent, consequences 
and background have been discussed. Judging by the scale of the low income 
housing problems and the persistent failures of earlier policy responses, the need 
to evaluate and assess the performance of the new Sites and Services approach 
can not be over emphasised. 
The starting point, however was to look at what literature already exist, in this 
area of new approaches to housing and to review what the earlier evaluators 
found regarding the nature and extent, as well as causes, of problems and 
discover what gaps there are in knowledge of the subject which need to be filled. 
To this effect, the first three chapters(2, 3 & 4) present this review. The 
information in the chapters is aimed at understanding the nature and extent of 
research problem in a better perspective. It also helps to understand causes of the 
problem in similar projects. 
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Chapter 2: The Sites and Services Housing Strategy and The World 
Bank. 
2.1.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on the background and context of the Sites and Service 
Strategy and the World Bank involvement with the strategy, the understanding of which is 
necessary to put the research problem into its proper context and perspective. 
The chapter is divided into two parts, with the first part on the background of the Sites and 
Services Strategy and the second part covering the World Bank involvement with the 
strategy. 
Part one is divided into three sections. The first section covers the definition and 
background of the strategy, its aims and objectives, while the second section discusses its 
underlying concepts ,namely self-help and aided self-help housing concepts. The third 
section discusses the self-help housing debates by prominent housing experts notably, Rod 
Burgess and JFC Turner. 
Part two is also divided into three sections, with the first section on the rationale behind 
World Bank's involvement with the strategy and the aims and objectives of the Bank's 
approach. The second section covers the planning and implementation of the World Bank 
assisted projects and the third section covers a brief summary of the findings of the 
evaluation studies of the projects. 
2.1.1 The background of the Sites and Services Strategy 
2.1.1.1 The interpretation of the strategy 
The Sites and Services Strategy already defined in chapter one, involves the provision (by 
authorities/housing agents/international organisations) of lots with some level of servicing 
e.g. access roads, water, electricity and drainage - for low income urban dwellers who are 
expected to carry out the actual building of their future houses on these lots. · 
Although it is generally agreed by many housing experts and authors that the central 
concept of the Sites and Services Strategy is the provision of serviced building lots, there 
· appears to be disagreement as to what else the concept does or does not imply (Van der 
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Linden J. 1986). Hence the concept lends itself to varying interpretations. While some 
authors stress the allottees' freedom to build the lots as they wish (Saini, 1979 : 89; 
Engleman, 1979: 16; Egnell, 1978: 26), others enumerate additional items of government 
involvement, such as to the provision of access to loans (Engelman 1979), construction 
materials (Lloyd, 1979:26) and mention limitations to the allottees freedom (Lloyd 1979). 
Hence authors like Van Huyck ( 1981) and Mayo and Gross ( 1987) are of the opinion that 
Sites and Services projects should be categorised into different types describing what each 
involves. Van Huyck (1971), for instance states that four major categories can be 
identified, " ranging from plots of raw land serviced with a few shared facilities to 
individually serviced plots with partially finished houses on them." In his opinion, a wide 
variety of proposals, which provide unfinished houses, come under the umbrella of Sites 
and Services. 
However, for the purpose of this study, Sites and Services shall be defined as the projects 
in which the authorities provide essential services like water supply, electricity, roads and 
drainage, as well as community facilities like schools and health clinics, on a large area of 
land, which is divided into individual plots to be allocated to a target group of 
beneficiaries, who are given access to construction loans, and expected, through self-help 
efforts, to gradually build their houses and occupy them over a period of time. The cost is 
to be fully recovered from the beneficiaries. The materials and construction standards are 
usually specified by project planners, and plot allottees are expected to adhere to them. 
2.1.1.2 Why the Sites and Services Strategy was adopted 
Sites and Services came about as a result of the realisation that the conventional direct 
provision housing strategy has failed to reach the poorer sectors of the population in the 
majority of the developing countries. In the late 1960s, a number of prominent housing 
experts after various studies of the squatter settlements in Third World cities, came to the 
conclusion that conventional approaches to housing the poor had failed and_ that assisting 
self-help efforts was the most viable alternative. 
Turner (1966,1972), Abrams (1964, 1971), Vernez (1974) were all of the opinion that the 
replacement of the slum dwellings with conventional housing had failed to meet low 
income housing needs. Turner also stated that slum dwellings are expressions of the desire 
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and ability of the low income to solve their housing problems. He argued that if these 
efforts are harnessed to some investment by the authorities, more could be achieved 
towards solving low income housing problems in the Third ·World countries with less cost 
than is required for conventional housing. 
Rodell (1983) was of the same opinion when he stated that governments can develop two 
to five serviced plots with the resources needed to build a single house in a conventional 
housing project. Also many more poorer people will have access to housing through the 
upgrading of old settlement and lowering of standards, with the same investment needed 
to provide conventional housing. 
2.1.1.3 Aims and objectives of the Strategy 
The main aim of the Sites and Services Strategy is to increase access to good housing for 
a wider proportion of the population than has been achieved by the conventional housing 
with the same, or less, amount of government investment. 
Other aims of Sites and Services include, housing the poor (Vernez (1976:10; Dione 
1980:1; Van Huyck 1971:11; McNamara 1975:32; Muller, 1982: 90); increasing the stock 
of permanent housing while limiting public expenses (Vernez 1976: 11 Peattie 1982a 
:133). 
Swan, Wegelin and Panchee (1983) also pointed out the following as some of the 
advantages of the Sites and Services. 
-a greatly increased supply of building plots with urban infrastructure and 
services that, while economical of resources, cannot be readily supplied 
on an unorganised basis; 
-creation of efficient new townships with more efficient urban development 
patterns; 
-much better living conditions than those available in unplanned 
squatter settlements; 
-increased scope resulting from self-help construction providing 
dwellings at minimum cost while stimulating non-monetary savings and 
income; 
-significantly improved employment opportunities and training; 
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-security of tenure and a basis for development; 
-a better general environment. 
Although these aims are often stated in most sites and services projects, care must be 
taken as to the correct emphasis when interpreting them. As Van der Linden (1986) has 
stated. "When 'restoring planning control' implies- as it sometimes does - replacement of 
squatter settlements by site and services projects, the aim of alleviating 'the demand for 
low income housing' will hardly be met. Similarly, if the emphasis is on 'increasing the 
stock of permanent housing', or on 'developing a strong construction section', this can 
easily happen at the expense of 'responding to the needs of the low-income groups'." 
Having defined and stated the aims of the Sites and Services Strategy, It important at this 
point to gain an insight into the interpretation of self-help housing and aided self-help 
housing as the major ideas behind the Sites and Services strategy. 
2.1.2 Self-help housing and aided self-help housing 
2.1.2.1 Interpretation of self-help and aided self-help housing 
Traditionally, self-help housing simply means, people using their own labour to collect 
materials/building components, prepare sites and assemble component into houses (Rodell 
1983). Earlier writers on housing like Abrams and Koenigsberger have recognised and 
acknowledged the contribution of self-help housing through the history of mankind. 
Abrams (1964) pointed out that self-help housing accounted for most of the houses in the 
world today and historically. 
Rodell (1983) has pointed out that the traditional view of self-help which the earlier 
writers had talked about, tended to put more emphasis on the technical aspects of families 
using their own labour to assemble materials and make a house as the only significant 
input besides the land. 
However, Turner's extensive studies of squatter settlements in South American cities 
(particular his early study in Peru) had changed that view. His findings had led to the 
redefinition of self-help housing as comprising the following two elements: 1). the 
element of direct investment by families, either through unpaid labour or cash savings and 
2). the element of decision making by the families about the investment. 
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2.1.2.2 Contemporary versus historical interpretations of self-help housing. 
The following table (adopted from Rodell 1983), outlines the basic differences between 
the views of self-help in the 1950s and in the 1970s (i.e. before and after Turner's study). 
Before Abrams ( the 1950s) After Turner (the 1970s) 
Basic Idea Basic Ideas 
Self-help housing = unpaid family self-help = a) families deciding about 
labour investments b )investment inputs 
Examples 
shacks and shanties in 
neighbourhoods. 
Construction process 
1. squatted land 
supplied by families, either inputs 
purchased by cash savings or unpaid 
labour or both 
Examples 
squatter Covers a range from shacks and 
shanties to standard neighbourhoods. 
Construction process 
1. Various and unpredictable, and lasts 
2. scrap and waste materials from one to five, ten or even fifteen 
3. unpaid labour on weekends and at years. 
nights shacks and shanties can be a final 
4. construction starts from occupancy product or an intermediate stage within 
and ends a day to a year after this date. the process. 
The end product is constrained by The end product is constrained by 
families' incomes during one year, cost families incomes over a decade or 
of materials and illegality of tenure. more, cost materials and perceived 
security of tenure 
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Who uses self-help Who uses self-help 
Recent migrants from distressed rural Anyone can; usually families who start 
areas. with self-help are at a low to middle 
income at the time they start. 
Policy implications Policy implications 
1 The basic theory: Self -help reduces 1 The basic theory: under certain 
the construction cost of a given type conditions, self-help mcreases 
of housing. investment in housing because 
a). it adds unpaid labour to the 
resources used in housing; 
b).it adds inputs purchased by families 
to resources used in housing 
2 Conditions for success 2 Condition for success 
Self-help reduces cost under all -families have to wait for five or more 
conditions years for conventional rental or 
ownership housing; 
- families find currently available 
conventional housing do not meet their 
definition of a desirable housing 
3 Problems to overcome 3 Problems to overcome 
a) lack of land; b) lack of credit to buy a) lack of secure , good , well located 
standard materials for a complete building sites; b) building and land use 
house at the date of occupancy; c) lack regulations making a number of self-
of planning and construction skills help options illegal; c) lack of p~blic 
needed to build conventionally. services; d) lack of small construction 
loans. 
33 
4 Solutions: plan house construction 4 Solutions: plan new neighbourhoods 
to use as much unpaid labour as in which families have secure, good , 
possible, with appropriate assistance. and well located land. 
It is very clear, from the above distinction, that contemporary self-help is about both 
decision making by families regarding their investment in housing as well as the 
technological aspects of assembling building components into a house. 
Turner's ideas about the new definition of self-help housing resulted from his extensive 
studies of squatter settlements in Peru in the early 1960s. 
His observation of the struggle by the low-income group, under all conditions, to secure a 
shelter over their heads demonstrates their motivation, independence and enthusiasm in 
dealing with their housing problems. His studies have also led to his understanding of the 
relationship between peoples and their housing process, and how they build the houses to 
suit their social needs and match their economic circumstances at any given point in time. 
He therefore argues that instead of looking at these efforts as housing problems, they are 
infact a solution. He pointed out that the reason most of them are poor quality and 
standards suggest the need to address the major constraints of the groups to improve the 
standards. 
2.1.3 The Self - help Housing Debates 
The interpretation of self-help and self-help housing is a subject of debate between 
housing experts. The major debates has been between Rod Burgess and JFC Turner, and 
have been centred around the work of Turner in South American cities particularly in 
Peru. The foci of the debate, as categorised by Burgess (1978), are: (a) The conception of 
the nature of housing; (b) the relationship between the public, private and popular sectors 
in housing; ( c) the conception of the role of the state and the planning in housing policies ; 
(d) Turner's main policy recommendations (Burgess 1982). 
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2.1.3.1 Turners views 
a) The conception of the Nature of Housing 
Turner defines housing both as a process as well as a product. He argues that the most 
important thing about a house is not what it looks like, but what it does to peoples' lives. 
This means that the satisfaction from a house does not necessary relate to the standards of 
materials it is built of (Turner 1976). The value of a house must therefore be sought in it's 
relationship with its user. This means that the value varies according to how far the house 
satisfies or frustrate its occupier. 
He also argued that the market-value of housing, which is often associated with the 
standards of its material, are very distinct and give only a partial view of the true value of 
housing. 
While elaborating on the theme of what a house does to the lives of occupiers, he made a 
comparison (from his case study in Peru) between a self-built shack (which he called 
'supportive') and a modem house (which he called 'oppressive'). 
From the household's economic point of view, he argues that the supportive shack is rent 
free, which may mean that families have surplus income to save towards a permanent 
dwelling in the future. 
The household in the oppressive modem house, on the other hand, paid 55% of their 
income towards rent, and 5% towards transportation because new housing estates were 
located far from the city centre where most inhabitants worked. The 40% of their income 
remaining was scarcely enough for food, and saving for a future house was totally out of 
the question. Furthermore, the vending activities which many households undertake in 
squatter settlements to supplement their incomes, were prohibited on the new housing 
estates. 
Although the modem house offers high standards of building, it represents a serious 
imbalance between the household's income and their housing expenditure, which could 
have serious consequences on all aspects of their lives. 
b) The relationship between the public, private and popular sectors in housing 
'when dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their own contribution to 
the design, construction or management of their house, both the process and the 
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environment produced stimulate the individual and social well being. When people have 
no control over, nor responsibility for key decisions in the housing process, on the other 
hand, dwelling environments may instead become a barrier to personal fulfilment and a 
burden to the economy.'(Tumer 1976) 
While elaborating on this point, he proposed that design, construction and management of 
housing must be shared between the users (popular sector), suppliers (private sector) and 
regulators (public sector or government), appropriately to ensure greater control by the 
popular sector who are the users. 
He identified two different housing systems in operation where the degree of control by 
the three sectors varies considerably. In the first system, which _ he called 
'autonomous'(locally self-governing), the majority of decisions are made by users and a 
minority by either private sector or government, as demonstrated in the following figures. 
Plan Construct :\fanage 
• • • 
• 
•• .___......._ ____ -..J 8. Locally self-go,·eming or. 
autonomous housing ir,tems 
Regulaton or 
Public Sector 
Supplien or 
Private (commercial) 
Sector 
' I t· sen or Popular Sector 
Plan Construct ~fan.age 
-
• 
9· Centrally administered or 
heteronomous housing sy,t~ 
Fig 2.1 a&b : Patterns of decision and control in two opposite housing systems 
Source: JFC Turner (1976): Housing by people :29 
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His basic idea here is that the autonomous housing system works better, because it will 
ensure a variety of controlling systems as the system to be controlled, while quoting 
Ashby's idea of requisite variety. 
To make this point clearer, he gave the example of the British housing system in which 
the public and private sectors have greater control. He pointed out that its rigid and 
hierarchical nature alienates the poor by creating mismatches and misfits, thereby 
increasing the growing number of homeless people on the streets. He is also of the opinion 
that hierarchical systems, particularly in the developing countries, are not sustainable 
because of their increasing dependence on borrowed capital. 
He argues that "the larger the organisation, and the more central management becomes, 
the more frequent and the greater the mismatches would be between the priorities in 
peoples' housing needs and what they get."(Tumer 1976). Large central organisations 
used costly and sophisticated technologies and highly paid bureaucracies, which demand a 
high proportion of the increasingly scarce resources, he added. 
His conclusion therefore is that 'the design, construction and maintenance of adequate 
housing at prices both people and society can afford depends very much on the investment 
of resources which households themselves control.' These findings, he pointed out, have 
been found to be as relevant in both North America and Britain as they were in Peru. 
He argues that a viable housing solution should therefore be based on the principle of self-
government in housing, the use of small scale technology, and on the basis of prescriptive 
laws (Burgess 1978). 
He pointed out that the authorities should concentrate on tackling the major constraints 
facing self-help builders (already stated in the table above) which include: lack of secure 
well located land, restriction of planning and building regulations, lack of public services 
and lack of building loans. 
c&d) the role of state and planning in housing and policy recommendations 
Turner's policy recommendations have been summarised by Burgess in the following 
statements: 
1. Legislative controls limiting the concentration of resources and facilitating the supply of 
land, technology and loans to low income people. 
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2. The modifications of the existing legislation on minimum standards and building 
procedures. 
3. The introduction of legislation and planning practices that set limits rather than 
procedural lines for housing activity. 
4) The legalisation of tenure of land and dwellings illegally occupied by squatters. 
5) The clear separation of various levels of authority in housing activities and the 
restriction of central government and municipal influence to certain well defined and 
basic functions. 
6) The encouragement, if possible, of formal sector activities through proscriptive 
legislation that gives decentralised technologies and local systems of labour, finance and 
materials, greater access to resources. 
The above recommendations have been the basis of aided self-help housing, which 
stipulates the provision of some form of assistance by the authorities to the self-help 
builders to carry on building by themselves. This should be done, through: (1) planned 
new neighbourhoods in which families have secure, good well-located sites, infrastructure 
and access to technical assistance, and in which they are free to make decisions as to how 
much to invest in Sites and Services). 
2) upgrading the old neighbourhood by giving families assistance to improve individual 
dwellings, modifying the existing legislation on minimum standards and building 
procedures, and legalising dwellings illegally occupied by squatters. 
3) restricting the role of governments to that of securing land and developing 
infrastructure. 
This view of the solution of low income housing problems has generally been seen by the 
proponents of self-help as an economically viable, socially and politically effective 
method of solving the low income housing problems in developing countries. 
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2.1.3.2 Burgess's view 
a) Interpretation of Housing 
Burgess has voiced an alternative opinion to the generally accepted Turner school of 
thought. He has questioned Turner's understanding of the basic concepts of self-help and 
his ideological view which has led to the solutions he proposed, while offering an 
alternative interpretation of the concepts. 
In his article 'Self-help housing advocacy: a curious form of Radicalism, a critique of 
J.F.C. Turner'( published in Ward 1982), he made his alternative view of self-help clear, 
while criticising Turner's view. 
He argues that in defining the concepts of housing Turner tends to confuse the utility (use-
value) and exchange value (market-value) of a house, when he refers to the self-help 
house as having use-value and not exchange value. He added that the tendency to equate 
the use value of a house with total utility and identify market-value as a ratio of exchange 
is contrary to the classical economic concepts of need which is identified with the concept 
of demand, through such notions as 'revealed preferences.' 
Burgess also thinks that Turner's interpretation of self-help concepts does not allow (a) 
the transformation of the self-help house into commodity form by the producer himself; 
(b) the fact that one man's use value can be another man's exchange value; (c) that a self-
help house can be a very different commodity to the various interest groups operating in 
the broader urban market. 
He also argues that the production of a self-help house must be understood in the context 
of the process of commodity formation under the conditions of capitalism operating in 
most societies today. 
He argues that a self-help house, even when produced and used by the producer must be 
seen as a potential commodity which can have an exchange value when the 9wner decides 
to put it in the market. He pointed out that the distinction therefore should not be between 
use value and market-value, but rather between a potential commodity (a self-help house 
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produced primarily for consumption by its owner) and a real commodity produced by 
agents primarily for exchange in the market. 
Furthermore, he argues that it is senseless to think of a self-help house as a use value when 
it's constituent elements have already been given value. For instance, he pointed out that 
the production of a self-help house consumes products ( cement, timber roofing materials, 
iron parts, electrical equipment's) which are commercially supplied and have market 
value; also the construction of a house involves the use of a labour component, either paid 
or paid, which has a market value. 
b) Relationship between the public, private and popular sectors in house 
production. 
The three areas Burgess focused his criticism on are: Turner's principle of self-
government and control by the people; the use of small scale technology and managerial 
tools in house production; and the idea of proscriptive planning legislation rather than 
prescriptive planning laws. 
He pointed out that Turner's view of a housing economy as dependent on the level of 
heterogeneity in its production, has lead him to analyse the cost of production of a 
autonomous house as being low, while that of a heterogeneous house as being high, 
because of the differences in the structural and organisational features of the systems of 
construction. 
He referred to where Turner suggested that a squatter, with a suitable building plot and 
secure tenure, can build a house at under half the cost of a government agency house. He 
pointed out that the cost savings by the builder is not simply because of the absence of a 
technocratic system, or the legal housing laws, or methods of building operations, but due 
to the fact that "he is operating in a different sphere of circulation of capital - that covered 
the petty commodity production of housing." He therefore does not escape capitalism, but 
is another part of it. 
. He argues that both systems are operating within capitalism and the relationship between 
them is that while "the hierarchical system is merely an expression of the formal process 
40 
of valorisation of the capital involved, the autonomous system on the other hand is the 
form that the petty commodity process of valorisation assumes". 
He stresses that the fact that Turner locates the origin of housing problems in the 
operation of hierarchical and bureaucratic system rather than in the operation of a specific 
mode of production, demonstrates his lack of understanding of the commodity processes 
and historical or social concepts of use values. Turner's knowledge, he added, is limited 
to the level of the object of housing. Turners view, he stated, "set a moral crusade against 
all social and economic systems organised on the basis of hetronomy," while undermining 
the existence of the contemporary ideological differences and political struggles over these 
differences. He argues that the whole debate about self-help housing and institutional 
housing policies is a debate carried out within the parameters of a bourgeois ideology. In 
his opinion, the differences between self-help and institutional housing are that of form 
rather than substance because as long as the capitalist mode of production continues, the 
commodity status of both will remain. 
c&d) The role of state and planning in housing and policy recommendations 
On Turner's recommendations, he argues that Turner's inability to understand and see the 
real economic aspect of the self-help housing in the capitalist mode of production has 
blinded him from the realities that are vital in understanding housing commodities. His 
policy recommendations, even if functional, were only to be short term. 
Burgess understood Turner's policy recommendations as an attempt to stimulate and 
expand petty commodity housing, because industrial housing had failed to satisfy the 
needs of progressively larger sectors of the society. 
He argues that Turner is totally in favour of petty bourgeois interest and "his alternative 
housing is that of rearranging rather than replacing the existing capitalist social relations." 
This he pointed out is made clear from Turners constant reference to pet~ entrepreneurs 
and the desirability of, and necessity for, differentiation within the barrios. 
He argues that Turners policies could not be implemented on the scale, and in the 
manner, which he considers to be critical to their success. If they ever are, he added, it 
41 
would result in drastic and dangerous consequences for the low-income group in the 
following ways: 
1). If government-guaranteed access to housing resources was achieved by the low-income 
it would present a massive diversion of investment away from middle class consumption. 
This would not only stand in direct opposition to the growth strategies in the Third World 
countries, but also polarise the existing class alliance necessary for a modernisation 
'programme.' He argues that the access to resources is more of an economic and political 
problem rather than a technical one. 
2). There would be a catastrophic effect on the prices of basic building materials (e.g. 
cement, sand, gravel, glass, iron roofing materials etc.), which would also extend to 
recycled materials and accord them a new exchange value. He concludes that "access to 
resources is not guaranteed by legislation alone." 
3). The intervention of the state to purchase large pieces of land would also have a 
dramatic effect on their value, thereby increasing the housing cost to those groups who 
would have avoided them. His conclusion is therefore , "the problem of legality is 
fundamentally the issue of market valuation of land." 
4). There would be a heavy burden on the provision of infrastructure resulting from the 
high rate of construction. 
5). The multiplier effects of self-help are particularly limited because of its utilisation of 
unpaid labour. He argues that housing policies can not be presented in isolation from 
general development strategy. 
6). Even if the policies make any significant impact on housing deficits, they may just 
lead to an increased rural-urban migration that would soon neutralise their impact. He 
pointed out that the housing problem is as much a rural as an urban problem and both are 
functions of the operation of the dominant capitalist mode of production. 
He concludes by suggesting that Turner's self-help housing policies are no more than an 
ideological bluff which have very limited application in the real world. For the poor to be 
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told to be more self-reliant when they are already doing everything, may appear, as rather 
a curious form of radicalism. 
Therefore Burgess's basic point is that it is government responsibility to provide for the 
poor, which was made clear in his following statements. 
( 1 ). The goal of socialist government policies should be to generalise the industrialisation 
of production of basic goods and services including housing, so that basic needs can be 
satisfied with a minimum of human labour and without exploitation; and (2) that housing 
which is a consumer good, must be supplied to acceptable standards by the authorities as a 
right and (3) that as a product, housing is a dependent variable of the political and 
economic system and any problems in the supply of housing must be dealt with through 
the political and social structures. 
Another prominent critic of Turners worth mentioning, is Harn Harms. Harms share a 
similar ideological view of the self-help housing with Rod Burgess. In addition to sharing 
most of the arguments put forward by Burgess, he also point out that self-help housing has 
been promoted and defended, historically by various fractions, particularly conservatives 
as a response to the conditions of economic crises. In article 'Historically perspective on 
the practice and purpose of self-help', he was able to trace the historical periods of 
economic crises and relate them to the self-help movements occurring then. 
2.1.3.3 Turner's reply to Burgess's criticism 
In response to the above criticism, Turner regarded the majority of the arguments as a 
demonstration of the critics' misunderstanding of the important issues he addressed in 
self-help housing. While Turner did not attempt to counter all the arguments, in reply to 
them he tried to make clear what he called the 'real issues', which he felt constituted the 
major areas where he was misunderstood. This discussion was presented in both his 
articles: 'The term of reference' (1978) and 'Issues in self-help and self-managed housing 
(1982). 
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On the question of value of a house, he felt that Burgess misinterpreted the issue of what a 
house does versus what it is', to mean use-value versus market-value. He pointed out that 
what the term implies is that value lies in the relationship between subjects and objects 
alone, and not a question of use-value versus market-value as Burgess assumed. He 
emphasised that he has not in any of his writings implied that the market value of self-help 
should be excluded as his critics have assumed. The issue he pointed out is a question of 
balance between the use-value and market-values, rather than a choice between the two. 
"The issue of value is a question of the means as well as the end of what is needed and 
what is done", while the issue of economy is that of usefulness versus productivity. 
When he talked about housing economy, in reference to small scale organisations and 
local production, by the users, he was referring to the evidence in both agriculture and 
housing, which showed that these basic necessities are more efficiently produced by large 
numbers of small organisations than by small numbers of large organisations. He added 
that capital intensive industries, which require large organisations, are suited for those 
productions which are not effectively produced by small local organisation e.g. ship 
production or communication satellites. 
He also pointed out that the Schumacher's 'intermediate technology' and 'small is 
beautiful' ideas, on which his small localised housing production is based, were not meant 
to replace high industrial technology as Burgess and other critics understood it. It should 
be understood as the identification of the existence of a wide range of different level of 
technology available as a means of achieving various ends. This range varies from 
traditional technology requiring very little hand tools, through to an intermediate level 
and on to highly sophisticated capital intensive industries requiring sophisticated 
machinery. Each is applied to achieving a particular end, and if misapplied becomes 
counter-productive. This was the point Turner has argued when he stated that the 
misapplication of centralised modes and capital intensive means of product~on in housing 
or other local activities waste resources and reduces the supply of goods and services. 
He also made it clear that his basic point on dweller control is about decision making, as 
repeatedly mentioned in all his writings (Turner 1966, 1976, 1977) and not only about the 
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use of free labour, as many of his critics tend to think. He also stresses that his decision 
making does not always refer to an individual household activity, but rather emphasis was 
put on the personal, local or social. 
Turner stresses that while he respects the logic behind Burgess's position when he argued 
that housing as a commodity should be centrally supplied with the use of minimum labour 
and without exploitation, he pointed out that he could not accept it because of the 
following beliefs (a) that personal fulfilment depends on participation in the production of 
necessities; (b) that centrally administered systems do not only exclude people from the 
process of production but also lead to excessive demands on scarce resources; (c) that only 
self-governing people working locally are capable of using the plentiful, renewable and 
pollution free resources properly. In his later article 'future directions in housing policies' 
(1986) he reiterated his ideas of balance of control in housing production by identifying 
local, intermediate and central as the three levels of authority in operation in housing 
production. Demonstrated in figures below. 
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Local authorities, an example of which is a squatter settlement where all decisions are 
made locally and unilaterally by the people, while the central authority is where all 
decisions are taken centrally and projects administered from the top. Authorities are totally 
concentrated on the hands of the organisations. Intermediate organisations on the other 
hand are a middle ground where local housing actions are supported by authorities 
guaranteeing access to basic resources and a freedom to use them. Authority over 
infrastructures and local services are mainly in the hands of local authorities and local 
industries with some contribution from the central authorities and the local community. 
Design, planning and implementation is entirely in the hands of local people with some 
contribution from the local authorities and industries. 
The intermediate organisations where power for local actions are entrusted on local people 
via decentralised local organisation with support from central authorities has been 
advocated as the appropriate organisation for housing production 
This idea is what has come to be known as the principles of devolution, decentralisation, 
support and empowerment in housing. Turner has always referred to these principles in 
various of his writings. He strongly belief that only by empowering, and supporting people 
to decide and act on their housing investment can an economically viable, socially 
acceptable and user friendly houses be achieved. He is of the opinion that higher 
authorities and big local organisation should not carry housing actions at all. Those 
organisations should play a supportive role by providing access to basic services, building 
materials and elements as well as loans for building. This advocates that the whole 
business of design, construction and management of low income houses should be 
undertaken by the people who need them rather than the authorities. This idea was also 
made clear in Turners article 'From central provision to local enablement (1983:207-209), 
where he pointed out that the new policy approach should be based on locally determined, 
self-organised and self managed programmes by the people who need th~m. Similarly, 
Wegelin et al (1983), while supporting the idea of people enpowerment and support in 
housing as a viable option, pointed out that their study of the Asian experience with the 
sites and services approach has shown that functional housing, appropriate to peoples 
needs will be arranged by themselves while the government plays a supportive role. 
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Turner( 1986) also pointed out that the transfer of responsibilities and authority over 
decisions that are difficult for central agencies to administer but relatively easier for local 
people in their own communities would have certain advantages which include bringing 
the local people and professionals to work together with a mutual respect and 
understanding. It can give the local people the power to negotiate with governments, local 
agencies as well as international agencies. This is already happening in some of the World 
Bank assisted projects. 
The idea of giving people power to build their houses has either deliberately or otherwise 
been misinterpreted in the planning and implementation of the majority of the aided self-
help projects. It is often interpreted as a limited participation of the low income at the level 
of construction of their individual houses, while decisions about planning, design and 
management remains in the hands of the authorities. This misunderstanding, as wegelin et 
al (1983) has pointed out has stemmed from the attitudes and perception of the roles of 
authorities, government bureaucrats and housing professional. They are accustomed to 
the idea that the provision of low income housing is their responsibility and the poor look 
up to them to handout houses. It is difficult therefore to come to terms with the fact that 
the poor should be given the power and support to do it themselves. They see it as loosing 
power, control and being made redundant. 
2.3.4 Evaluation of the debate 
In effect Turner's critics adopting the Marxist view point, are saying that the use of self-
help housing, allows the labour of the poor to be exploited twice, both at work and in 
home building; it also helps to maintain the status quo and discourages the necessary 
social change; increases the access of poor to low-cost housing, reduces the subsistence 
level and thereby reducing pressure for wage rises; rationalises poverty and provides only 
a stop gap and not long term solution. 
Turner and his supporters with a more liberal view point, on the other h~d are saying 
that, under the economic situation of scarce resources and competing demand, it is 
obvious that the authorities can not provide adequately for everyone, which has already 
been demonstrated by his various studies in especially the Third World countries. 
Therefore, it left with two options; one is to do nothing and let the poor continue to suffer 
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as they have been doing and, two is to put in what they can afford and harness the 
resources and efforts of the poor demonstrated in their self-help activities to achieve a 
better solution. He has recommended option two. 
It is clear, from the above discussion, that both Turner's and Burgess's views and 
arguments on the interpretation of self-help concepts have their merits in the areas which 
they cover. Both views have had support from other prominent housing experts. Payne 
(1976, 1982.), Abrams (1966,1972), Vernez (1976), Wegelin (1983), Dione 1980, 
Peattie (1982) all have similar views on self-help to those of Turner, as demonstrated in 
their various writings. For instance, Payne's book 'Low income housing in the developing 
World: the role of sites and services and settlement upgrading', was based on the original 
ideas of Turner. 
Other people with the same view as Burgess include; Deniz Kandiyoti and Harms (1976). 
It is very important to note that firstly, though the critics of Turner's ideas are logically 
consistent and sound in their arguements, they appear to have little or no detailed data to 
substantiate them. 
Turner's arguments on the other hand are not only logically consistent but also based on 
his real life experience in the countries he had studied. 
Secondly, although Turner's critics have raised very important points in the debates on 
this area of housing, many of them, as Turner pointed out in his response, appear to 
misunderstand the major issues which he had addressed in the first place. 
Thirdly the whole debate could also be a case of different ways of interpreting the same 
concepts, which may have been influenced by the writers' backgrounds, exposure to 
similar situations and experience in this particular area. Rod Burgess, for instance, though 
has a doctorate degree in self-help housing, is primarily a geographer and lecturers 
geography. Turner on the other hand is an architect who has lived and worked in different 
parts of the World, held an appointment in Department of planning and has written much 
about his studies of squatter settlements especially in South American cities. 
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By and large, there is no doubt that all participants in the debate have their valid and 
respectable points and experiences in this area of housing. However, it could be argued 
that the work, experience and exposure of Turner's critics in especially the Third world 
housing problems, is hardly comparable to that of Turner. Also the fact that his concepts 
have been found to be relevant not only in the Third World countries, but also in the 
United States and Britain shows his ideas have a universal application. Furthermore, the 
fact that his interpretation has been applied (particularly in the Third World countries) for 
over 30 years shows that it can also stand the test of time. 
However the debate is still valid insofar as it opens up other avenues of looking at self-
help housing, especially in relation the specific mode of production, as Rod Burgess has 
pointed out and the influences of both political and social interests groups in it. Therefore 
self-help is still open to debate and need more research to be done to help clarify the issues 
raised. In recent years, however, the debates have been extended to the main applications 
of the concepts i.e. Sites and Services and Settlement Upgrading Strategy. A number of 
housing experts (e.g. Peattie 1973, Laquian 1982, 1984,1986 etc.) have voiced opinion 
and expressed their doubts about the effectiveness of sites and services in solving low-
income problems in the Third World, especially following the large scale involvement of 
the World Bank with the strategy. This has lead to a growing volume of literature on the 
evaluation of this strategy, the review of which is covered in the next part of the chapter. 
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2.2.0 The World Bank's adoption of the Sites and Services Strategy 
Having been convinced by its own studies and through the influence of earlier studies 
and writings of housing experts like Turner, Abrams, and Mangin, already mentioned 
above, that the earlier policy interventions have failed, the World Bank came to the 
conclusion that the problem is a lack of understanding of the problems on the part of 
policy makers as well as housing agents. Looking at the situation in economic terms the 
Bank concluded that all existing evidence shows, " there is a sufficient demand for 
housing, but numerous constraints make for the weaknesses on the supply side. As long as 
the supply side keeps providing conventional permanent housing only, it is not properly 
geared towards the enormous existing demand. The only viable method to correct this 
imperfection is to bring the supply cost down, so that housing and services become 
accessible to the large portion of the population presently excluded in the housing Market" 
(Van der Linden 1986). 
The Bank also pointed out that corrections must be made to the three major components 
of the supply which are; land, services and finance. Regarding land, the Bank pointed out 
that the institutional constraints inherent in the supply of land must be eliminated. 
Regarding services, the World Bank argued that the standards are too high and that costs 
can be brought down by lowering these standards. As for finance, the financial institutions 
must be developed and sound pricing policies be implemented geared towards major cost 
implied reduction. In addition to cost reductions, public expenditure must be minimised, 
as in the following statement of the Bank, and quoted by Van der Linden ( 1986): 
"In view of the scarce public resources and the enormous demand, reliance on subsidies 
will not only be uneconomic it will also be sure to strain the replaceability of any such 
undertaking (World Bank 1972: 65; 1974: 3; 1975: 18; 1980a: 11-12)." 
One way of reducing public expenditure the Bank pointed out was to shift the financial 
burden from the Government to the private sector and the urban population itself through 
an active mobilisation of their energies and resources. Such resources can be trapped by 
letting them build their houses by themselves, the same principles of self-help which 
earlier writers of the Turner school of thought had put forward. Based on this basic 
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principle, the authorities are only expected to facilitate the major inputs of housing which 
are; land , services and access to finance, while the households undertake the actual 
building process by themselves. The recognition of the negative effects of eradicating 
squatter settlements, had made the Bank expand the scope of their adopted strategy to 
include the squatter upgrading aspects in addition to the servicing of freshly acquired land. 
2.2.1 Goals of World Bank's Sites and Services Strategy 
In adopting the strategy, the Bank also hoped to achieve the following goals: 
i).The eradication of poverty which the Bank argues is a common cause of civil upheavals 
and violence. McNamara, the then Governor of the Bank, was reported to have said "if 
cities do not deal with poverty, poverty will begin to deal with cities" (McNamara, 1975: 
20). 
ii). The Bank pointed out that "housing is used as a tool for macroeconomics 
development", which leads to higher national productivity and a greater flow of income by 
using the under-utilised materials, labour and financial resources (World Bank, 1972: 
3,17). 
iii).The third goal is in the wider context of a more rational pattern of urban growth 
where Sites and Services plays a part of providing' orderly, more efficient alternatives to 
squatter invasions (World Bank 1972: 4). 
However it is interesting to note that the Bank made no pretension to trying to solve 
housing problems in the developing countries. It is clear by its approach that the problems 
should be self solving. Its role was only going to be catalytic in nature (McNamara, 1975: 
35), and based on three main principles. One, is the principle of affordability which will 
demonstrate that there are low-cost, affordable and user acceptable solutions to housing 
problems. The second principle is cost recovery, which implies that the cost of housing 
should be recovered from the beneficiaries. Having recovered the cost, the projects 
should therefore be capable of replicating themselves; this is the third principle. Also the 
Bank was to play a role in housing institution reformation and building, having discovered 
that this is a major bottleneck in the supply of housing (World Bank 1972: 7). With these 
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set goals and clearly defined principles, the Bank set out to persuade the majority of 
Developing Countries to adopt the strategy, with its financial assistance. 
2.2.1.1 The World Bank assisted projects 
When the World Bank decided to intervene and help developing countries in providing 
low income housing, many sceptics doubted how the Bank could serve the interest of the 
poor, given its tough economic reputation (Laquian.1983: 221). 
Between 1972 and 1981, the Bank was reported to have partially financed 36 urban shelter 
projects, most of which are either Sites and Services or upgrading with a commitment of 
about $53.2 million in the different regions of the developing world (Swan 1983). This 
figures have increased drastically in the last few years. Onibok.un (1989), for instance, 
reported that by 1988 the Bank's financial commitments to shelter assistance in 
developing countries was $2 billion dollars on 62 different projects. 
While the earlier projects in Botswana, El Salvador, Jamaica, Kenya, Peru, Senegal and 
Tanzania focused on sites and services mainly, the later ones in Columbia, Indonesia, and 
Zambia emphasised upgrading (World Bank 1983 : 16). The Nigerian projects (in Bauchi 
and Owerri) have more emphasis on the sites and services, but also have the component 
of upgrading. 
2.2.1.2 Objectives of the Bank projects 
The following are the major objectives of the projects as stated in the Bank's document 
(World Bank 1974). 
-to increase the supply of building plots with urban infrastructure and 
services which are economical and affordable. 
-to create environments with better physical living conditions than that found 
in squatter settlements. 
-to restrain the growth of unplanned settlement. 
-to provide affordable dwellings through self-help construction. 
-to give security of tenure and a basis for economic development 
-to significantly increase training and employment opportunity 
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-to provide more adequate social services and a generally better housing 
environment. 
To pursue these objectives, the Bank outlined some guidelines concerning the design, 
financing and organisational aspects of projects which were thought to be very crucial to 
their success. 
2.2.2 Bank's projects planning and implementation: guidelines 
i) Projects design 
The issues dealt with under project design included, target income groups, scope of 
projects, standards, employment and self-help. 
a) Target group 
In all the Bank's projects, a 'target group' was identified for whom the project's benefits 
are intended. The choice of this group was the first issue in the design of the projects. The 
projects by definition were meant for the poor. However, the Bank (1974) pointed out 
that if the cost of projects were to be recovered from the beneficiaries, the poorest stratum 
of the population can not be included in the target group. It is believed that for the poorest 
group, day to day survival is the primary concern. Investment in housing to either build 
new units or improve old ones, is much less important (Swan 1983 :19). The Bank 
argued that the poorest group were to benefit through the so-called 'trickle down effect' 
where, if the targeted low income group were allocated plots on the new site, they would 
move out of the squatter settlements reducing the overcrowding for the poorest group who 
would remain there. It was also suggested that rental rooms for the poorest group could be 
allowed in the new project. Furthermore, the complimentary squatter upgrading projects 
were bound to benefit the poorest groups who lived in the squatter settlements. The 
important issue in the selection of project beneficiaries is therefore that of the income mix 
of group. It was pointed out that a mix that will include a certain percentage of the middle 
incomed could be beneficial to cost recovery as well as an opportunity to provide a cross-
subsidy. Also it was argued that the new community may open up marginal employment 
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opportunities like vending, washing, housekeeping and other domestic services for the 
poorer households, which will supplement their earnings. 
However, the Bank warns that where this practice is used, care most be taken as to the 
proportion of land allocated to the middle income group. If too much land is allocated to 
them, less is available to the low incomed. Furthermore, the middle and higher incomed 
are often only attracted to larger plots. Care most also be taken to identify all the subsidies 
(direct and indirect) that may be involved in a project and ensure that they are not passed 
on to the middle income group who do not need them. 
b) Project scale and location 
On the issue of project size, the Bank stated that this should be large enough to take care 
of the housing supply backlog and accommodate the growth in population of the group 
for which they were being designed. This scale of projects, which will usually run into 
tens of thousands of units, in most cases cannot be viable at immediately. The Bank 
suggest that the replaceability of projects over time will expand them into larger scale 
programmes. Also, where both services and settlement upgrading are designed and 
implemented together, a larger scale of beneficiaries is achieved, which should have a 
significant impact on the backlog (Swan 1983). 
However, it is also important to note that the need for large scale sites and services 
projects has a direct bearing on the location of the projects. Large empty sites are not often 
available in the centre of most urban cities. This means projects have to be located at the 
periphery of the cities. The major disadvantages of the remote locations are; the limited 
access to employment opportunities in terms of their proximity, as well as transportation 
costs , and the high cost of extending essential services to sites, because they are often 
beyond the existing urban infrastructure networks (Swan 1983). 
It is suggested that groups of small pockets of land found around the city could be 
collectively used to overcome the location difficulty. This will also ensure 'that the target 
group continue to live in their familiar communities with their families and networks of 
friends. It will also mean that services can be extended cheaply. However, this approach, it 
· is argued, may be difficult to undertake - it is not only more expensive to develop separate 
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pockets of land, but also the plot acquisition process may prove complicated. It is 
therefore important to bear the above "trade-offs" in mind in choosing the site location. 
c) Scope and standards 
On the issue of the scope of projects, the definition of the sites and services itself was 
crucial. As has been mentioned above, sites and services is customarily used to cover a 
variety of projects in which urban land is developed primarily for the benefit of the low-
income group (World Bank 1974: 6). The Bank chose to give the strategy a wider 
meaning to cover both the physical product, as well as the process. The physical facilities, 
which are classified into essential and variable, comprise the overall components of the 
project design. The essential components, which include building plots for dwellings, 
water supply, waste disposal and means of access, are those which are reflected in all 
project design, irrespective of the country or city. While the variable components, which 
include police post, health and education facilities, community centres, sites for markets 
and commercial activities and recreational facilities, are dictated by the local conditions 
of the countries and may be excluded in some projects and included in others. If for 
instance, a project is located in proximity to an area where these facilities already exist, 
there will be no need to duplicate them. 
Other variable components include, the core unit in addition to the building plot, provision 
of credit for building materials and technical assistance. 
The design standards aspects of the projects is very difficult to deal with. Several "trade-
offs" may have to be made between the various objectives of the projects. For instance, 
smaller plot sizes may be acceptable in the context of a higher level of service and 
employment opportunity. The setting of overall standards should be guided by the 
maximum cost that can be afforded, which depends on the income levels of the target 
group, and by the amounts of subsidy that can be justifiably included. This depends very 
much on the local situation. For this reason an ad hoe approach is preferred ~n determining 
services standards for the projects. The project location is another crucial element in the 
success of the sites and services. Poor locations may lead to a total rejection of the project 
by the groups for which it was intended, as had happened in earlier projects the Bank 
pointed out. Therefore care must be taken in the location of the sites relative to 
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commercial and employment areas where most of the beneficiaries may be getting their 
daily bread. A remote location implies a high cost of transportation to and from the work 
places of beneficiaries, which may upset the benefits of the project. On the other hand, it 
is a well known fact that suitably located land is difficult to acquire on the scale required 
by the sites and services projects, and acquiring small parcels at different location is not 
cost effective and difficult to administer. 
Also in choosing a location for the projects, the Bank stressed that other factors like the 
availability of off-site infrastructure (water supply, electricity and sewage disposal system) 
large enough to accommodate the new development, and the physical characteristics of 
the land, which also may have cost implications, have to be taken into consideration. 
d) Planning for cost recovery and repliceability 
Cost recovery is one of the major principles of the World Bank assisted projects. It is 
envisaged that if the cost of project, are fully recovered, they may be self replicated into 
larger programmes. 
In planning for cost recovering, consideration should be given to the real cost of the 
project as well as the ability and willingness of the target group to pay for them. 
In calculating the real cost of the projects, all costs should be identified, including hidden 
subsidies. 
Also, in determining the ability of a target group to pay, care most be taken as to the 
method to be used. Income data are often used, but have proved to be unreliable in many 
cases due to problems of understatement of income by the low incomed and overstatement 
of poverty by the higher incomed (Swan 1983). 
Expenditure levels may be more relevant in determining the ability to pay in this type of 
housing project. Where income levels are used, care most be taken to take into account all 
incomes of households including gifts, transfers or donations which in some cases will 
substantially increase their ability to pay. 
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Consideration must be given to the availability of personal savings. This is particularly 
important in projects where down-payments, or substantial initial investment are required 
from target groups. 
The estimate of the monthly payment by the beneficiaries of the project has a serious 
impact on cost recovery. If the estimate is too high for the target group, cost recovery may 
not be realised. The general estimate used is 20 - 25% of an individuals income. This has 
been found to be unreliable, because in many developing countries the low incomed are 
often not able or willing to invest so much of their monthly income in housing. 
It is also important to remember that the low income group in sites and services projects 
will not only be making monthly payments but will also need money to purchase required 
materials and labour for developing their plots. 
If the real cost of the project is carefully calculated and its affordability to the target 
group properly estimated, there should be differential land values which will relate to the 
locations of plots as well as the difference in standards of development. It is envisaged 
that higher rates charged for better located plots, plots with superior services and industrial 
land use, will create a surplus which can be used to provide subsidised underpriced plots 
to the poorest groups. 
Other issues like the proper co-ordination of project activities by all the agencies involved, 
the occupation of plots by allottees, and the proper design of collection procedures, should 
also be taken into consideration in planning for cost recovery. 
e) Community participation, employment generation and self-help 
Cornrnunity participation is very necessary to ensure co-operation between beneficiaries 
and project agencies. Also the more people are involve in the planning and implementing 
their project, the more compatible the project would be to their needs. 
Employment is one of the basic purposes of the sites and services projects (World Bank 
1974: 13) and will generate income. 
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The idea behind including an employment component in the design should be to help the 
families improve themselves economically. This should place them in a better position to 
pay for their units, make some savings and also gradually develop the size and quality of 
their shelter (Swan 1983). 
Investors should be given opportunities to develop an industrial estate within t~e project 
which would generate employment opportunities for the locals. Swan (1983), pointed out 
that when offering attractive opportunities for industrial entrepreneurs, there should be 
linked to a guarantee to draw the majority of their labour force from the project 
community. 
When designing for self-help, care must be taken to also involve technical officers. 
Families may need technical assistance in the design and construction of their houses. The 
technical officers and the target group should both contribute to the design process. This 
should make designs more practical and user acceptable, thereby minimising waste. 
ii) Project financing 
The total project cost include both the capital and the current cost. The cost of all the 
various components must be estimated appropriately, even where the land is publicly 
owned, its real value must be represented in the cost estimate. The difference between its 
public value and market value will be part of the government's contribution towards the 
cost. There is a lot of controversy centred around the valuation of land, so, for this 
purpose, in the sites and services projects, the World Bank generally excludes the land 
cost from the items it is prepared to disburse as part of contribution (World Bank 
1974:15). 
The total cost of the projects is normally shared between the public, private sector and the 
beneficiaries. The full cost of public services like health centre, schools, off-site 
infrastructure, primary roads, street lights and extension of trunks mains (water, electricity 
and sewerage) will be borne by the public authorities as part of the routine urban services. 
On-site elements like paths, secondary roads, on site provision of water, sewerage and 
electricity should be apportioned between the public authority, private sector and the 
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settlers in proportion to their respective areas of land. However, both the capital cost of 
individual connections to electricity, private water taps and sewerage are borne by the 
users only. The size of the charges in this case will be differentiated according to the level 
of services available to each individual plot. Care must be taken to make the charges 
consistent with the income of settlers to ensure they are able to pay, and that the low 
incomed should not be treated unfairly in their payment for services . It was also stressed 
that elements of subsidy should not be so large as to jeopardise cost recovery, and hence 
replaceability of projects, or attract higher income groups to displace the target group 
(World Bank 1974). 
In their guidelines for cost recovery, the World Bank outlined the following two methods 
of recouping capital cost from the beneficiaries: (1) through an initial down payment, (2) 
then amortisation of the remaining costs over a period of time at an agreed rate of interest. 
Care must be taken with both the amortisation amounts to be set as well as the initial 
down payments, for they will both have implications on the outcome of the project. For 
instance, too high a down payment will mean too little money left over, and plot 
development might be delayed. So before the amount is set, the size of the savings 
available to households, the level of incomes and the total expenditure needed for plot 
development must be considered. The amount is usually set at between 10-20% of the 
target group's income, in the majority of projects. The period of amortisation of the loan 
is also an issue to be carefully considered. A short period will mean a high rate which may 
be a burden on the poorer households. On the other hand, a long period which is more 
favourable to households will mean a delay in cost recovery and re-investment on similar 
projects. Generally, a period of 15 - 20 years is recommended. 
The total cost of the initial investment in the project is contributed partly by the World 
Bank, and the partly by the recipient government. The Bank usually disburse its loan 
through a Development Bank, Building Society or any equivalent ins~itution in the 
receiving country from which individual settlers will receive a loan for plot development. 
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Contracts for the design, planning and construction of infrastructure will normally be 
awarded to local consultants and contractors. For this purpose, only local contractors will 
normally be invited to bid for the contracts. 
iii) Project organisation 
As a starting point, the Bank considers the creation of a project administrative unit to 
initiate and control the operations of the project as a basic requirement. The existing 
Housing Ministries and agents, can not be trusted to handle these projects efficiently due 
to the inherent institutional constraints and bureaucracy within the system (World Bank 
1974). Other project organisational arrangements should be made according to the local 
requirements, and some should be left optional. One argument is that the management and 
construction of projects, beyond the basic infrastructure and community services should 
be left to the settlers entirely, because it is believed they will be able to organise these 
matters themselves and can find the lowest cost solution. While others argue that an 
administered organisation will be more efficient in the use of resources and be more 
innovative. 
The three major stages at which careful planning and organisation are needed are: (1) the 
pre-construction stage when the land is acquired and the target population selected who 
may be mutually involved in discussions towards the planning of the projects; (2) the 
physical construction stage when the land is levelled and provided with services, 
community facilities and core units, where necessary; (3) the plot development stage when 
the actual construction of houses by the plot allottees takes place, this is the consolidation 
stage. A progressive development over a period of time is usually recommended. 
However, it is recommended that allottees put up temporary units to enable them to 
move to the project site while they build the permanent one. 
61 
2.2.3 Evaluation of the World bank assisted projects 
From the above discussion, it is concluded that the ever growing low income housing 
problems in the developing countries and lack of effective policy response to tackle them, 
had led to the adoption of the Sites and Services approach. It was also shown that the 
World Bank had in the past two decades, become very involved with this housing strategy, 
its main role being that of providing the financial assistance and encouragement for the 
adoption and implementation of the strategy by the various governments of the developing 
countries. The Bank's continuous involvement has, in recent years, led to a growing 
interest from researchers and evaluators (Onibokun 1990). This curiosity has given rise to 
a wide ranging volume of literature on this approach to housing the low incomed 
especially in the developing countries. 
Evaluators of these projects are interested to know how effective they have been in 
solving the housing problems of the low income. The leading evaluation studies in this 
area are the ones sponsored by the World Bank and conducted by its Officials. This 
section discusses the summary of the evaluation findings of the Bank assisted projects. It 
starts by briefly discussing the concept of evaluation, which is meant to give an 
understanding of the definitions, purpose, and techniques used in evaluating housing 
development project. It also identifies the common methods used for evaluating the World 
Bank projects and chooses the appropriate one for this study. The second part of the 
section discusses the summary of the findings of some of the leading evaluation studies 
the World Bank assisted projects. 
2.2.3.1 The concept of evaluation 
Different writers define evaluation in various ways depending on the focus. For instance, 
while House( 1987) simply defines evaluation as any study that leads to a judgement about 
the value of an action, Posavac and Carey (1983) defined it more comprehensively as 
"collection of methods, skills and sensitivities necessary to determine whether a human 
services actually do help the people in need." Rutman (1985) on the other hand defined 
evaluation as any study which uses scientific methods to measure the implementation and 
the outcome of a program for the purpose of decision making. Though these definitions 
vary in scope and focus one thing common to all is the idea of putting a value on an 
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action. The way by which an evaluation study is conducted will vary according the 
purpose. 
2.2.3.2 Purpose of evaluation 
An evaluation study may be undertaken for various reasons, the commonest of which are, 
administrative and managerial, accountability, the extension of knowledge, and political 
benefits. From the point of view of administrative and managerial reasons, an evaluation 
is viewed as a tool for making an improved decisions on planning, design and 
implementation of a policy or program. The management will want to know whether a 
programme is being carried out as planned, what factors impede the implementation, 
whether the benefit of the project go to the right group of people and whether a particular 
intervention is the right solution to the problem posed. The study of this nature will aim at 
identifying ways of improving the effectiveness of subsequent programme. Most of the 
World Bank's projects evaluations studies fall into this category. Also the results of such 
studies help the administrators make informed decisions on whether to expand, curtail or 
even terminate the programme. At the preliminary stage, it can help to choose between 
alternative options to achieve the same results. 
An evaluation study, which is conducted for the purpose of accountability will aim to find 
out whether the benefit of a programme is worth its cost. This purpose has become 
increasingly more important in the world of scarce resources and competing demands. In 
countries like the United States, for instance, all government programmes must be 
accounted for in order to get continuous political and financial support from both the 
public and the congress. Even in the Third World countries, some aid agencies like the 
World Bank insist on the accountability of previously assisted projects as a condition for 
future lending. 
An evaluation study can also be conducted for the purpose of knowledge only. A 
knowledge oriented study may not be put into immediate use, however it adds to the stock 
of knowledge in a particular field which can be drawn on when the need arises. The 
design of such studies is very academic in nature, and is usually intended to answer 
questions about a particular problem, or test a particular hypothesis, a professional 
practice principle or theory underlying certain policies. 
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When an evaluation is undertaken for a political purpose, the aim will be to try as much as 
possible to boost the image of the actors (politicians). They will hope to gain more support 
from the public by demonstrating through evaluation studies that the policies they 
implement are working and worthwhile. 
On the other hand, an evaluation can also be conducted on the same policies by the 
opposition to the government to discredit them or sabotage their programmes. An 
evaluation conducted for this purpose can hardly ever be objective, and therefore defaults 
the rule of a good evaluation study which Posavac and Carey (1980) stated must be as 
objective as possible, with results that are very consistent so that when repeated by other 
researchers the same results are obtained. 
2.2.3.3 Methods and technique of evaluating housing development projects 
Many experts feel that an evaluation should be the beginning and end, and through 
appropriate monitoring techniques it should be a continuing process, not simply one stage 
in an over-all programme. This implies that evaluation studies can be undertaken at 
different stages of a programme or project. The different stages can be grouped into four 
main types: ex-ante, monitoring, process and ex-post evaluation studies. 
i) Ex-ante evaluation 
Ex-ante evaluation is undertaken before a programme is designed and implemented. It is 
aimed at giving information about the extent of, and distribution of, a problem; the need 
for an intervention; the type of intervention needed and the expected impact of a particular 
program. Also through analysing the cost and benefits of all alternative proposals, the 
planner is able to make the best choice. This type of evaluation study will also give the 
planner the information that will enable him to make recommendations on the most 
effective ways of implementing the programme or project. As useful as this evaluation 
seems, it has the major disadvantage of not being able to predict an unexpected impact 
which may result from implementation. Some of the techniques used include cost benefit 
analysis, appraisal studies, impact analysis. 
64 
ii) Programme monitoring 
Monitoring is a type of study undertaken during the implementation of a project or 
programme. It is designed to give feedback on whether the project's implementation is 
proceeding the way it was designed to in terms of technical, budgetary, staffing and time 
schedules. It will also give information on whether the right target groups are being 
reached. Any drift in the original plan is easier to rectify while the programme is still 
going on. It might be too late to rectify when the programme is completed. Monitoring 
studies will also reveal the use to which project inputs and benefits are put and give 
feedback on the reaction of the recipients to the project. This type of information may be 
used to predict whether a project/programme will succeed or not. Monitoring, therefore, is 
an essential tool in avoiding failures in project implementation and also in realising 
whether certain aspects of project are not implementable (Casley and Lury 1983). Some of 
the techniques used for monitoring studies include; programme evaluation review 
techniques (PERT), Critical path technique and project performance tracking. 
While this type of study is easy to conduct, and in most cases involves only the day to day 
progress report of the implementation process, one of its major disadvantages is the fact 
that it is in-built into the project and therefore only undertaken by the project or 
programme authorities. To get continues political and financial support, the management 
may concentrate only on showing the good aspects, while hiding the failures. Secondly, 
due to lack of adequate technical facilities for analysing data, especially in the Developing 
Countries, results may be delayed and rendered useless from the point of view of 
feedback.Closely related to project monitoring is process evaluation. 
iii) Process evaluation 
This type of evaluation is very similar to programme monitoring, they are both 
undertaken while implementation is still going on. The major difference being that while 
a monitoring exercise is a day to day report of a progress of a programme undertaken by 
the programme management, a process evaluation is an assessment of the programme's 
performance undertaken either by the project management or an external body. Process 
evaluation is designed to study the process of events and their causes, it also tries to find 
out the series of events that have lead to the disparities that exist between intended and 
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realised programme goals (Levin 1984). The information from a process evaluation study 
is also used for feedback, which is its major advantage. 
Its major disadvantages include the following: (1) since it is usually based on general 
development criteria, it is not of much help in identifying the particular interventions that 
accounted for success or failure; (2) the impacts of programme or project on a particular 
group can not be easily determined using this type of evaluation; (3) the evaluation could 
mask or underestimate the effects of certain interventions (Young 1983). 
iv) Ex-post evaluation 
This type of evaluation, which is undertaken after the project or programme is 
implemented, is meant to assess its outcome. It is usually designed as an impact 
assessment, looking for what differences the project has made to the situation, especially 
for the target groups, whether they are better off or worse off with the programme and 
what are the positive and negatives effects are. It can also be designed to discover the 
level of delivery achieved, whether the objectives of the projects have been achieved, 
whether they are appropriate and what the actual situation of cost and benefits is. 
Information from such studies will be used in planning and implementation of future 
similar projects and expanding the scope or coverage of completed ones. There are 
several approaches to ex-post evaluation studies. One of the most commonly used is the 
goal based approach which is used to determine whether and to what extent, a programme 
has achieved its stated goals and to what extent it hasn't. The criteria for success or failure 
will be the stated goals because the difference between the stated and the achieved is the 
level of success or failure. A second approach is the system analysis approach which 
measures the outcome and is related to variations in programme. It will seek to find out 
whether the expected effects have been achieved, and if this achievement was the most 
economical way. Some of the techniques used with this approach include cost benefit 
analysis, planning balance sheet and linear programming. Another approach is the case 
study approach which attempts to describe the project or programme performance as 
viewed by the participants. The usual techniques here is a field study, which would 
include conducting interviews, site observation and administering of questionnaires to 
participants. Other approaches to ex-post evaluation studies less relevant to housing 
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projects include the decision making approach, and goal-free, art-critic, the professional 
review and quasi-legal approaches. 
One of the major disadvantage of the ex-post evaluation is the fact that results can not be 
fed back into the same project. Furthermore, not all findings will be relevant to other 
similar projects because of the variation in the of circumstances. 
It is important to note here that most of the World Bank evaluation studies reviewed above 
are ex-post in nature and use the goal based approach whose main focus is to measure the 
extent to which the stated goals were achieved. Most of the goals stated in form of 
physical products were the objects of assessment. The successes and failures of the 
projects were measured by the achievements of mainly the physical objectives irrespective 
of how, and by whom, they were achieved. This refers to particularly to the plots allocated 
in the Bank's project, level of services provided, and quality and quantity of housing units 
built. This is shown by the summary of findings of the Bank's evaluation in the next sub-
section. 
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2.2.3.4 Summary of findings of the World Bank's projects evaluation 
In discussing the evaluation findings, an attempt has not been made to discuss individual 
projects in details, instead general aspects of the projects performance indicators were 
used as guides and example of the extent of performance or lack of it are drawn from the 
individual projects. 
The assessment of the performance of the projects are discussed under the six major 
aspects which are: achievement of physical objectives; affordability and accessibility of 
projects to the target group; impacts of projects on quality and quantity of housing; 
impacts of projects on employment, income and expenditure and the efficiency of project 
implementation. These aspects have also been identified as the specific objectives of these 
projects by their planners. 
2.2.3.4.1 Achievement of physical objectives. 
The level of achievement of physical objectives varies from one project to another, but the 
general reports are impressive. Keare and Scott ( 1982) in their evaluation of projects in 
four countries (Zambia, El-Salvador, Philippines and Senegal), reported that most physical 
objectives have been achieved. For instance in the San Salvador sites and services 
projects, as at 1980 when they conducted the study, 4,348 (60%) dwelling units were 
completed, out of which 3,540 were occupied, and a further 2,246 were at different stages 
of construction. Secondly virtually all project participants received both plot and material 
loans. Four out of five storm drain drainage systems were installed, five out of eight foot 
paths and five out of six trunk water supply systems were completed and one out of two 
proposed sewage system was installed. 
Similarly in the Lusaka (Zambia) projects, as at 1980 (when the study was conducted), 
about 98% of the infrastructure and services have been achieved, about 19,000 (nearly 
100%) families have been served with stand pumps, roads, and security lighting in the 
upgraded area, and about 5,500 plots have been developed and allocated in over-spill 
areas, and 2,590 in sites and services areas, i.e. over 80% achievement. However this 
achievements are not very consistent because there was a short fall in the provision of 
community facilities, due partly to the problems involved in land acquisition which have 
delayed implementation leading to cost overruns due to inflation, making it more difficult 
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for the projects management to provide all the facilities as planned. Also, the communities 
questioned the need for some of the facilities. A construction of a market was reported to 
have been stopped in Lusaka for this reason. Even the Philippine project, which was not 
completed at the time of this study showed a remarkable progress towards the 
achievement of its objectives it was reported. 
The Kenyans projects were also remarkably successful in achieving physical objectives. 
Kayila ( 1980) reports that at the end of phase one of the Dandora community development 
project, about 90% of the plots had been developed and in the second phase, despite rise 
in costs rise due to inflation, about 88% had also been developed. Provision of services 
was also impressive. Nine out of ten families were provided with access to piped water, 
roads, electric networks and community facilities. Despite the reported delays in the 
implementation due to the controversy over the application of existing building bye laws 
and public health rules and also conflicts between local political leaders and Housing 
Development Department officials, the overall achievements were very impressive (Smith 
.and Memon . 1988). 
Similarly, in their evaluation of 24 World Bank assisted shelter projects, Richard Ludwig 
and Shabbir Cheema (1987) reported that most physical objectives have been achieved. 
For instance, in the Lahore walled city phase one project, which was completed in 1984, 
all laid down targets have been achieved. Some of the tasks undertaken included the 
provision of 9,200m of water mains, the replacement of 2,700 water connections, the 
provision of 18,500m of sewerage pipe, re-paving of 20,500 square meters of streets and 
the provision of street lighting covering an area of 20 hectares. 
However, it is important to note that the Senegal projects are exceptions to this success 
story. Most physical objectives had not been achieved at the time of study. The failure was 
said to have been due to the following: (1) over ambitious design standards which neither 
the government nor the participants could realise, (2) problems of land acquisition which 
delayed take off of projects by nearly two years thereby raising their cost due to annual 
inflation, making it more difficult for both the government and participants to achieve 
their objectives; (3) delays in provision of basic services which rendered sites unsuitable 
for years after projects had commenced; (4) projects were located on remote sites making 
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it difficult for the poorer households in particular to consolidate faster, because of the cost 
of transporting themselves and building materials to the site was too high. The problems 
in Senegal were so unique that drastic measures had to be taken before any progress was 
observed. The whole project had to be redesigned and contractors appointed to handle 
some of the work of the projects. (Keare and Scott 1982). 
Similarly, the progress of the Chaani (Kenya) sites and services projects was less 
impressive because the start was delayed for many years. As at 1984, no beneficiary has 
been issued an occupancy certificate for their plots (Kayila 1980). In this case, land 
acquisition seemed to be the major hindrance in achieving some physical objectives. 
Therefore it was recommended that governments should keep a land reserve for housing 
development. They should acquire the land through purchase or expropriation well in 
advance of projects. 
2.2.3.4.2 Affordability and accessibility of projects to the low income group. 
Whether these projects are affordable and accessible to the low income groups, for whom 
they were intended is a major concern to researchers and evaluators. Though the findings 
of the studies already conducted were mixed, the general evidence on most projects 
suggests they are not affordable to the intended groups. In both El Salvador and Zambia, 
the projects were said to be affordable to the target groups (Keare and Parris 1982) 
because the indicators of lack of affordability were either not present or did not have any 
significant relationship with incomes as shown by the studies. For instance, in the El 
Salvador study, the tum over rate in the project area was not significantly higher than in 
control area , also there was a very low level of defaults of payments of both instalments 
and charges (Keare and Scott 1982). The Lusaka projects on the other hand experienced a 
high rate of default of payment of instalments (80%) but the study showed no significant 
relationship between this rate and the income of beneficiaries. i.e. the lower income 
households are not necessarily the ones in default. Defaults on payments were explained 
by the lack of an effective collection system and political unwillingness to either force 
payment out of beneficiaries or impose sanctions on the defaulters for fear of losing 
popularity. However, these results should be treated with caution because it could have 
serious implications on the income composition of the actual beneficiaries. The project 
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management in El Salvador also expressed a concern that the lowest income target groups 
might not have been the actual beneficiaries of projects (Keare and Parris 1982), because 
more middle incomed households were allowed to participate to the detriment of the 
lower. A similar situation occurred in the Senegal Projects. 
The Dandora Community projects in Kenya were also said to have been raided by a 
middle income groups for whom the projects were affordable. The middle income groups 
were said to be using renters from lower income households as a source of extra revenue, 
so they could afford to pay their charges promptly. In both the Philippine and Senegal 
projects, lack of affordability was clearly indicated by the studies. A socio-economic 
survey of the Tondo upgrading projects in Manila, for instance, showed that households 
were neither willing, nor able, to spend up to 20% of their income on housing, as the 
project assumed. Similarly, few of the squatters were re-housed in the Kuala Lumpur low 
cost public housing, while many of the Sites and Services schemes remained vacant 
because the squatters could not afford the improved lots (Ludwig and Cheema 1987). Also 
in the Senegal case, the affordability problems were indicated by a very high dropout rate 
and a very slow pace of construction and consolidation. This has been explained firstly by 
the lack of clear guidance and technical assistance directed to building houses consistent 
with the means of the target population. This has led to participants undertaking high and 
costly construction standards with which they could not continue. 
Secondly, lengthy delays in the implementation of projects due partly to the land 
acquisition problems mentioned earlier, have raised the cost of participation in the project 
through the annual rise in inflation beyond the means of most initial target households 
(Keare and Parris 1982). By and large accessibility and affordability of the World Bank 
assisted shelter projects still remains a problem due to the following reasons: (1) the high 
standards in both the services provided, and the construction of the houses insisted upon 
by government agencies, has made the participation of the poorer target groups more 
difficult; (2) the remote locations of most of the sites and services projects, where, the cost 
of living away'from their job location (city centre) is too high especially for the poorer 
members of the target groups; (3) the lengthy and complicated bureaucratic procedures 
may have discouraged some households and made them withdraw from participation, 
application forms for instance, were reported to have been mostly in English which most 
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households could not read (Sanyal 1982a); (4) screening procedures are often not reliable 
and are open to corrupt practices at one level or another (Swan 1983:121); (5) improper 
definition of income might lead to the elimination of eligible households from the 
selection stage (Keare and Parris 1982; Bamberger et al 1982a); (6) many allottees either 
abandoned or sold out their plots to the middle income groups because they could not 
afford to continue with the projects; (7) wrong assumptions regarding the affordability of 
target beneficiaries could be a contributory factor. 
The conclusion from these studies is that: (1) the affordability for the World Bank assisted 
Sites and Services project will remain a major problem for the low incomed group; (2) the 
upgrading component, have been found to be more affordable to the poorest group than 
the sites and services component in the majority of the projects evaluated. However it is 
also important to note that, the benefits of the upgrading are accrued more by the home 
owners in upgraded settlements than the renters who had to pay higher rents to remain at 
the improved area, or be forced to move on to poorer areas. 
Some of the strategies for increasing affordability and accessibility of projects to the lower 
income households suggested by these studies include: the lowering of standards; 
introducing some elements of cross subsidy for the benefit of the lower income groups and 
the use of more accurate methods of calculating affordability. 
The findings have also shown the importance of a proper definition of income in the 
calculation of affordability of the projects. It is recommended that total income (i.e. earned 
plus extra incomes from gifts and transfers), rather than only earned income, should be 
used in the calculation. This is because transfers and gifts were found to be a significant 
proportion of the total income of most households. In El Salvadore, for instance, the 
proportion was said to be up to a third in some cases (Keare and Parris 1982). This was 
found to be even more significant for female headed and unemployed male headed 
households. Most of these strategies have been adopted in the second and third generation 
projects. 
To prevent the displacement of poorer households from upgraded areas, basic services 
should be provided without rationalising housing , subdividing and selling land or 
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reducing the density of the community to a certain acceptable standard (Laquian 1983). 
This has been tried with success in the Indonesian Karnpung improvement programme. 
Another important factor to be considered in the accessibility of projects to low income 
groups is their location. The evidence from for the study by Ludwig and Cheema ( 1987) 
suggests that the location of a Sites and Services project has a bearing on its accessibility 
to the low incomed. Where a project is located away from the centre of employment 
opportunities, the project participants may not be from the poorest group. For instance, the 
Rangsit Sites and Services Project in Thailand, which is located at a distance of two hours 
bus journey from the centre of Bangkok was meant for low income families earning less 
than $75, but by the middle 1980s, more than half of the participants were found to have 
incomes above the maximum planned. 
However it is interesting to note that despite the reported lack of affordability and 
accessibility of projects to the target groups, there is a good record of improved access to 
services and community facilities to the target group resulting especially from the 
upgrading projects. 
2.2.3.4.3 Access of the target group to urban services 
Increased access of the target population to services has been remarkable in most projects. 
This has been assessed by comparing project areas with control areas. For instance, the 
study of three squatter settlements similar to projects areas in El-Salvador, revealed that 
all had inferior access to basic services like water supply, sanitation and lighting (Keare 
and Scott 1982). Also the mean travel distance to facilities like schools, clinics, 
playgrounds and parks has also reduced. In the Tondo upgrading projects, access 
especially to drainage and sanitation has increased greatly. It was reported that within a 
year, the population using water sealed toilets has increased from 38.5% to 45.8%, the 
percentage of houses without drainage has decreased by almost 50% (Keare and Scott 
1982). In the Lusaka project, access to water supply was most impressive, before the 
project, only 14.5% had access to good sources of drinking water in both Matero and 
George areas, but after the project, the percentages rose to 98% and 98.4% respectively. 
(Hamburger 1980). 
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However, these results are not consistent. In the Tondo project in Manila, beneficiaries 
expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of electric and water connections to their houses, 
while in Lusaka, the main problem was dissatisfaction with transport and health facilities. 
A survey of the beneficiaries showed that 58% of the households interviewed thought 
their access to health facilities has worsened by the project, 32.8% thought there was no 
significant change, while only 9% thought they had improved access. Similarly for 
transportation over half of respondents thought they were worse off in terms of access to 
transportation, only 5.8% thought they were better of. Apart from the isolated cases, 
generally speaking, in most projects, access to services for the target population has 
increased. The major dissatisfaction in the area of infrastructure facilities, like 
transportation and clinics, was seen more in the sites and services than in the upgrading 
projects. 
The improved access to the services and community facilities might have had an impacts 
on the health and general living conditions of the recipients. Although it is extremely 
difficult to trace health improvement to a particular intervention in most of the projects 
evaluated, a sharp decline in ailments associated with bad water supply and sanitation was 
observed. Even though statistical techniques have failed to relate the improvement with 
the project intervention, it is generally believed they might be related. Moreover, the 
increased access to clinics in many communities, due to project intervention, means that 
medical attention could be received earlier and people are more enlightened about 
preventive rather than curative methods, and environmental rather than disease aspects of 
health which most of the programmes emphasise (Laquian 1983). One major difficulty in 
accessing the health impact Laquian (1983) has pointed out is the fact that evaluations are 
usually done over a short (2 to 3 years) period, while health impact takes longer to 
manifest itself. 
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2.2.3.4.4 Impact on quality and quantity of housing 
It was reported that the quality of housing in the low income areas has improved with the 
project (Keare and Parris 1982; Bamberger 1983 and others). In the upgrading areas, the 
security of tenure has led to more investment in housing and thereby improvement on 
dwellings (Santiago 1982). This was evident from both the level of services provided and 
the high quality materials used. The improvement of quality has led to appreciation in the 
value of the houses. For instance the quality of housing in the Tondo upgrading projects 
in Manila has increased from 60% to 85% in monetary terms (Keare and Parris 1982). In 
the sites and services projects too, it was observed that most houses were built of a higher 
than expected quality of building materials. For instance in the Lusaka and Manila 
projects, 90% and 85% of houses respectively were built of concrete block (Bamberger 
1980; Keare and Scott 1982). A survey of the households in the Manila projects also 
showed that many households expressed their satisfaction with the increased space around 
their houses for gardening as compared with the low-cost houses where they use to live. 
These results, though desirable, could have serious implications for the affordability and 
cost recovery of the projects, bearing in mind that the affordability calculations were based 
on the assumption that beneficiaries were to use locally produced and cheaper building 
materials for building their houses. It could mean one or more of the following: (1) the 
present beneficiaries, who built the houses, are not the target group, they are from a higher 
income group, which is why they could afford to built with expensive materials, (2) 
because of the high demand for good housing by the target group, this has led them to 
borrow money from other private sources to supplement their loans and build more 
expensive houses, the problems of which would be seen in the cost recovery, when the 
private money lenders will put more pressure on households to pay their debts to the 
detriment of the projects management, (3) the project planners miscalculated the 
affordability of the housing to target population by not including their other sources of 
income, like those mentioned earlier. The implications of this are that many households, 
who otherwise could afford to participate in the project, might have been denied 
participation because of the faulty calculations. Although most of studies seem to dwell on 
the latter explanation, others explanations could have relative importance in some 
projects. 
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Housing stock, no doubt has increased with the projects, but because most of the initial 
projects are pilot and small in scale, the increases is not enough to satisfy the ever growing 
demand in majority of cases. Continuous increases in quantities to offset demand can only 
be made by expanding these projects into large scale programmes. This was supposed to 
be done through project self replication according to the World Bank, but the prospects for 
this so far are very slim as many evaluation studies have shown. 
2.2.3.4.5 Impacts on employment, income and expenditure: 
The expected impact on employment from these projects was the absorption of surplus 
labour, in construction through self-help and shared labour, with the assumption that 
unemployment rate was high in the majority of the project areas. The project were also to 
set up sites for industrial and commercial establishments, giving out loans to small 
businesses and providing technical assistance to beneficiaries to acquire some skills 
(Laquian 1983). 
But contrary to these expectations, majority of households were found to have regular and 
well paid jobs, which they were better off doing rather than engaging in self construction 
of their houses (Keare and Parris 1982:75; World Bank 1980b:21; Jimenez 1980: 113). A 
survey of unemployment in Zambia, for instance showed rates to be very low in projects 
areas, 1.3% in Matero; 2.4% and 2.7% in Lilanda and George respectively ( Bamberger 
1980). Setting up industrial and business establishment on site, was not successful in 
many cases, because entrepreneurs were not attracted to them. In the Lusaka sites and 
services project, for instance, of the 100 commercial plots set up, only 31 were taken up, 
of which, only 13 had started any construction at the time of study (Bamberger 1980). 
This was due partly to a lack of availability of business loans, high cost of building, 
remote location of sites, discouraging many people, and poor insufficient advertising 
techniques for stimulating interest (Keare and Scott 1982). A three year study of change 
in employment status in El Salvador, comparing beneficiaries and control groups, showed 
no differences for the household heads. 
An increased involvement of spouses and other family members in active work has been 
observed in projects areas. This could be due to the increased expenditure of households 
on housing as a result of project repayments as Leucine (1983) has suggested. 
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By and large, projects did not seem to have any significant positive impacts on 
employment. Negative or destructive impacts, were however, observed in some sites and 
services projects, where hawkers and vendors were dislocated, disrupting the delicate 
seller buyer relationships which they had established over a long time in the community 
based on mutual trust (Leucine 1983). Research in Delhi also revealed that the 
opportunities for side jobs for family members other than the bread winner had diminished 
substantially after relocation to sites and services projects, while the financial burden on 
families had increased as a result of projects' monthly payments (Misra and Gupta 
1981:89). Also in the El-Salvador project, it was shown that the increase in the flow of 
incomes of the project beneficiaries(75%), is similar to that of a control group(70%) 
(Bamberger 1980). It is important to note that, though there had been little increases in 
incomes flows, steady rises in expenditure on housing in the same period, for the majority 
of families in the project areas were observed. In Manila project, for instance Laquian 
(1983) reported that, a rise of expenditure of upto 170% was observed, of which 64% was 
on housing. Since project did not lead to a corresponding rise in income, it means that 
families were spending less on other needs like food, medicines and clothing which could 
lead to deterioration in their nutritional and health standards. 
However, the Dandora project appeared to be an exception, because available data shows 
positive results concerning employment and income generation. For instance, in the sites 
and services projects, families have been found to gain substantial amount of income from 
subletting spaces in their units. Also housing construction has been found to generate 
employment and income to the hired builders. (Bamberger 1981). 
I.2.2.3.4.6 Efficiency of projects implementation. 
For all development projects, the efficiency with which they are implemented is a key 
factor in determining whether they will be successful or not. In most of the World Bank 
assisted projects, "eight aspects of the projects which have particular financial, economic 
and social importance " have been examined in evaluating the efficiency of the 
implementation (Keare and Parris 1982). These are project planning and design; selection 
of project beneficiaries; construction methods; construction material loans; housing 
completion and occupancy; maintenance of housing and infrastructure; cost recovery and 
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community participation. The findings of the evaluations, their implication and 
recommendations on each of the aspects are discussed below. 
i) Planning and design: There are a number of ways by which the planning and design 
of a project can affect the efficiency of its implementation. Very high design standards, 
for instance, can limit the participation of the low income target group and the slow 
consolidation process. This was the case in the Senegal projects. The design standards 
were over ambitious neither the beneficiaries nor the government could support them. The 
progress of the project was therefore halted until the design standards were revised (Keare 
and Parris 1982). Also, if designs are rigid, especially in terms of the material to be used, 
implementation may be delayed if the recommended materials are either not available in 
the required quantities or too costly for the target groups to purchase. If progressive 
development was designed to be very slow both the administrative and the consolidation 
cost will increase, leading to cost overruns and reduced project inputs such as materials 
loans and level of services. The combination and level of services designed in the projects 
also, may not be that preferred by the beneficiaries, especially where they are not 
consulted before the design is decided on. For instance, in both the Philippine and 
Zambian projects studied by Keare and Parris (1982), findings show that participants 
expressed a desire for more space than the project provided, preferring this more than the 
improved services like toilets which the project management attached more importance to. 
Some families have demonstrated this by building an extra floor following the reblocking 
in the Tondo upgrading project in Manila. The desire for more space has also been 
demonstrated by the beneficiaries in the Senegal project. 
ii) Selection of beneficiaries: The manner by which the selection of beneficiaries of a 
project is conducted can also affect the efficiency of its implementation in a number of 
ways. (1) A very slow selection and screening procedures can discourage some families 
and lead to their withdrawal from participation, on the other hand very hasty screening 
procedures can lead to costly mistakes, to the detriment of some families (Keare and 
Parris 1982). For example, if the project management do not take time to clarify 
information given on application forms, their selections may be based on false evidence. 
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(2) Faulty selection may also result where selection criteria are not properly defined. For 
instance, in the Zambian project, the income criteria had to be modified twice because the 
initial upper and lower limits were found to be unrealistic under the circumstances 
existing in Lusaka at that time. (3) Selection procedures are an aspect of these projects 
that can easily be manipulated during implementation. These manipulations are usually 
done to the detriment of the target groups, as was reported to have happened in the 
Kenyan projects. The selection procedures have been changed in favour of the 
participation of more middle income households. 
iii) Construction methods: Several methods of construction, which have different 
implications on cost, speed and quality of house construction, are available. These are: 
completely contracted house building; building by mutual help; self help in which families 
hire contractors; self help in which a family hires labour and supervises the construction 
personally and self help in which families use their own labour for the entire building 
work. The World Bank projects, which place emphasis on reducing the cost and 
increasing the affordability, recommended the use of self help and mutual help types of 
construction methods which will use free labour for the construction. Evaluation findings 
show that the hired labour housing construction method was most commonly used (Keare 
and Parris 1982; Bamberger 1980; Sanyal 1981 and Smith 1988). The recommended 
methods of construction were not used in most projects for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
projects participants were mostly in full time employment and therefore did not have time 
to engage in either self help or mutual labour, so they hired labour to build their houses. 
This means that the original assumptions of the projects regarding unemployment were 
wrong, as discussed earlier. Secondly, most participants did not have the technical know-
how to engage in self help construction methods. Technical assistance was suppose to be 
one of the projects' inputs, but the project management in most cases did not pay much 
attention to it. If project management had devoted time to giving participant~ the necessary 
technical assistance, they would have also had the time to use the skills they acquired to 
build their houses. Thirdly the desire to have high quality houses, which most families 
believe can only be achieved through the employment of skilled work men, has pushed 
them to use this method. This desire was expressed more by families who intended to 
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sublet their property, because the better the housing quality the higher the rent demanded 
from prospective tenants. Fourthly, It takes longer to complete a house using self help and 
mutual labour, so most families prefer to hire skilled labour for speedier completion of 
their houses. This has led the World Bank to redefine the concept of self help from self 
construction to self-management (Van Der Linden 1986). This is in line with Turner's 
definition put forward more than a decade earlier. However, self construction is not to be 
dismissed because it is still very significant especially among the poorer members of the 
target groups. For instance, in Zambian project families earning less than 100 kwacha 
hired labour for only 15% of their construction work, the rest was done by either self help 
or mutual labour. 
iv) Building materials loan: In most of the projects, building material loans have been 
made available to beneficiary households in addition to the serviced plots. The nature of 
the loans and the manner in which they were conducted varied from project to project. But 
generally in earlier projects, like those of Lusaka and El Salvador, material stores were run 
on site, and loans issued in the form of vouchers redeemable only in the site stores. The 
evaluation findings revealed a lot of problems encountered in using this system. Firstly, 
the lengthy queuing time necessary to obtain materials from the store. In the Lusaka 
project, for instance, some families had been to queue for up to 20 hours. to be served 
(Bamberger 1982). This was partly due to the shortage of staff to run the stores and the 
lack of adequate and continues supply of materials to the stores, during projects the 
implementation period. Secondly, many families were forced to use the materials 
provided by the store against their will as they could not redeem their vouchers anywhere 
else. In the El Salvador case, it was reported that many families had expressed their 
preference to use both hollow block and asbestos roofing sheets which the site stores did 
not stock (Keare and Parris 1982). However, in the later projects this system was changed, 
and in the new system loans were in form of cash and material stores rarely existed. The 
cash loan system have also been reported to have been faced by a number of difficulties, 
particularly relating to its size and accessibility to target group. Some findings have 
revealed that, the material loans were too small and insufficient in most cases. They 
offered t offered just a marginal contribution to the construction, especially for those who 
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used expensive materials. Furthermore, in some cases, many participants could not even 
obtain the loan, for example in the Philippines and the Bauchi projects in Nigeria. In the 
Bauchi project, up to half of the participants had not obtained any loans as at the time the 
Bauchi projects were completed, (Onibokun 1989). The failure to provide sufficient loans 
in some projects was due partly to the cost overruns resulting from delayed 
implementation of the projects. A cash loan means that there is no restriction as to the type 
of materials participants could use for construction. This could have serious implications 
for the affordability of the target group as many would be tempted to start building with 
expensive materials which they could not afford to continue to use; this would lead them 
to abandon their buildings. This was reported to have happened in both the Senegal 
project and Bauchi project. 
v) Plot/ house consolidation 
Consolidation pace has been reported to be low in the majority of the projects studied. In 
the majority of the projects, it was recommended that families move to site as soon as they 
were allocated plots, and build temporary structures to live in, while the permanent 
construction was going on. Evaluation findings showed that this pattern was not followed 
in most projects except in a few cases like the Dandora phase 1 project in Kenya. This 
was partly because the temporary materials were neither as cheaply nor readily available 
as the project had anticipated. This means that families had to maintain two homes during 
construction, paying rent on their current houses while spending on the construction of the 
new house. Therefore, since the rents are fixed, they can only spend so much at a time on 
the new house. The result of this is a slow pace of construction and consolidation which 
can go on for years before a house is completed and occupied. Other factors that might 
have affected this pace include: income; design standards; and delayed provision of 
services. Families from the lower income band will tend to be slower in consolidating. So 
in the projects where participation of the middle income groups is higher, the pace of 
consolidation pace is faster. Also, the design of the houses can affect consolidation, for 
instance in the Dakar projects in Senegal, it was reported that high design standards 
coupled with inflationary rise in the cost of labour and building materials have grounded 
consolidation process almost to a halt. The designs had to be revised and income criteria 
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modified before consolidation started picking up. The delayed provision of basic services 
in some projects has also slowed consolidation. Most families would not move until they 
are sure the essential services were in place. Some families would also prefer to complete 
their houses before moving in., because their families are too large for a half finished 
house. This would be more common among polygamous and extended families. Some 
families were also reported to have refused to consolidate, purely for speculative reasons 
To improve on the pace of. consolidation, in some of the later projects, wet core units 
were provided on every plot. For example in the Dandora projects in Kenya core units 
provision has quickened the consolidation process (Laquian 1983). This was demonstrated 
by a study comparing the pace of consolidation in two different levels of core units. 
Consolidation was faster on plots with a higher level of core units. Details on the extent of 
consolidation problem in the case study, are discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 3), 
while a literature review on its likely causes is discussed in Chapter 4. 
vi) Community participation: The results of community participation on the efficiency 
of implementation vary. While in some projects management believe community 
participation has slowed down progress, and therefore less desirable, in others it is 
crucial. It was reported, for instance, that the implementation of the Lusaka upgrading 
projects would have been impossible without the support of the community (Bamberger 
1982). A powerful community group can also be used to ensure maintenance of 
infrastructure and community facilities and collection of charges from households if it is 
involved early in the project. On the other hand they can also jeopardise cost recovery if 
they decide to collectively stop payment of charges when they are not satisfied with th~ 
services provided. Community group leadership, however, is characterised in some cases 
by a lack of representativeness of the whole community, it often represents particular 
interest groups. However, because of the obvious advantages of community participation, 
both the World Bank and other agencies has given it more emphasis in recent years 
(UNCHS 1983). But the type of participation prescribed is still very marginal in that 
people are involved only at the final stage, and have no control over the design and the 
early stages of implementation. 
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vii) Cost recovery : Cost recovery is one of the fundamental principles in the design and 
implementation of these projects. Costs are to be recovered to minimise subsidy and 
enable projects to replicate themselves. From the evaluation findings, the results on cost 
recovery vary. While in Senegal, Zambia and Philippines there was a high rate of defaults 
in payment, in El Salvador, the default rate was very low. As at 1980, it was only 2.3% 
(Keare and Parris 1982). Since no relationship was found between the rate of default and 
incomes, it was concluded that defaults might not have been due to lack of affordability. 
Reasons for defaults were discussed earlier under affordability. Other factors that may also 
affect the cost recovery include: the levels and rates of payment; the economic 
characteristics of people selected for participation in the projects; the availability of an 
effective collection machinery and the role played by community groups in cost recovery 
(Laquian. 1983). The low default rate in El Salvador was explained by the efficiency of 
and dedication of the foundation which managed the projects. High cost recovery records 
should be treated with caution because they could be due to projects missing the actual 
target groups. For instance, in the Karachi Metroville project, cost recovery was 97%, but 
this was because the target group was entirely missed (Swan 1983). Similarly the 
Dandora projects in Kenya were also reported to have had good cost recovery records, 
which was attributed main to the fact that, they largely benefited a middle income renter 
group instead of the low income target group 
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2.2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the interpretation of Sites and services housing 
strategy, concepts of self-help and aided self-help housing including the self-help housing 
debate notably the Turner Burgess debate; the World Bank involvement with aided self-
help Strategy; the available methods and techniques of evaluating housing projects; and 
the findings of the evaluations of the World Bank assisted projects. 
It was clear from the review that the sites and services strategy was adopted as a result of 
the failure of conventional approaches to solve the low income housing problems in the 
Third World countries. The advantages of the strategy over conventional approaches 
including increased access, reduced investment of authorities in housing and greater 
utilisation of surplus household labour have been elaborated on. 
From the self-help housing debates discussed in the first part of the chapter, it was clear 
that Turners view of the self-help housing has gained a wider acceptance among housing 
professionals as well as authorities and aid agencies notably the World. The sites and 
services housing strategy adopted by the World Bank in the past three decades was based 
mainly on Turners theories of self-help. 
The findings of the evaluation of the World Bank assisted Sites and Services projects 
discussed in the second part, revealed that some of the major problems common to most 
projects include the following: problems of reaching the target groups; poor 
administration; the imposition of a higher standard than the target group can afford; 
problems of land and the location; and cost recovery and low level of plot consolidation. 
Each of these problems has been elaborated on and explained by the different studies in 
different ways. 
It has also been pointed out that where very poor groups were involved, the settlement 
upgrading have been found to be more beneficial. 
A great deal has been done no doubt, and future projects will have a lot to learn from the 
findings. 
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However there are some difficulties inherent in these studies which include the following: 
Firstly, because most of the studies dealt with broad and general aspect of the projects, 
specific aspects could not be studied in great details, therefore many questions pertaining 
to some aspects especially of standards and plot consolidation, still remain unanswered. 
Secondly, very few independent studies exist in this area, most evaluation was done by the 
World Bank who are also the sponsors of the projects, the Bank's studies are essentially 
managerial in nature and therefore more concerned with efficiency and administrative 
aspects and less concerned with the qualitative and distributional effects of groups projects 
(Mosely 1983:596). Moreover, World Bank reports may tend to emphasise more on the 
successes of projects while playing down the failures to justify their continual 
involvement. So independent studies will be necessary to give more objective assessment 
of the projects. 
Thirdly, due to the variation in the socio-economic, cultural, religious and housing market 
situation in the different project countries, there is a problem in generalising the findings. 
For the above reasons, and more, further empirical studies are needed in this area of 
housing. This study seeks to investigate the causes of the consolidation problem. To this 
end, the Makama project was chosen as a case study and next chapter describes the project 
and gives general review on the preliminary findings on its performance with particular 
emphasis on the extent of the problem being studied. 
The process evaluation has been adopted in this study for the following reasons: firstly, 
the aspects on which the study is mostly interested in, that is the plot consolidation 
process, is not yet completed, so the results of the study can easily be fedback into the 
project. Secondly, the process evaluation which enables the study to find the disparities in 
the process of events and their causes is most appropriate for the study. The case study 
approach will be used involving the beneficiary group directly. 
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Chapter 3: The Makama Sites and Services Project -
A case study 
3.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter was a literature review of the nature of the research 
problem and its context. This chapter is a description of the Makama Sites and 
Services Project (the case study). The purpose of the chapter is to reveal the 
characteristics of the project and its area, and show the extent of the research 
problem at the time of study. The chapter is in four sections with the first section 
covering the background of the project, with a brief description of the area. The 
second section includes the characteristics of Makama project as planned, and 
the discussion of the implementation of the project with, reports on the 
preliminary findings on the performance of the project. The third section covers 
the degree of low level of consolidation in the project, with a presentation of 
some survey data, while the last section is a summary and conclusion. 
3.1 Background to Makama project 
Like many other developing countries (Kenya, Senegal, Zambia, Philippines, El 
Salvador, etc.), Nigeria adopted the World Bank Assisted Sites and Services 
Strategy as a result of the realisation that earlier projects had failed to reach the 
low income. Also due to the recognition that certain constraints, namely land and 
services, have been the major draw back to any efforts made by such groups to 
provide for themselves (as already discussed in chapter 2). This strategy, aimed 
at making affordable land and services accessible to the low-income, could not 
be more timely. 
Following the creation of the seven new states in Nigeria by the then military 
government, it was decided that the strategy be applied in the new states as part 
of the governments programmes to ease the acute low income housing shortage. 
The programme popularly known as the 'Nigerian States Urban Development 
Programme (NSUDP)', had two primary objectives, as stated in the project 
inception report. 
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1). To assist the States in their implementation of the National Housing 
Programme (NHP), That was defined by the then Federal Military Government. 
The first phase of the programme was to design a national mechanism for the 
financial and technical implementation of the National Housing Programme. It 
was to be applied initially to two States (Bauchi and Imo), but should be able to 
assist all the other states of the Federation in meeting their own specific needs 
(Dar Al-Handasah Consultants 1979). 
This mechanism was aimed at responding to the following policy objectives. 
a).Financial repliceability 
b).Substantial increase in the housing supply for low-income groups, who are 
expressing the greatest need. 
c).Definition of affordable standards of construction of housing and 
infrastructure 
d).Full recovery of investment cost to ensure repliceability 
e).Control of the effects of urban sector investment on national and state 
economies. 
2). It was also the primary objective of the first phase of this programme to 
develop and improve understanding of the components of this mechanism in 
order to permit identification and financing of similar projects in other states. 
By 1978, the World Bank loan was approved for the pilot projects in Bauchi and 
Imo states, and the implementation of the strategy had commenced by the 
following year. Other states were also encouraged to adopt the strategy. By 
1988, when the Bauchi project (the oldest pilot project) was completed, many 
other states were at different stages of adoption or implementation of similar 
projects as shown in the table below. 
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Table 3-1: Adoption of World Bank Assisted Shelter projects 
in Nigerian states 
STATE TYPE OF PROJECT LEVEL OF ADOPTION 
BY MARCH 1992 
Anambra Urban Development Indicated interest 
Bauchi Sites and Services First phase completed. 2099 
and Upgrading plots provided 
Bendel Urban Development Discussion stage 
Gongola Infrastructure Loan approved and designs 
development being prepared 
Cross River Infrastructure Development Discussion Stage 
Imo Urban Development First phase completed 7880 
plots provided 
Benue Infrastructure Development Project began 1988 
Kaduna Urban Development Feasibility studies completed 
Kano Urban Development Project had begun 
Kwara Urban Development preliminary stage 
Lagos Urban & Infrastructure preliminary stage 
Development 
Niger Urban Development preliminary stage 
Ogun Urban Development preliminary stage 
Ondo Infrastructure Development preliminary stage 
Oyo Urban Development Appraisal of feasibility 
Studies completed 
Plateau Urban Development Feasibility report completed 
Rivers Urban & Infrastructure Feasibility Studies completed 
Development 
Sokoto Urban & Infrastructure preliminary stage 
Development 
-
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
The remaining states have also indicated an interest in adopting the strategy. 
These projects were called the Nigerian States Urban Development Projects 
(NSUDP) because they were being implemented in collaboration with the state 
governments. 
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89 
In the most recent government policy document on housing (the National 
Housing Policy 1991), the Sites and Services Strategy have further been 
highlighted as one of the means of tackling the low income housing problem. So 
with this level of commitment to the Strategy, the requirement for new ideas and 
methods of making it more effective and efficient can not be overemphasised. 
This study is aimed at making a vital contribution towards providing such ideas 
through studying the existing problems and their causes. 
The Mak:ama project that is one of the pilot projects so far implemented in 
Nigeria, has been chosen for the purpose of this exercise. 
3.1.1 Choice of the Makama project as a Case Study 
... 
The choice of Makama as the case study has been motivated by a number of 
factors. The first and foremost motivation is the existence of the study problem· 
in this project. Secondly, the project is the oldest and the most mature of all the 
pilot projects. Thirdly, no similar empirical studies known to the researcher have 
so far been undertaken on the project. Fourthly, the researcher is particularly 
familiar with the project town and the culture and traditions of the beneficiaries. 
This reduces the limitations of the field survey, both in terms of cost, 
accessibility to data and understanding of the reasoning behind the responses 
given. Also by understanding traditional and cultural practices, certain types of 
data can be observed and interpreted accurately. 
Mak:ama, which consists of three wards, is one of the largest areas of Bauchi 
town. Bauchi town is located in the north eastern region of Nigeria and is the 
commercial and political capital of Bauchi state. Being an urban centre, it has a 
similar population explosion and the resultant housing shortage as most urban 
centres. The population of Bauchi town in 1978 (when the project was planned) 
was taken as 91,673 (Dar Al-Handasah 1978). Assuming an average of about 
5% rate of growth, it was estimated that the population will grow to about 
102,034 by 1980, and 159,961 by 1990. It is important to point out that the 
population estimates were crude, because they were based on many assumptions. 
The indigenous population of the town was predominantly Muslim with large, 
and usually polygamous, households. 
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The Makarna area was selected for the location of the project because it was 
believed to be most representative of the characteristics of the general 
population. Furthermore, it also had both large tracts of undeveloped land and an 
un-serviced residential community needed to implement the Project. See figure 
3.2 on the facing page showing the location of Makama. 
3.2 The Makama project 
The Makarna Project was planned and implemented between 1978 and 1987. It 
is a combined project involving servicing new sites and upgrading an existing 
settlement in the Makarna area of Bauchi. 
3.2.1 Objectives of the project 
While the aim of the project was similar to those stated by the World Bank in all 
its projects, the specific objectives of the Makama project were stated as follows. 
a) The provision of shelter, employment and urban services to the low income 
population at a cost they can afford without any need for public subsidies. 
b) To improve the living standards, productivity and welfare of the low income 
group in Bauchi through upgrading of several of the lowest income settlements 
and the developments of sites and services. The specific goals of the project 
were stated as follows. 
-to increase the supply of low income housing by allocating 3,950 
serviced plots to low incomed selected beneficiaries and providing them 
with loan for construction, 
-to demonstrate low-cost methods of providing urban housing, 
-to recover investment costs on housing and infrastructure, and 
-to permit repliceability, 
-to generate employment opportunities and improve the income of the 
project beneficiaries through provision of 74 serviced industrial plots, 
-to extend essential services (water, electricity, good access roads, storm 
drains and refuse collection services) to an old settlement in the Makama 
area benefiting 27,000 people. 
92 
3.2.2 Makama Project as planned 
After the completion of the feasibility studies and the approval of a loan by the 
Bank, a firm of consultants was appointed to prepare detailed plans and designs 
for the Makama project. The following are some of the very important aspects of 
the project's planning discussed under: design principles, financing and 
administrative responsibilities and organisation. 
3.2.2.1 Design principles of the project. 
The major design principles of the project are, affordability, cost recovery and 
repliceability. 
Affordability principle is to ensure that target beneficiaries are willing and able 
to pay for the cost of the housing services provided by the project. 
To achieve affordability, identification of the appropriate target group and the 
design of appropriate standards of shelter and services, whose target cost, would 
match the group's ability was particularly crucial. 
The primary target group for the Sites and Services Strategy has been defined 
with reference to the low income group generally. Using the data from the 
income and expenditure survey, in the Bauchi project this group has been 
identified as the lower 50% of the population. Even though the group not being 
served by any government housing programme at that time, extended to 70%, it 
was thought that the 50-70% group were capable of providing for themselves 
without any assistance. 
To define the lower income limit of the target group, project planners used 
income levels and expenditure patterns to establish a subsistence level. 
All the families who fell below the defined subsistence level were excluded from 
the project, because for them the main concern was their food. 
The actual target group thus identified, ranged between the 13th and 54th 
percentile (Dar Al-Handasah 1979). 
It was thought that the affordability within this wide rage would vary, therefore 
the group was further broken down to three subgroups comprising 12-26, 27-40 
and 41-54 percentiles. 
The income of the poorest family in each of the subgroups was used as a guide 
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to the amount that can be afforded for shelter related expenditure. 
The shelter related expenditure used in the analysis included: 
-plot cost (capital sums or monthly mortgage), 
-erection of new building on the plot, 
-maintenance of existing buildings, 
-recurrent services charges relating to consumption of water and electricity, 
-monthly/ annual contributions/ taxes relating to services, e.g. drains and roads. 
It was assumed that target group would devote 20-25% of their income on 
shelter related expenditure. This assumption, though contrary to reality, was used 
in calculating the affordability of the target group. The reality is that most people 
in Nigeria have been found unwilling to spend more than 10% of their income 
on housing. 
The cost recovery was also to depend on the assumptions regarding the validity 
of affordability. The costs to be recovered. are the cost of land and development 
(services and on-site infrastructure), and mortgage loans to be issued to 
individuals. 
The subsidy element in the design of the project was kept as low as possible. 
Though subsidy was an important element in affordability, a high level would 
jeopardise cost recovery and hence repliceability of the project. So a delicate 
balance would need careful planning and trade off. The obvious element of 
subsidy, as planned in the project, was limited to, the difference between the 
market value of the land and the value at which the project sold the land to target 
beneficiaries. Another element was the cost of off- site infrastructure which was 
to be provided as part of the routine urban development responsibility of the 
government to the public. 
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Scale : 1 :12500 
3.2.2.2 Components of the Makama project. 
With the stated objectives and principles in mind, the projects were designed to 
include eight major components which were: sites and services, settlement 
upgrading; off-site infrastructure; home construction and improvement loans; 
social services; industrial estates; and technical assistance to both local 
authorities and individuals. 
i) Sites and services: The sites and services component was intended to provide 
3,950 serviced plots, on 120 hectares of freshly acquired of land and 74 hectares 
of in-fill land within the existing settlement in the project area. The services to 
be provided included roads, water supply, storm water drainage, electricity, 
sanitary facilities, solid waste disposal system and landscaping. 
To achieve affordability by the three different subgroups of the target groups, 
different options of standards of services, plot sizes and their cost were 
estimated. 
It was assumed that the poorest member of each of the subgroups would afford 
the cost listed below. 
Poorest group 
Middle group 
Upper group 
798 Naira 
1219 Naira 
1625 Naira 
Hence estimates of three different cost options, in relation to the assumed 
affordability of these sub-groups, were estimated, as shown in the following 
table. 
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Table 3.2:Cost assumed to be affordable to target group 
cost element poorest group middle group upper group 
100m2 100m2 200m2 
I.Land 20 20 40 
2. Standpipe 71 100 100 
3. Pit latrine 50 50 50 
4. Soak-away 75 75 75 
5. Stonn-water drainage - - -
6. Roads minimum 150 150 330 
7. Shelter (5.5 m2) 389.5(5.5m2) 81 l(l l.5m2) 1005 (14.3m2) 
8. Electricity - - -
9. Site peg-out 12.5 12.5 25 
Total cost in Naira 798 1219 1625 
Source: Dar Al-Handasah • Makama Project Working paper 3, 1979 
For both electricity and water supply, while provision is made on site, individual 
connections were not to be undertaken by the authorities, but by plot allottees if 
they wished and could afford. 
Smaller less serviced plots cost less, while bigger plots with direct access to road 
cost more. 
Following the above estimates and assumptions, the final categories of plot sizes 
and cost were proposed. The four different categories and their cost are 
presented in the table below. The amount of mortgage loan as well as the 
monthly repayments worked out for each category were also sho~n by the table 
(3-3) below. 
Note that the sizes of plot finally decided upon are much bigger than what was 
estimated. This was because the target group had shown a great need for bigger 
plots. 
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Table 3-3: Plot sizes in The Makama Sites and Services Project 
Plot Type Size Proportion plot Mortgage monthly 
(m2) (%) costs loan repayment 
(Naira) 
AS (Small 216 25 978 3,200 30.0 
Subsidised) 
A (Small Normal) 200 35 1,114 3,200 35.0 
B (Medium plots) 270 20 1,414 4,500 60.0 
C (Large Plots) 378 20 2,232 6,000 75.0 
Source: Field Work March 1992 
The C-type plots were meant for a medium group who might be interested to 
participate in the project. This was meant to enable the principle of cross 
subsidisation to be applied, where the higher payment for the larger plots could 
be used to subsidise for the smaller (As) plots for the poorest group. 
The Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria was reported to have said the pricing 
policy of the plots was based on the principle that will ensure equity, cross-
subsidy, high rate of cost recovery and low level of subsidy. 
The FMBN said the following formula was used to arrive at the pricing. 
Total area of As plots priced at 50% of level price per square meter. 
Total area of A plots priced at level price per square meter; 
Total area of B plots priced at level price per square meter, plus 113rd of 
50% subsidy; 
Total area of C plots priced at level price per square meter, plus 213rd of 
50% subsidy. 
Based on these plot sizes a variety of layouts were designed on the basis of 
residential modules of about 4 hectares in size and were to . accommodate 
between 50 and 150 plots. A total of 2,100 plots was expected be made available 
for allocating to selected beneficiaries among the target group in the freshly 
serviced land. A further 1,850 plots were also expected to be made available 
from in-fill land within the Makama area making a total of 3,099 plots. 
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Income was the most important criteria in · the selection of plot allottees. In 
addition to income, other criteria used included length of residence in the town 
(a minimum of five years) and Family size (larger families to be given higher 
priority). Application forms requiring this information among other relevant 
ones was designed in English and later translated to the local language (Hausa). 
It was envisaged that most beneficiaries would come from the group in the area 
who were currently renting or sharing or displaced by the upgrading exercise. 
However, there was no restriction on those from other parts of the town from 
applying for plots in the project. 
The target beneficiaries who were to qualify by selection income criteria had to 
be within 104 - 282 Naira income bracket. 
The successful applicants were expected to operate a contract mortgage account 
with the FMBN for at least 10 months before they qualified for the project loan. 
The loan granted to the plot allottees, was at an interest rate of 6% payable over 
a period of 20 years. The amount of loan and the monthly payment arrangement 
depended on the type of plot allocated as shown in the table 3.3 above. 
ii) Residential upgrading component: It is important to note that the term 
'Residential' is used in the Makama Project rather than the usual 'squatter' 
settlement used in most projects. This is because the Makama area is not a 
squatter settlement, it is a traditional settlement that is badly adapted to modem 
planning requirements (Dar Al Handasah 1978). 
The upgrading component of the project was to provide infrastructure and 
services to a traditional settlement inhabited by 27,000 people living in 1,900 
compounds. Services to be provided were water supply, electricity, good access 
roads, storm drainage gutters, refuse collection services and landscaping. 
iii) Off-site infrastructure: This was to involve the improvement of town 
roads; construction of main out-fall drains; high tension electricity networks and 
the connection of the existing bore-holes to the main city networks serving the 
walled area of the city. The cost of this component will be borne by the 
authorities as part of their routine urban upgrading. 
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iv) Home construction and improvement loan: Loans were to be made 
available to all plot allottees for the development of their individual plots. The 
loan was to cover building material cost of the proposed basic unit while the cost 
of labour is assumed free through the use of family labour. The calculation of the 
amount of loan was based on the estimate of materials cost for the construction 
of two bedrooms basic unit (50m2). It was estimated to cost about 3,500 
Nigerian Naira ($4,390 as at 1978). This was only the minimum acceptable size 
and material standards, but those who wanted bigger units could build if they 
could afford them. It is important to note that the cost estimate did not include 
the price of the serviced land. The assumption was that families would have 
savings or other sources of money to pay for their land. 
v) Social Services: Under this component, 5 health clinics, 5 primary schools 
and recreational facilities were to be provided in the sites and services site, to 
serve both new area and the old settlement in Nasarawa. Large borrow pits in the 
area were also to be filled levelled to eliminate one of major breeding ground of 
mosquitoes thereby reducing the spread of malaria. 
vi) Industrial estate: The industrial component was incorporated to generate 
employment for the residents. About 74 fully serviced industrial plots were to be 
made available to interested investors who could acquire and build light scale 
industries. 
This component of the project was aimed at generating employment for the new 
community in sites and services as well as the old settlement community. 
vii) Technical Assistance: The Urban Development Board was to be provided 
with technical assistance in form of man power, for the implementation of the 
projects. Also the plot allottees were to be given some technical training on 
building process via demonstrations' units and extension services. 
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3.2.2.3 Financing the project 
By principle, the project cost will be paid for by the beneficiaries, but the initial 
investment estimated at $36.6 million (56 million Naira at 1978 rate) needed 
was to be jointly paid for by the World Bank loan, the Federal government of 
Nigeria and the Bauchi state government in the proportions shown by table 3-4 
below 
Table 3-4: Financing of the Makama Projects 
Contributing Body Amount contributed Percentage 
(million dollars) (%) 
World Bank 17.9 49 
Bauchi State Government 11.4 31 
Fed. Govt. of Nigeria 7.3 20 
Total 36.6 100 
Source: Field Work, March 1992 
Except for the off-site Infrastructure, primary roads and street lighting, all the 
other cost (both Capital and Current) was to be recovered from the beneficiaries. 
Three methods of payment to be used were; land cost which includes the cost of 
services; loan amortisation and the pay as you use charges for on plot electricity 
and water connections. 
The payment for land was to be immediate as a down payment and depended on 
the size of plot allocated. The remaining cost was to be paid at a 6% interest rate 
over 20 years. The amount to be paid varied also depending on the size of plot 
allocated and the amount of loan taken as shown in table 3-3 above. 
3.2.2.4 Administrative organisation 
The following administrative arrangements were made for the effective project 
planning and implementation. 
i). A project unit was to be set up, and charged with responsibility for the 
implementation of the project under the direct supervision of the Bauchi State 
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Urban Development Board and the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria with 
technical assistance from the World Bank. 
ii).The Bauchi state government through its Development Board was to be 
responsible for co-ordination of projects, acquisition of land, payments of 
compensations, survey of land, preparations of designs (Direct or via an 
appointed consultants), staffing a project implementation unit, supervision of 
project implementation, mobilisation of community action in both sites and 
services and upgrading projects and post implementation maintenance of the 
projects. 
iii).The Federal Ministry of Works and Housing and the Federal Mortgage Bank 
were to jointly supervise the project preparation studies and monitor the 
performance so that lessons learnt could be transferred to future similar project 
iv).The plot development was entirely an individual matter. However, it was 
suggested that local community groups be formed through whom beneficiaries' 
complains or request could be channelled. Such groups would also be helpful in 
mutual help labour as well as management and maintenance of housing area and 
services. They may also be useful in cost recovery. 
3.3 Project implementation 
In 1987 the Makama project was declared officially completed when all plots 
achievable were made available for allocating and the World Bank had disbursed 
all its loan. 
The Project as implemented however, fell far short of the planned target dates 
and quantity. According to the original schedule for instance, implementation 
should have been completed by 1983 when all preliminary and civil works 
should have been completed and plots demarcated and allocated to selected 
beneficiaries and shelter loans disbursed to them for home construction. Two 
years from then by 1985, the project was expected to be fully matured with all 
structures and shelter in place and households occupying at least basic units in 
the beginning. In reality, the project implementation had dragged for nearly a 
decade and was still not fully completed at the time of this study. The delay in 
the implementation has also resulted in cost overruns due to inflation and 
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devaluation of the Nigerian currency. The appraisal study conducted by 
Onibokun in 1989, for instance revealed that, the project actual cost crune to 126 
million Nairas ($28 million) instead of the 23.76 million estimated. This means 
that the value of the World Bank loan taken has also increased from 11.56 
million to 61.9 million Nairas, meaning that the Nigerian government as at 1988 
will pay more than five folds of what they had borrowed from the Bank. The 
figure has even gone up now, because the value ofNaira has further depreciated. 
The delays in project implementation have been attributed to a number of factors 
including the following: 
i) Delay in setting up a project implementation unit due to the shortage of 
technical personnel, inertia and long bureaucratic procedures. When the unit was 
finally set up, many of the staff were inexperienced and could not effectively 
handle matters in project execution and monitoring (Onibokun 1989). 
The unit did not have an autonomous power to deal with many issues. Matters 
like plot allocations had to be referred to the Commissioner of lands in the state 
ministry and join the bureaucratic delays inherent in the system. 
ii) Delays in land acquisition procedures: This, which was envisaged to be quick 
and easy due to the land use decree turned out to be a very difficult, costly and 
time consuming process. The project unit, instead of preparing a cadastral map 
for easy identification of the various parcels of land, used a crude method of 
physically measuring the land area each owner said he owned, have his nrune 
written down and pay him accordingly. There were 1,500 land owners involved 
in this process. 
iii) Delays in execution of civil works: The award of contracts for the civil works 
was delayed until 1981. This was because the first set of detail designs and 
engineering drawings prepared by the appointed consultants were found to be 
incorrect and had to be condemned. The project had to be re-commissioned for 
new designs causing further details and an additional cost. When the contracts 
were finally awarded, as a result of lack of consistent release of funds and lack of 
co-operation from the other agencies, the contractors did not work as fast as 
expected. 
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The plot allocation exercise and the initiation of construction which were 
dependent on the progress of the civil works were also delayed until the last 
quota of 1983. 
iv) Delays in plot development: Monitoring reports and preliminary evaluation 
of this project have indicated the slow process of plot development by the plot 
allottees. Many plot allottees were either very slow or not developing their plots 
for a long time after allocations were made to them; some started building and 
later abandoned. This is the major focus of this study and therefore discussed in 
greater details in the later part of the chapter. 
3.3.1. Achievement of project's objectives 
Of interest to any project evaluation is whether the original design objectives of 
the particular project have been achieved after implementation or not. In the 
Makama project, the objectives are only partially achieved. The objectives of the 
project were translated into specific goals and targets. The examination of the 
each of these targets below, shows clearly that a wide gap exists between the 
stated goals and the achieved in many aspects of the project. 
i). Substantial increase in the supply of low income housing in Bauchi through 
providing 3,950 serviced plots for low income housing 
First of all, only 2,100 serviced plots were achieved, living a short fall of 1,850 
plots. 
There is no doubt that the project has led to an increase in the supply of housing 
in Bauchi. However it failed to substantially increase the supply to the low 
income group. Survey (analysed in chapter 7) has shown that only about 20% of 
the houses built in the project area belonged to intended low-income earners, 
while about 80% belonging to a middle and high income earners. 
ii). To demonstrate low-cost methods of providing urban housing: This was not 
achieved at all. The methods of construction adopted throughout the project was 
not low-cost. The majority of the house built were found to cost more 3 times 
the cost of an average low cost house in Nigeria (Onibokun 1989). 
It is important to point out here that even the demonstration unit built by the 
project unit that was supposed to set an example was far too costly. The 
104 
completed project demonstration unit was sold to a very rich individual at the 
cost of 45,000 N aira. It would be argued that the high costs of most of the houses 
in the project were as a result of ambitious designs and construction standards 
undertaken by the builders. Although the resulting standards are desirable, the 
implication, as it was found out during the survey was that the builders were not 
whom they were intended to be. 
iii). To recover investment cost on housing and infrastructure, 
The prospect the recovery of the investment cost of the Makama project 
anticipated, was not too promising according to the Manager of the Federal 
Mortgage Bank. Although the majority of beneficiaries have been found not to 
default payment, the assumed recoverable cost of project appeared not realisable 
for a number of reasons. First, every component of the project cost more than 
was estimated. The project was expected to have cost 28 million Nairas but the 
actual cost was 36.6 million. This meant a widening of gap between the cost and 
amount recoverable. The following table shows the estimated amount 
recoverable. 
Table 3.5 Estimate of amount recoverable from Makama project. 
Source of recovery Amount- (Naira) Comments 
Development 104,000 This amount turned out to be double the 
charges actual amount collected on the approved 
plan 
Mortgage loans repayments 7.53 million This amount was based on the assumption 
that all mortgage loan would eventually 
be paid off with full interest by borrowers 
Sales of housing plots 1.07 million Based on the assumption that all plots 
would be sold 
Sales of industrial 74,000 Assuming plots be sold at the rate of 
plots 1,000 
User charges-water 1.5 million At a rate of 6 Nai·ra per month per 
household over 15 yrs. 
User charges - electricity 1.5 million assuming rate of 6 Naira/month/household 
over 15yrs. 
Total estimate 11.78 million 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
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As can be seen, the total amount recoverable is 11,785,3000.00 Naira. Even if 
this amount was to be recovered fully, a wide gap still exists between the actual 
project cost and the recoverable amount. This represents a heavy element of 
hidden subsidy in the project. Furthermore, as a result of Naira devaluation, the 
actual cost of the project in Naira, as at 1988, was 126 million. Also the actual 
amount in Naira that the Nigerian government has to repay to the World Bank is 
61.850 million, as at 1988 (Onibokun 1988), and not the 11,558.4 million 
estimated. This amount has since increased because of the downwards trend of 
the Naira. The amount stood at nearly 140 million in 1992. Note that this amount 
excludes any interest on the loan. As this additional cost can not be transferred 
to the beneficiaries, it represents a huge element of subsidy that has to be born by 
the government. This clearly means that the original investment can not be 
recovered. 
iv). Following the above discussion on the failure of cost recovery, the 
conclusion is that the prospect of replicating the project in the near future is 
almost impossible. Many officials involved with the project, including the 
FMBN Manager, have reported that repliceability is not possible. 
v). To generate employment through the industrial layout provided to investors. 
This aspect of the project was also not achieved. Contrary to the assumptions of 
the project planners, no investors showed any interest in the industrial plots 
provided. Therefore the plots have been converted to residential plots and sold to 
high income earners. 
The only form of employment generated was of a temporary nature during the 
construction work. However, most household heads were found to be employed 
in another part of the town and did seem to be doing very well. This is because 
the area is not remote and is easily accessible from the other parts of the town. 
vi). To improve the quality of housing in the existing settlement by extending 
essential services (water, electricity, good access roads, storm drains and refuse 
collection services) to them, thus benefiting 27,000 people. 
This appeared to be the most successful component of the Makania project, both 
in meeting its set target, as well as reaching the intended groups effectively. All 
the five clinics, five primary schools, proposed roads, as well as water supply 
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and electricity, promised, were delivered to the community. This has no doubt 
improved the living standards of the low incomed directly. Although the 
majority of households were still using wells as a major source of water supply, 
complete reliance on them was less than it use to be. 
The only problem with this component of the project, appeared to be the 
provision of storm drains. The storm drains were still uncompleted as at the time 
of the survey. Some parts of the project area were being flooded occasionally. 
Improvement in individual houses appeared to be concentrated on the frontages 
(zaures) mostly. Generally, the area looked improved in all aspects. The 
following table summarises the general performance of the Makama project as at 
the time of this survey in 1992. 
The above discussion clearly shows that the objectives of the project are far 
from being fully achieved. 
While many of the objectives were only partially achieved, others were not 
achieved at all. The following table gives a summary of the performance of the 
project. 
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Table 3.6 Summary of the Makama project performance. 
Project Goals Planned Achieved Comments 
1. Substantial Increase of low- 3,950 2,100 Partially achieved. 
income housing, through the All plot 55% Target number of plots could not be 
provision of serviced plots and allottees achieved. Also only about 20% of 
building loans • low income allocated plots were 
a. Serviced plots built. and only about half of plot 
b. Building loans 
allottees received building loans. 
2. Affordable cost of construction to all not The houses built were found not to 
achieved be low cost. 
3. Reaching the low-incomed 
a). S&S Component 80% 20% Only 20% of the low-incomed 
b).Upgrading 100 100 benefited by building a houses 
in S&s project, but 100% oflow 
income benefited through upgrading 
4. Recover investment cost Recover cannot Less than 10% of the capital cost 
estimated recover 
would actually be recovered. Huge 
cost fully 
element of subsidy 
5. replicate project in other unlikely Replication of project is highly 
location 
unlikely 
7. Generate employment by 74 local none Entrepreneurs showed no interest in 
providing 74 industrial plots to industries plots provided. 
entrepreneurs 
8. Improve the quality of 5 clinics 5 clinics 
Most targets were achieved, though 
with delays. 
existing settlement to benefit 5 school 5 schools 
27,000low 11 b/holes 
11 k. volt 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
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3.3.2 Issues arising 
Apart from the delays in implementation of the project, several other changes 
were made during implementation of the project some of which include: upward 
increase of income bracket for participation in the project, imposition of the use 
of higher standard permanent materials and plot revocation exercises from 
original allottees. These changes had their various consequences, which have 
already been discussed in the first chapter. 
However, of interest to this study is the issue of plot consolidation by the target 
plot allottees of the project. Although the progressive development model by its 
nature advocates a gradual and slow development process, in many cases the 
process turned out to be even slower than expected. 
In the Makama project, about seven years after the project commencement, 
nearly half of the allocated plots were still vacant with no sign of any 
development and many constructions that had been started looked abandoned 
(Onibokun, 1988). This means a very low level of consolidation in the project. 
Since the Sites and Services Strategy has been incorporated into the National 
Housing Policy, this slow production process will be a major drawback to the 
overall housing provision for the low income groups. The aim of this study, as 
stated earlier, is to investigate why the level of consolidation remains lower than 
expected. As a starting point for this investigation, an attempt has been made in 
the next section of this chapter to find out the extent of the low level of 
consolidation in the project at the time of the study. 
3.4 The low level of consolidation in Makama Project 
This section attempts to establish the extent of the low level of consolidation in 
the project at the time of the study. Here, the major determinants of the 
consolidation level, such as: the speed and rate of completion of houses, lack of 
consolidation by certain groups, and the turn over rates are discussed. 
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SPECIFICATION 
Concrete foundation and ~lockwork up to 
ground level 
Concrete floor slab 
3m-high mud-block walls 
Cement render externally 
Zinc roofing plus azare timbers 
1 zinc and timber door 
4 zinc and timber windows 
NET COSTS: N=3 500 
fig 3.4 : Specified size of basic unit and building materials . 
Note that though a 3m mud wall was put down on paper as one of the material specifications, 
this was replaced with concrete blocks or burnt bricks by the authorities as the soon as project 
took off. The use of mud for any part of construction was banned. The few people who 
attempted to use it were ordered to demolish their buildings. 
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Consolidation can be interpreted in many different ways by different people at 
different times depending on the focus of a study and the issues being addressed. 
For instance, for a study focused on assessing consolidation iri a squatter 
settlement, consolidation would be interpreted as the gradual process by which a 
squatter in an illegal settlement improves his dwelling from a mere makeshift 
house to a permanent dwelling following legalisation and provision of basic 
services by the authorities. On the other hand, consolidation on a freshly 
acquired plot of land as in the sites and services projects will mean a process by 
which the owner gradually builds his house and occupies it. The latter 
interpretation is what this study is mostly interested in. 
The process of new house building will usually involve: the purchase of land, its 
preparation and development, preparation of the house design, purchase of 
materials and labour and the actual building of the structure. However in the 
sites and services projects, the project authorities undertook the initial stages of 
acquiring, preparing and developing the land and then allocating it to the 
households. A design for the initial basic unit house was also made available for 
those who wanted to adopt it. In effect, the plot allottees undertook only the 
payment for the plot, the act~al construction process and moving into their 
houses. The completion of these stages marks the end of the process of 
consolidation for this type of housing exercise. However, for the purpose of 
analysis in this study it will be necessary to define the end point where 
consolidation is completed. In this study, consolidation is defined as the process 
by which households, who were allocated plots in the sites and services projects 
gradually build at least minimum habitable housing units over a period of time 
and move in. Though house building continues beyond this level, as and when 
the household can afford it, additions will mainly be improvements and 
extensions to the dwellings. The minimum habitable unit, estimated by the 
project planners, was a unit of two bedrooms and a parlour, and a service core 
(kitchen and toilet) built with a combination of traditional (mud) and modem 
materials (concrete). See figure 3.4 
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3.4.1 Pace of Consolidation in Makarna project 
The actual consolidation undertaken by each plot allottee consists of a number of 
stages, beginning from the setting out the building plan through laying 
foundations and floor, to raising the walls and roofs and finally finishing the 
house and moving in. The level of consolidation at any one time will depend on 
how fast or slow the households are able to undertake these processes through to 
completion. Hence speed of construction and rate of house completion are very 
crucial in determining the level of consolidation. 
Every beneficiary in the Makama project was expected to complete and move 
into at least a basic unit or show substantive progress towards this, within two 
years of plot allocation. This requirement was necessary to achieve one of the 
projects' objective of increasing estimated additional low income housing stock 
for the planned period. In order to find out how far this dateline was adhered to, 
the owners of completed houses were asked how long it took them to complete 
their units, their responses are in the table below. 
Table 3-7 : Duration of construction period. 
Duration of construction Frequency 
(in years) 
No % 
1-2 61 60.4 
3 30 29.7 
4-5 10 9.9 
Total 101 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
The table reveals that most completed houses were built to a habitable level 
within a relatively short period. Up to 60.4% were completed within two years or 
less of plot allocation, and 29.7% took three years while only 9.9% took four to 
five years. 
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This means that those who consolidated did it speedily, mostly within two years 
of plot acquisition. Despite this, the total number of units completed in the 
project remains low. This is because certain plot allottees are either not 
consolidating or are very slow in doing that. A general survey of the project site 
reveals that many units that were started are uncompleted and others are 
abandoned. Some plots are empty with no signs of construction at all, as shown 
in the following table. 
Table 3-8: Level of consolidation 
Level of consolidation Frequency 
No % 
Completed and occupied 1,272 60.6 
Uncompleted 696 33.2 
Not started 131 6.2 
Total 2,099 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
The table reveals that, as at March 1992, nearly a decade after the project took 
off, only 60.6% of the plots were fully consolidated. A further 33.2% are at 
different stages of construction while the remaining 6.2 % are totally empty with 
no sign of construction. A further analysis was also undertaken to show the 
stages of construction of the uncompleted houses. This will also be used to 
indicate how many more houses will be completed within a certain period of 
time; and from this the future rate and level of consolidation can be estimated. 
The results of the investigation, as shown by tables 3-9 and 3-10, are not very 
promising. Despite the majority of houses being at earlier stages of construction, 
many are abandoned and may not be completed within five years or less. Note 
that some of the uncompleted houses shown in the following plate~ show no sign 
of progress. Many of them looked abandoned, with no sign of construction being 
continued. (Plates 3.1 - 3.6 are illustrations of abandoned and uncompleted 
houses.) 
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Plates 3.1 a,b, & c : Show the Makarna Project aerial 
view at various angles from Jahun hill 
The plates Show the project area as it was at the time of survey in March 1992. 
The pictures were taken from the top of Jahun hill. Notice that the vegetation is 
very scanty, because most of the original frees in the area were cut down during 
plot preparation. Also the areas originally demarcated for parks and tree planting 
were converted to building plots. 
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Figure 3.2 : Bauchi town showing the Location of Makama Project Area 
Source:Final Recommendations, Makama pilot project, Dar Al 
Handasah Consultants, Shairs and Partners 
Scale : 1/20 000 (rn) 
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Plates 3.3 a&b : Examples of some of the unfinished houses at the 
advanced construction stage 
Showing houses at roofing and finishing stages. The house in plate A was bought from an 
original allottee when the foundations were only partly completed. Building activities have 
resumed in the house and will be completed three months from the time this picture was taken. 
The owner, however, has another house and will let this after completion. 
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a. 
Plates 3.4 a&b: Examples of abandoned uncompleted housing units. 
The units in plate A had been abandoned for five years at the time of the survey, and those in B 
for three years. The owners were interviewed and they said they were renting at the time. They 
did not think they would be able to complete the houses. 
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Plates 3.5 a&b : Examples of uncompleted units and undeveloped 
plots used for dumping solid waste 
These are occasionally burnt down, releasing fumes, which smell terrible into the whole 
surrounding area causing air pollution. 
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Plates 3.6 a&b : Showing large uncompleted housing units 
More examples of large uncompleted houses. Both of houses have cost more than necessary to 
complete a minimum unit of consolidation. 
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Table 3.9: Stages of consolidation reached. 
Stages of construction Frequency % 
(percentage completion) 
Paid for plot only (5%) 38 29.1 
Foundation & dpc (25%) 17 16.5 
Low walling (45%) 27 26.2 
Wailing to lintel (65%) 15 14.6 
Roofing stage (75%) 9 8.7 
Finishing (85%) 5 4.9 
Total 111 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
The table reveals that nearly half (45.6%) of the plots were either empty or had 
only foundations, and 40.8% are at different stages of walling. Only 8.7% are at 
the roofing stage and only 4.9 per cent at the finishing stage. This means that 
more than half (71.8%) of the uncompleted houses have not gone half way 
through the process of consolidation. Furthermore, many looked abandoned with 
overgrown grasses and rubbish tips. 
When some of the non-consolidators, were asked to estimate the time they 
thought they needed to complete their houses and move, the following responses 
were obtained. 
Table 3-10: Expected date of completion. 
Expected time of Frequency 
completion (years) 
No % 
2- 3 years 25 28.7 
4- 5 years 13 14.9 
Indefinite 22 25.3 
Planning to sell 23 25.4 
uncompleted unit 
Have a revocation notice 4 4.9 
Total 87 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
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Note that only 28.7% (25) of the respondents said they could finish within 2-3 
years. This means that by 1995, the total number of completed houses would 
have increased by only 25 units. The plots that have not been developed are 
likely to be revoked and allocated to other people, who are mostly not from the 
target group as evidence has shown. This implies, that not many houses will be 
completed in the near future and the total number will remain low. 
3.4.2 Rate of production of units 
The rate at which the units are being finished can indicate the overall level of 
production at any one time. The higher the rate, the more the number produced 
at the end of a certain period. The rate of production in this project is measured 
by the number of units completed per year using the project records from the 
previous years. For the three year period between 1992 (when the survey was 
conducted) and 1995, the responses from the survey were used to estimate what 
the. rate is likely to be, as shown in the table below. 
Table 3-11: Level of consolidation by year 
Year No of Plots Noof Noof Level of Rate of 
allocated houses houses completion production(/yr.) 
started completed 
1985 1174 131 18 1.5 18/year 
1988 1972 954 438 22.4 146/yr. 
1992 2099 1968 1270 60.6 317/yr. 
1995 2099 2099 1295(est.) 69.9 8/yr. 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
Though the above table shows that the level of house completion has increased 
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over the years, it is still lower than the expected level as at 1992 (by which time 
the level should have been 100% ). Furthermore, an estimate of the number of 
houses to be completed in the period between 1992 and 1995, shows that no 
significant increase will be made on the level by the intended target group. What 
is even more alarming is the finding that the original plot allottees are being 
systematically replaced by an unintended group. 
123 
>-() 
C 
QI 
Proportion of target group and level of consolidation by year 
::, <10 
l 
~ 
30 
20 
10 
O+---------+---------t---------; 
1985 1988 1992 1995 
Year 
I-Level of consolidation _._ Proportion of target group I 
Fig 3.8 Proportion of target group and level of consolidation by year 
124 
The project Surveyor reported that as at 1992, 400 plots originally allocated 
have been revoked and reallocated to others. A scan through the allocation 
register confirms this. It also revealed that most of the new allocations went to a 
higher income group because stricter conditions, which the low income could no 
longer meet were introduced. If the project records are anything to go by, the 
initial allocation exercise was 80% to 20% in favour of the low income target 
group (those earning between 200-500 Naira). However, this ratio kept changing 
over the years. The proportion of the low income group had reduced to only 
19.7.8% by 1992. See the table below and the comparative graph Fig.3.8, on the 
opposite page. 
Table 3-12: Proportions of income group 
Income levels 1985 1992 
(in Naira) No % No % 
200- 350 72 75.0 54 19.7 
351 - 500 13 13.5 77 28.1 
501 - 800 11 11.5 125 45.6 
800&over 0 0.0 18 6.6 
Total 96 100.0 274 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
Note that the 1992 survey includes the owners of all categories of plots 
consolidated and unconsolidated. When these categories are separated, the 
results become even more disappointing. Out of the 159 completed houses 
surveyed, less than 20% is from the legitimate income group. 
The fact that initial allocation records showed that 80% of the plots was 
allocated to the low income group, and the result of the analysis of the completed 
houses shows only 19.7% belong to this group, indicates that the consolidation 
problems are being experienced mainly by the low income beneficiaries. 
It is very important to note here that the income brackets used were not the 
original figures used by the project authorities. Adjustment in incomes and 
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changes in the definition of the low income groups, which occurred over the 
years since the project was started, were taken into account. 
3.4.3 The extent of the low level of consolidation 
At the time the study was conducted in March 1992, the level of consolidation in 
the project remained lower than expected. The project was declared completed 
in 1987, by which time most of the civil works had been completed, all the 
serviced plots achieved were allocated to the beneficiaries and the World Bank 
had disbursed all its loan. The following table reveals the date of plot allocation 
in order to show that all the plots surveyed had been allocated for many years. 
Table 3-13: year of plot allocation 
Date of plot Frequency 
allocation 
No % 
1983/84 34 29.8 
1985/86 39 34.2 
1987/88 28 24.5 
1989/90 13 11.5 
Total 114 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1993. 
As the table has shown, 88.5 per cent of the surveyed plots were allocated before 
or during 1988 (that is four years before this survey).Only11.5% were allocated 
in 1989/90, about two years before the survey, which was also sufficient time for 
the minimum period of basic unit consolidation (2 years) expected after plot 
allocation. Therefore it is justifiable to say that a full consolidation of 100% was 
expected on all plots by the time this survey was conducted. 
However, as we have seen earlier, this did not happen. Further evidence also 
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revealed that the level would not increase significantly in the following three 
years. 
3.4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
It is clear from the above discussion that in many aspects of the projects, there 
were discrepancies between the planned targets and what were actually executed. 
These include, the time and cost targets and plot consolidation. Of major interest 
to this study, as stated earlier, is the discrepancy in plot consolidation level. 
The gap in level of consolidation was established. Certain plot allottees have not 
started building, and others not completing the buildings they have started on 
their plots. This was due to a number of reasons~ the investigations of this will 
be the major preoccupation of the rest of this study. Also evidence has shown 
that the level will remain low in the near future unless some measures are taken. 
It was also established that the consolidation problem is more serious among the 
low income group (original plot allottees) whose proportion in the project, kept 
reducing with time. It is important to note that even if consolidation in the 
project increases in the next few years, it is more likely to be by a group other 
than the original target group, judging by the trend shown above. Unless 
something is done to reverse this trend, the intended target group will be 
displaced completely within a short time and the benefits of project will shift 
entirely to a different group. So the purpose of this study is to find the causes of 
this problem. To accomplish this task, the first step was to discover what has 
been said about the causes in the literature, on the basis of which the hypotheses 
tested by the study were partly formulated. 
The next chapter presents this discussion. 
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Chapter 4 :Causes of the l~w level of consolidation in Sites and 
Services project 
4.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter was a description of the case study which established the 
extent of the research problem. This chapter, which is mainly on the factors 
affecting consolidation, and the causes of if low level, is aimed at finding likely 
answers to the research question. The hypotheses tested in this study were 
derived partly from the relevant information provided by this review, and partly 
from the background knowledge and understanding of the case study area and 
the beneficiaries. The chapter is divided into three sections, with the first 
discussing the concepts and definition of consolidation in aided self-help 
housing projects and the interpretation of the low level of consolidation. In the 
second section, the factors affecting consolidation and the causes of its low level 
in the site and services projects are discussed. The last section is a summary of 
the chapter with a conclusion on the factors to be tested. 
4.1 Consolidation in the self-help housing projects. 
The consolidation process in aided self-help housing can be looked at in two 
different ways. First, consolidation can be defined as a process by which families 
in squatter settlements gradually invest and improve their dwellings following 
legalisation and upgrading of the settlement by housing agencies. The other 
definition of consolidation that is more relevant to this study, is 'the process by 
which families allocated plots in the sites and services projects progressively 
develop them over a period oftime' (Laquian 1983). 
The level of consolidation can also measured in different ways. In a squatter 
settlement, the level of consolidation can be measured by the extent of 
improvements made by households on their dwellings at a given point in time. In 
sites and services projects, on the other hand, the level is measured by the total 
number of houses completed to the required standards (quality and size) and 
occupied by the plot allottees at a given point in time. The minimum size of 
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units and quality of building materials are usually specified. This definition is 
adopted for the purpose of this study. The level of consolidation is said to be low 
when the actual number of houses completed to the required standards is short of 
that expected at the time of measurement. The extent of the low level is 
determined by the extent of the gap between the expected level and the actual 
level. 
The most important factors to be considered when studying a consolidation 
process are the pace of consolidation, the cost and the methods used. All these 
three factors determine the direction of the process and influence its ultimate 
level. A slow pace of consolidation has been widely reported (Laquian 1983; 
Keare and Parris 1982 Bamberger 1982; Ward 1985 and Onibokun 1988) as one 
of the major problems in the World Bank assisted sites and services projects so 
far executed in most Third World countries. A number of factors have been 
found to affect consolidation, some of which are discussed in the following 
section. 
4.2 Factors affecting consolidation process 
The factors responsible for the pace, cost, scope and direction of consolidation 
are the most important to be identified in analysing consolidation (Laquian 
1985). Most studies of basic housing show the following factors as having the 
most important influences on the housing consolidation: security of tenure; 
condition of dwelling at the start of programme; family income levels; housing 
design; types of building materials specified and the construction method used 
(Laquian 1985). Other socio-economic factors like reluctance of participants to 
leave their old communities, ownership of another property, level of education 
and type of occupation also have a significant influence on the process. 
4.2.1 Security of tenure 
The security of tenure has been shown to be one of the most important factors 
in the process of consolidation, particularly in squatter settlement upgrading 
projects. J.F.C. Turner (1966) in his work on the 'Barriadas' of Peru has 
observed that a relationship exists between security of tenure and housing 
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consolidation. His main hypothesis was that "If people were assured security of 
tenure they will voluntarily improve their dwelling to their fullest capability" and 
if people felt insecure, they will be reluctant to invest in their dwelling even if 
they can afford to (Laquian 1983). This hypothesis has been found to be true in 
many urban developments all over the world. However the question of land and 
land tenure is a complicated and sensitive one. 
Different systems of land tenure are in use in different parts of the world. The 
most commonly used are the outright ownership system and common law 
system, both originating from colonial powers and spreading to the rest of the 
world (McAuslan 1985). 
A). Outright ownership originated from France, Netherlands and Spain and 
spread to the different countries around the world colonised by them. This 
system of tenure gives rights to free ownership and disposal of land. Outright 
ownership is the most favourable option to prospective house 
builders/improvers. Outright ownership will make them invest as much and as 
fast as they can in their houses because they feel very secure. It was reported for 
instance, in the Tondo Project of Manila that once the security of tenure was 
assured by sale of land to the bona tide residents, the pace of consolidation 
accelerated rapidly (Laquian 1983). However this is not very favourable to the 
project management as it limits their control on the use of land. If, for instance, a 
road in the project needs to be lengthened or widened for which land needs to be 
acquired, the process is usually expensive, complicated and time wasting 
(Laquian 1983). 
B). The other major land tenure system is the English common law system. This 
system which originated in England has spread to many of its former colonies, 
including India, parts of Africa, and the USA. This system gives a restricted 
ownership and rights to land. It allows authorities to retain some of control over 
land transfer, land use, acquisition by the state, taxation, and land development 
(McAuslan 1985). 
i). Leasehold and freehold are two of the ways used to implement the restricted 
land ownership. In the leasehold arrangement, there is a landlord and leasehold. 
The leaseholder is permitted to use the land for a limited period of time, 
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anything up to 99 years or more, after which the land is returned to the landlord. 
Freehold is very similar, except that there is no landlord between the occupier 
and the state (McAuslan 1985). 
ii. Right of occupancy. This system that has been developed and use in Nigeria 
(Land Use Decree 1978), vests ownership and control over land in the state, who 
can give a right of occupancy to the public. This has some similarities to both 
the leasehold system and the traditional African system. In the traditional 
African system the land is vested in the hands of the local chiefs who give rights 
to the individual occupiers, while they retain total control of it and prohibited its 
transfer. A similar system is also used in Tanzania. 
In the 'right of occupancy' system, although the state or president has some 
control over the land, they can grant permission to occupiers to transfer or sublet 
the land. The state however, retains the right to re-acquire the land for any 
development in the interest of the state. A lease term of up 30 years or more is 
often used and rent is also payable by the occupier to the state. In the 1978 Land 
Use Decree of Nigeria, a further provision was also made to discourage land 
speculations. This provision that is known as the 'half-hectare rule' prohibits any 
individual from holding more than half of a hectare of undeveloped land. 
The leasehold appears to be the one most commonly favoured by aid agencies in 
many developing countries, their argument being that it allows sufficient time 
for housing investment to the beneficiaries while allowing the authorities to still 
maintain control of the land and regulate its uses. Some authorities give the 
beneficiaries a purchasing option after the lease period of 25 years during which 
they had monitored and controlled project development. This option is also 
favourable to the speed of investment because beneficiaries will invest in the 
fullest knowledge that an option to own the land after a few years is open to 
them. The main concern with this option is that allottees often sell their right to 
ownership even before they are legally entitled to do so. There is a concern that 
the low income target beneficiaries would sell their rights to a higher income 
group for immediate financial gains and drop out of the project. However, a 
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leasing arrangement is often made to prohibit this activity to make sure the 
project actually benefits the target group. 
The hypothesis, that security of tenure influences investment in housing, has 
been fully exploited by the World Bank in their intervention to aid the low 
income housing sector in the developing countries, through sites and services 
projects. Beneficiaries were beneficiaries were given titles to freshly serviced 
plots of land on which to build their houses, and in squatter upgrading, where 
existing slum settlements are provided with essential services and illegal 
occupants are given legal titles to their dwellings. 
Many studies(World Bank 1982, 1983, 1985) have reported that these projects 
have increased the investment in housing by individuals. However there still 
leaves a lot to be desired in the speed and level of investments brought about by 
these projects. This is because security of tenure is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for investment in housing. 
4.2.2 The initial stage of the dwelling before the project 
If the initial stage of the dwelling, before a project started is such that the level of 
basic needs required by a family already exists, majority of households will be 
reluctant to make greater improvements quickly. If on the other hand, the 
condition of the dwelling is very dilapidated at the start, the slightest opportunity 
will make households want to improve their dwellings. Co_nsolidation will 
therefore be faster. This however is a more relevant explanation in upgraded 
settlements. In a freshly serviced site, the situation is almost the reverse, as was 
found by some studies, e.g that of Dadora project in Kenya A wide range of 
options of levels of services and core units was offered to participants in the 
different sites and services projects according to their affordability. It is generally 
observed that the provision of a core unit and more, ensures quicker completion 
of a dwelling. A study revealed that consolidation was fastest where the highest 
level of services and core units was provided, and slowest where services were 
least (Laquian 1986). In the Dandora project, two basic options were provided. 
Option 'A', where a plot with only toilet, water connection and a party wall was 
provided, and option 'B', a plot with all the facilities in 'An' and a completed 
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room. Plots in option 'B', were occupied almost immediately after allocation, 
while further building activity was undertaken gradually. Type 'A' plots, on the 
other hand, required some initial investment by the households before they are 
habitable. So while the allottees of plots in option 'B', moved in and were 
advancing their building activities, the option 'A' owners took longer and 
invested more to bring their units to a habitable stage. This was further 
compounded by the fact that most of them lived far away from the project site 
and had to travel at a considerable cost daily to and from site. As a measure to 
encourage them to move to the project site, the construction of temporary 
shelters was recommended. 
Although the provision of core units accelerates the pace of consolidation, it also 
has the major disadvantage of forcing households to use certain materials and 
makes them stick to the design arrangement dictated by the existing core units. 
This may be against their will as some studies have shown. Provision of a high 
level of services and core units also means an initial high cost incurred by the 
project's management. This will mean a high level of mortgage repayment that 
may be difficult for the majority of the beneficiaries to meet. The implication of 
this is that, where this option of higher level of services and core units is 
provided, it may only be afforded by a higher income group. Another 
disadvantage is that it imposes a certain design style and room arrangement 
pattern on the participants following the location of the core unit already 
provided. In some cases, participants were reported to have knocked down the 
core unit which they felt did not conform to their arrangements. This means an 
unnecessary waste of scarce resources. 
4.2.3 Family income 
The amount of disposable income available to the beneficiaries can also affect 
their ability to consolidate. The higher their income, the more able -they will be to 
invest on housing and vice versa, particularly if they have large family 
commitment that is likely to consume all the income. Peter Ward (1976a) has 
shown in his study that the type of employment and the level of education of the 
beneficiaries is also likely to affect the level of consolidation. The better and the 
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more stable the jobs they have, the more willing and able they will be to invest in 
housing. 
Income is the single most important selection criterion of the beneficiaries of 
basic housing projects, therefore it is anticipated that all other things being equal, 
selected participants should have adequate income to afford the cost of 
consolidation in these projects without any problems. However, this assumption 
does not take account of external factors like inflation. In most of the projects 
evaluated, it was reported that one of the main problems experienced is the rise 
in cost of building materials and labour due to inflation. In Senegal, for instance, 
the construction price index rose from an annual average of 180.9% in 1975 to 
251.9% in December 1979. Also, over a period of 4 years (1976-1980), the price 
of a ton of cement in Dakar more than tripled (Laquian 1987). The rises in the 
cost of construction meant that the target group could no longer afford to build in 
the project. 
4.2.4 House design standards 
The issue of building codes and housing standards has for a long time been a 
major area of controversy in the provision of low income housing in the 
developing countries. The standards set are usually too high for the particular 
target group. Some of them are a direct copy from Western Europe and North 
America so are neither economically nor socially appropriate for the people 
(Mabogunje 1978). Therefore much of the low income housing provided by 
direct consti;uction entirely misses its target and ends up in the hands of the 
middle income groups leaving the low incomed housing problem unsolved. The 
World Bank aided housing projects were meant to rectify this problem. 
Since affordability was found to be the main issue in low income housing, the 
World Bank has tried to push for lower standards of both housing units and 
services to reduce the cost thereby increasing the affordability by their target 
group. The argument still remains as to whether the standards are low enough for 
the group of people in question. 
Furthermore, even the Bank's proposed standards have been rejected by many 
housing authorities in the different countries, who still insist on the application 
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of their existing building codes and standards to the projects. For instance, in the 
Dandora projects, it was reported that progress in sites and services was 
hampered by the adherence to building codes and standards (Laquian 1983). 
Similarly in the Senegal projects, the recommendation of expensive design 
standards by the housing authorities was reported to have made consolidation 
difficult by many of the target households. 
Therefore the issue of the right standards for low income housing still remains a 
problem. How does the cost of the existing standards compare to what they can 
afford? and how can the gap be narrowed to increase their affordability? These 
questions still remain as some of the main issues to be addressed in low income 
housing. 
4.2.5 Types of building materials 
In specifying the type of building materials for basic housing, factors like the 
cost of the materials, their availability, or scarcity, the skills needed to work 
with them and the peoples' attitudes to them must be taken into consideration. 
This is because they affect consolidation directly. If high standard imported 
materials are specified for construction, the cost would be high and 
consolidation slow. If on the other hand, locally available cheaper materials are 
used, the cost would be less and consolidation probably faster. Similarly if the 
type of materials specified are not readily available, it will hamper the progress 
of consolidation. Although the World Bank claims to have recommended the 
use of locally available cheaper building materials in the majority of the projects 
it has assisted, studies, particularly of the earlier projects (e.g. Senegal project) 
have revealed that some housing authorities tended to favour the use of 
permanent and expensive materials (Keare and Parris 1982). In the later projects, 
such as in Zambia, the use of locally produced sun-dried bricks and soil-cement 
blocks was recommended in the design. The main factor under consideration 
was the cost. It was estimated, when they were designed that the units built with 
local materials would cost half as much us those with imported materials. 
However, the major setback here is the peoples' attitudes to these materials. 
Most people felt that they were not good enough for them. Furthermore, contrary 
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to the project assumptions, the study of the Zambian Project by Bamberger 
(1982) revealed that it took longer to build with the soil-cement blocks than 
with hollow blocks. This was because of the lengthy processes and waiting 
times involved in making them ready for use. The hollow blocks, on the other 
hand were readily available in the market. People preferred to use the hollow 
blocks for reasons of aesthetics, and prestige. Many considered a house made of 
local materials as a poor man's house, and no improvement over their former 
house in the slum settlement. Also for families who were considering sub-letting 
their house, the use of hollow blocks was an important economic consideration 
because they attract higher rents. 
4.2.6 The methods of construction used. 
The extent to which self help labour and mutual labour are used will affect the 
pace of consolidation (Laquian 1983). Some studies, for example those of Keare 
and Parris (1982) show that self-help construction took longer to finish because 
most households did not have the technical skills for it, and being in full time 
employment could not devote much time to construction work. Evidence from 
the earlier studies has also shown that consolidation was faster in projects where 
hired labour and contractors were used (Laquian 1983). When self-help or 
mutual labour was used, there was the need to train and organise participants, 
which caused major delays. 
4.2. 7 Socio-economic factors 
The socio-economic factors which affect consolidation include the following: 
house ownership; reluctance to move from former communities; household size; 
level of education attended, and type of occupation. If some of the households 
allocated plots already own houses outside the projects, they will have no 
urgency to consolidate and will therefore hold back their plots for the purpose of 
speculation. Also, some households may be reluctant to leave their old 
community for fear of losing intimate friends and friends in need. The 
coexistence of low income and high income families in most housing 
developments is very beneficial to both groups. Although this point may not be 
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relevant in some communities, in many Nigerian communities, it is a very 
significant point. While the low income earners render small services to the high 
income, they are paid in cash or kind. Also sometimes they are offered free 
meals by richer neighbours. 
The level of education which determines the nature of a person's job and the 
amount of wages he receives affects consolidation in a similar way. Peter ward 
(1976) did an extensive study of these factors in three upgraded settlements in 
Mexico City. The three squatter settlements he chose for his study were at 
different stages of consolidation. He defined them as consolidated, consolidating 
and incipient. He carried out a comparative study of the settlements to find out 
what factors are responsible for the marked degree of difference in the level of 
consolidation (home improvements and extensions) between them. The results 
of the study showed that the age of household heads, their income levels, 
number of years spent in education and the type of work they were employed in, 
as the most important determinants of the level of consolidation. 
Households who are less educated and in low paid jobs are economically 
insecure and have less ability to invest in housing, while those with good 
education and highly paid jobs invest and consolidate faster at the slightest 
opportunity. His Study also revealed that the older residents of the upgraded 
settlements were more willing to invest and improve their houses following the 
legalisation. 
In addition to the above factors, people may also have different reasons why they 
do or not invest in housing. 
The most important reason why people do not invest in housing, is that they may 
the lack of means to do so. Many people's life-long ambitions are to own a 
house of their own, and given the means, the majority would invest in one. 
Another very important obstacle towards house investment may be the lack of 
security of tenure. Lack of security of tenure would do the exact opposite of 
what security of tenure (discussed above) does. People would not invest in a 
squatter dwelling, even if they had the means, for fear of being relocated and 
entirely losing what they had invested. 
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The most important reason for people to invest in housing is the need for a 
house, both for the individual and the family. The greater the need, the more 
likelihood it is for households to invest at the slightest opportunity. 
Also some may want to own a house for economical reasons, as an asset or to 
sublet and get income, or simply to avoid paying rents. Others may want to 
invest towards a house for the future. For instance, in the event of death of the 
family's wage earner, who pays the rent, the rest of the family would have 
something to fall back on. Some may even invest in building their own house to 
change their social class from renter to house owner, which might seem to be 
more prestigious. 
4.3 Causes of the low level of consolidation in Sites and Services Projects 
The following have been identified by earlier studies as probable causes of the 
problem of the low level of consolidation in sites and services projects: a) high 
cost of consolidation relative to participants affordability, b) lack of access to 
adequate building loans, c) subsidised building and d) technical assistance from 
the project authorities; e) delayed provision of basic services to project sites; f) 
remote location of project sites and socio-economic causes which include: g) the 
reluctance of participants to move from former communities, ownership of 
another property, h) level of education, i) types of employment, and j) large 
household sizes. Some of the causes are elaborated in the following subsections. 
4.3.1 High cost of consolidation relative to participant's incomes 
The high cost of consolidation in most project has hampered their progress 
If the cost of consolidation is higher than the participants can afford, there will 
be a consolidation problem in the project. A number of factors such as prices of 
building materials, labour and land determine the overall cost of consolidation. 
Affordability is the major consideration in the design of the Sites and Services 
Projects. Despite this, evidence from the evaluation of projects has shown that 
most target groups can not afford the cost of building on the piece of land 
allocated to them. The affordability problem in this project often arises as a 
result of the gap between what people can afford and the actual cost of 
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consolidation. This could be due to high design standards as in the case of 
Senegal, evaluated by Keare and Parris (1982). They reported that in this project 
the low level of consolidation was partly due to the expensive design suggested 
for the project dwellings. It was also reported that the project authorities made a 
design of model houses which the participants were persuaded to copy even 
though it was well known that they could not afford them. They also observed 
that the households did not only adopt these design standards but attempted to 
build and finish their units in a single phase. The result was that many plot 
allottees abandoned their unfinished units. 
The gap between affordability and the cost of consolidation could also result 
from wrong calculations and assumptions of affordability made by the project 
authorities. For instance, households may not be willing to spend up to the 20% 
of their income on housing that was assumed by the World Bank in calculating 
affordability of most of their assisted projects. Also the majority of household 
may not have savings or other sources of borrowing to supplement the project 
loan for building. 
Problems may arise in verifying incomes of self employed participants and 
therefore wrong figures may be used. 
Other factors which can affect the cost of consolidation may be external to the 
projects, such as inflation and pricing policies. If high inflation raises the cost of 
building materials and labour, the original target plot allottees may lose the 
affordability to consolidate. This is particularly so if project implementation is 
~elayed. In many Developing Countries, inflation rose by several hundred 
percent in the recent years thereby escalating the cost of everything including 
building materials, in Nigeria and Senegal. In Senegal for instance, Keare and 
Parris (1982) have reported, that a ton of cement tripled its price in four years 
between 1976 and 1980. 
Similarly in Nigeria, between 1978 and 1988, the price of cement rose by 250%. 
Studies of earlier projects (Keare and Parris 1982, Bamberger 1982, 1983) have 
also shown that the majority of project participants tended to use paid labour 
rather than the free self-help assumed. The added costs of labour meant an 
increased cost of consolidation. Consequently if the target group could no 
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longer afford to consolidate, they may sell their right to ownership to a higher 
income group. This may lead to a gradual displacement of the target group and a 
shift of the benefit to an unintended group. 
Some project authorities (e.g. in Senegal, Zambia and Nigeria) have raised the 
income band for participation, thereby allowing some middle and high income 
households to participate. This further reduces the access to the project of the 
originally intended groups. For instance in the Senegal project, the income band 
was raised twice, first from CFAF14 500 to CFAF15 000-45 000 and then to 
CFAF18 000-415 000 (Laquian 1986). 
4.3.2 Lack of sufficient support by project authorities 
The provision of a serviced piece of land is a necessary and most important 
condition but may not be sufficient for consolidation to occur. Additional 
support had to be provided to some beneficiaries to help them consolidate. Such 
support included: the provision of cash and/or materials loans; provision of 
- technical assistance and the availability of building materials at an affordable 
price by the beneficiaries. It has been widely reported in many evaluated 
projects (e.g. Senegal, Zambia and Makama) that many of the target 
beneficiaries blamed their inability to consolidate on the lack of a sufficient 
project loan. This is because most low incomed participants did not have savings 
or other sources of finance and depended totally on the project loan for 
consolidation. For instance, a survey of the Senegal project revealed that 92% of 
participants said their construction was to be fully financed by the project loan 
(Laquian 1983). Personal savings were used in only 8% of the cases and other 
banks' loans were inaccessible to the project participants. The few commercial 
banks in most Third World Countries, which provide finance for housing, prefer 
to give to the higher income groups for security. 
Regarding the building materials, many projects, particularly more recent ones, 
did not provide subsidised building materials to the participants. The plot 
allottees had to use what little loans they were issued to purchase the materials 
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on the open market. This, in many cases, could not buy them enough to complete 
their houses. 
The earlier projects which operated building materials stores, issued vouchers to 
beneficiaries for purchasing building materials (as discussed in chapter 2). 
Because the stores provided a very limited choice of materials, many families 
felt that were being forced to use specific types of materials which they did not 
like. Also running the stores proved difficult, especially in terms of keeping up 
with the demands. People had to queue outside the stores for days. So this idea 
was dropped in the later project. 
Technical assistance also is crucial to those households who want to engage in 
self construction. Again it is the poorer households who can not afford the cost 
of hiring labour. Keare and Parris ( 1982) in the their study, showed that self help 
construction was significant among the poorer participants. Their consolidation 
process will be slowed if they are not given the required technical assistance. It 
takes longer, and materials are wasted if they have to build by trial and error. 
This becomes more difficult if they are forced to use the type of materials with 
which they are not very familiar. The evidence from other projects has shown 
that technical assistance was not made available to the participants. The lack of 
technical skill has discouraged many households from engaging in self-help 
labour. For those who could not afford to hire labour, the only alternative was 
not to build anything on the plot until when they could afford to pay. 
Insufficient supports for participants may either be due to faulty project 
planning, in which they were not included, or proposed, but not implemented. 
The latter is more common among the group of projects in this study. 
In an attempt to tackle this problem, some project authorities, (e.g. in the 
Makama and Senegal projects) had to increased the amount of loan. 
It was reported in the Senegal projects that the loan was raised from 
CFAF275000 - CFAF415000 (Laquian 1986). 
However, there was a limit to how much increase they had to offer and also 
because the size of loan had to take into consideration what people were able to 
repay. Increase in the size of loan, meant an increased amount of monthly 
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instalments which the majority of the poorer participants may not be able to 
meet. 
4.3.3 Delayed provision of services to the project site. 
The delayed provision of services to the project site by the project's agency has 
also been reported to have contributed to the low pace of consolidation in some 
projects. It was reported in most of the earlier projects that the majority of 
households will not move on to a site until basic services are in place. One of the 
most important basic services on site, for consolidation, is water which is not 
only needed by households for drinking but also for construction on their 
allocated plots. Delayed provision of water to the sites meant a delayed 
consolidation process, and the lack of street lighting has also been found to 
discourage it. In the survey of the Senegal Project, when participants were asked 
why they did not move on to the site, even though they had completed their 
basic units, the reasons given included: lack of essential facilities on site (42%); 
unfinished fencing around the plot (21 % ); lack of police station, market or 
community toilets (16% ); and 21 % other reasons. The pattern of these responses 
reveals that lack of services and infrastructures were responsible for the delayed 
movement to the site (Laquian 1984 ). The delayed provision of the services in 
most of the projects has been attributed mainly to lack of inter-agency co-
ordination and lack of sufficient funds (Keare and Parris 1982). 
One of the measures suggested to rectify this problem was the phasing of service 
provision during implementation, beginning with the most important services for 
consolidation like water supply and electricity and adding the less important 
ones later. 
The best solution of course is to provide all services at the beginning, and in time 
for participants to move in and consolidate. This was found to be very difficult 
in most project, because of the manner in which project funding was released. 
For instance, in the Makama project, it was found that inconsistent and delayed 
release of funds by the project financier has contributed to the overall delay in 
the implementation of the project. 
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4.3.4 Project location. 
The earlier sites and services were often located on the outskirts of the city far 
from the centre, on the grounds that land was cheaper there(Swan 1983). In 
many projects located on the periphery, it was found that the target group were 
reluctant to move to new sites due to lack of access to employment or easy 
transportation to the city centre. However this problem has been overcome in 
some of the later project. For instance, in the Makama project, though the project 
is not exactly in the town centre, the easy access and relatively inexpensive 
transportation costs have solved the problem. 
Also, contrary to the project assumption that households would build basic units 
and move into them while extension went on, in most cases they did not. The 
erection of temporary shelter on site during consolidation was discouraged by 
most local authorities Their argument was that temporary structures would spoil 
the appearance of the environment (Laquian 1983). 
4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
Consolidation, for the purpose of this study, was defined as the process by which 
households allocated plots in the Sites and Services project gradually developed 
them to the authorities required standards over a period of time. 
Consolidation in aided self-help projects generally has been found to be 
influenced by a number of factors, some of which include the following: 
security of tenure; initial stage·of the dwelling; family income; design standards; 
types of building materials and methods of construction used; and socio-
economic factors including; the reluctance of participants to move from former 
communities; ownership of other houses; level of education; types of 
employment and large household sizes. The low level of consolidation, in the 
sites and services projects particularly, has been attributed to a number of 
causal factors, some of which include the following: high cost of consolidation 
relative to participants' affordability; lack of access to adequate loans, subsidised 
building materials and technical assistance from the project authorities; delayed 
provision of basic services to project sites and remote location of project sites. 
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Some of the explanations are, however, more important in some projects than 
others depending on the particular circumstances of the project. 
It is important to note that most of the factors identified did not result from 
academically oriented empirical studies of the projects described. It is therefore 
the concern of this study to devise a testable hypothesis based on the literature 
and personal understanding of the study problem. The factors in the literature 
which will be used in formulating the study hypotheses include: the high cost of 
building relative to the income of target beneficiaries, lack of access to adequate 
building loans, and the methods of building used. Based on the knowledge of 
this project and of the beneficiaries, the study will also test the inadequacy of the 
size of the basic unit specified to the target group. The hypothesis thus 
formulated has already been stated in the introductory chapter. The next chapter 
(5) discusses the methods of testing the hypothesis. 
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Chapter 5 : Methods of testing the hypothesis 
5.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter ( 4) was a review of the literature on the causes of the low level of 
consolidation in sites and services projects, from which the hypothesis for the study was 
partly formulated. This chapter discusses the methods used in testing the hypothesis. 
This involves determining the nature of data required, methods of gathering the data and 
the analytic techniques used. The chapter is in three sections, with the first restating the 
hypothesis and discussing the nature of data required to test it. The second section 
discusses the sources of the data and the methods used in gathering them, while the last 
section is on the analytic techniques used in testing the hypothesis. 
5.1 The Nature of data required 
The principal hypothesis for this study is that the low level of consolidation by the target 
beneficiaries of the Makama project is caused by inaccurate estimates and assumptions 
made by the project Planners regarding their affordability, needs and preferences. 
The statement means that Planning errors have been committed in this project which 
were assumed to be responsible for the existence of the research problem. The areas 
where these errors occur are in the affordability estimates, the determination of the needs 
of the target beneficiaries, as well as their housing preferences. 
Affordability, for the purpose of this study, is used to refer to the ability and willingness 
of the target beneficiaries to pay for the cost of the basic unit. Inaccurate estimates will 
then mean that the planners have overestimated the cost which the target beneficiaries 
were willing and able to invest in building their units. Needs here refer to the target 
beneficiaries' spatial needs (number of rooms) in the basic unit. Wrong assumptions 
regarding preferences here mean that what, and how the target beneficiaries preferred to 
build are different from what it was assumed they would prefer. 
The principal hypothesis is simplified into a measurable form as stated in chapter one 
(1.2.3). The data required to test the hypothesis is determined by the parameters to be 
measured as follows: 
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1). The actual cost of building a basic unit with required materials (concrete and factory 
burnt bricks) is significantly higher than the target beneficiaries could afford. 
To test this hypothesis, two parameters had to be measured and compared. The two 
parameters are: a) the actual cost in Naira of building a basic unit. b) the cost in Naira 
affordable by the target beneficiaries. To get the required data, the cost had to be 
determined by using both the builders' estimates as well as the market estimates of the 
cost using the specified materials. 
Data for the cost which the target beneficiaries could afford were determined from what 
they said as well as on estimate of how much it cost them to build their uncompleted 
units. Also data on the amount of loan given as well as the availability of other sources 
of finance like savings, other borrowing and donations were used in determining the 
actual amount of money available to the target beneficiaries to invest in building the 
basic units. 
2). The target beneficiaries preferred, and used, hired labour in building rather than the 
self-built methods assumed by project planners. It was also thought that the method of 
labour (hired labour) which the beneficiaries preferred to use had increased the over all 
cost of consolidation. Data required here covered the actual method which target 
beneficiaries used and methods assumed by planners. 
Data on the estimated cost of hired labour was also required to show how its use of hired 
labour has significantly increased the cost of building a basic unit. Although reliable 
data on how much was spent on labour could not be obtained, the general estimated cost 
of labour for building similar units in the rest of the town was used An estimated 
amount of between 15 - 20% of the total cost was generally paid towards hired skilled 
labour. 
3). The size of a basic unit (number of rooms) which the target beneficiaries needed is 
significantly less than that assumed by the project planners. For this hypothesis, two 
measurements were obtained and compared. i). the number of rooms proposed by 
planners and ii). the number the target beneficiaries needed. The information regarding 
the number of rooms needed was obtained directly from asking the target beneficiaries, 
146 
and by observing their building practises both in the project and outside it. The two 
measurements were compared to establish the extent of the gap. 
5.2 Sources and methods of data collection 
The data required for this study were collected from both primary and secondary sources 
using various techniques. This study, being a case study in nature, most of its secondary 
sources of information are documentary, including: administrative documents, project 
proposals, progress reports and other written reports on the project. The primary data 
were mainly obtained from a questionnaire survey, direct observation and interviews. 
The main methods include: informal discussions with the beneficiaries and project 
officials, personal observation, and direct interviews, which involved asking questions 
directly to extract the required data. 
5.2.1 Informal discussion 
Informal discussions and interviews were held with the project's officials and some of 
the project beneficiaries. Some of the project officials interviewed included the Project 
Manager, Project Architect, Surveyor, Accountant, Land Officer, the Federal Mortgage 
Bank Manager, some members of the plot allocation committee and many junior 
workers who took part in the implementation of the project. They were asked mainly 
open ended questions about the planning and implementation of the projects and their 
general opinion on how things went. They were also asked some specific questions to 
confirm certain aspects of the projects already reported in documents. 
5.2.2 Personal observation and photography. 
This was the first stage of the field work undertaken. The whole project area was 
observed. The purpose of this was to make the researcher familiar with the area, 
understand the road pattern and become acquainted with the respondents whose 
maximum co-operation was needed in the later stage of the survey. Observation 
techniques were also necessary to assess the progress of consolidation. This was done 
by physically counting, the number of houses completed, the number uncompleted and 
the number of unfinished houses at the different stages of constructions. Also to note, in 
addition to asking people, the type of materials used. Photographs were taken to show 
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the type of houses built, the general look of the project area at the time of survey, the 
nature of uncompleted or abandoned houses, and the quality of finished houses on the 
project site. 
5.2.3 Questionnaire survey 
The questionnaire's survey was the major technique used for the collection of the 
primary information from the beneficiaries of the project. This involved the design of 
questionnaires, selection of the study sample (sampling procedure), a preliminary pilot 
study, and the administering of questionnaires to the selected sample. The various 
responses from the questionnaire survey constituted the major information upon which 
the hypotheses were examined and tested. There are various techniques which are 
generally used to administer questionnaire based surveys. These include mail 
questionnaires, personal interviews and telephone interviews. Both the mail 
questionnaire and the telephone interviews have been found to be unsuitable for this 
research, because respondents often have neither correct postal addresses nor 
telephones. Also, mailing questions reduces the control of researcher and his freedom to 
probe or explain beyond what is stated in the questions. Furthermore, the response rate 
for mail questionnaires is often low. Therefore the personal interview technique using 
structured questionnaires was chosen for its obvious advantages of greater freedom and 
control by the researcher, higher response rate and more flexibility and opportunities to 
obtain details of reactions while observing respondents. 
5.2.3.1 The questionnaire design 
The design of a questionnaire for a survey is based on the assumption that, it is possible 
to formulate questions and phrases with an identical context which have the same 
meaning and are equally meaningful to all respondents (Bailey 1987). 
The questionnaires translate the research objectives into specific questions, the answers 
to which will provide the information needed to test the Hypotheses. Some of the things 
taken into consideration in designing the questionnaire included: the content, format and 
sequence. The content was such that it probed for as much relevant information as 
possible. The questions were also made as precise as possible. Questions which were 
either embarrassing or annoying to the respondents were avoided and their proxies were 
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used where possible. The format of the questions is both open and close ended. In close 
ended questions, care was taken not to suggest or force answers on respondents. They 
were always given a chance to give a different answer from the options suggested if they 
wished, e.g. an option like, "other and then specify" was included to take care of that. 
The sequence of questions moved from easy ones to more difficult ones to build up 
respondents' confidence and enthusiasm. The most difficult or more sensitive questions 
were left to the end. 
The questionnaire covers all major aspects of the factors which were assumed to be 
responsible for the problem being studied. Also other factors on the socio-economic and 
housing characteristics of the targ~t beneficiaries, which are considered important in 
supporting certain explanations were included. The main content of the questionnaire is 
as follows: 
1) Extent of the low level of consolidation in Makama project. This section of the 
questionnaire is meant to show the magnitude of the research problem at the time of 
survey. Questions asked here concerns the speed and pace of consolidation. The 
variables to be measured include: the duration of consolidation (in years); dates of plot 
allocation; methods of plot acquisition; the stages of consolidation reached on 
unfinished units; and estimates of completion time (in number of years). 
2) Causes of low level of consolidation 
This section asks questions which relate directly to the assumed causes of the problem 
as stated by the hypotheses. Questions were asked on each of the aspects of the 
hypotheses. These aspects were: 
a) Reasons for the lack of consolidation 
The actual cost in Naira of building basic units; prices of building materials required, 
methods of construction used and the reason for these, cost of labour hired, the amount 
which is invested in housing monthly by target beneficiaries. 
b) Size of basic unit 
Questions in this section are meant to provide data on the size of basic units proposed by 
the project as well as actual sizes of housing units measured by the number of rooms 
needed by the participants in the project. For the project proposal, the data is available in 
the project documents. For the sizes of units needed by the participants, two methods 
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were used. The first was to ask individuals their requirements and the second was to 
observe their practices in both their traditional areas and the new project area. 
c) The amount of loan available. 
Questions here include whether the project loan was taken, how it was utilised, the 
amount given, its sufficiency, and the availability, or lack of other sources of finance. d) 
Methods of construction used. 
It was assumed that the majority of target beneficiaries had used or attempted to use paid 
labour rather than the self-built method assumed by the project. Questions here were on 
methods of construction used, and how much was paid towards labour were it was 
employed. 
e) Socio-economic characteristics of target project beneficiaries. 
Certain socio-economic factors, as discussed in Chapter four above, have been shown in 
other studies to affect consolidation in the earlier projects. Although they are not the 
main factors in this project, they could be used to support the findings of the study. The 
variables to be included in the questionnaire include: the household size, head of 
household's occupation, income, and level of education. 
f) Housing characteristics of project consolidators and nonconsolidators. 
In Chapter one (l.1.3) it was pointed out that one of the consequences of the research 
problem was that the nonconsolidators were living in worse housing situations than the 
project house owners. To verify this, the housing characteristics of the whole surveyed 
sample were investigated and a comparison was made between the characteristics of 
nonconsolidators and consolidators. The parameters to be included in the questionnaire 
are: the quality of building materials, level and availability of services and the costs of 
housing. The cost of housing (in Naira) here refers to the running cost of current 
housing. Data required included the number of rooms in their houses, quality of 
building materials used to build houses, availability of electricity and sources of water 
supply and also types of sanitation (toilet facilities). 
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5.3 Sampling 
Having designed the questionnaire, the next task was how to administer it. The direct 
interview methods have already been chosen as the most suitable technique to 
administer the questionnaire for this study, however, the sample population on which to 
administer it has to be selected. This procedure which is known as sampling is necessary 
partly because it is almost impossible to survey the whole study population, due to the 
limitations of time and resources. Moreover, results from a carefully selected 
manageable sample size can give a high degree of accuracy of conclusions about the 
entire population group. 
The main emphasis in selecting a sample is to make it as representative of the 
population group as possible, so that a conclusion on the whole population can be 
drawn. For the purpose of this study, the following procedures have been undertaken to 
select the required sample. 
5.3.1 Sample size and sampling techniques used for the survey. 
The project provided a total of 2100 plots organised into 18 clusters, each of which 
forms a small neighbourhood sharing common facilities like public pumps and open 
space. The sizes of the clusters vary widely in the number of plots as well as the 
available open spaces. The total number of allocated plots (2,100) forms the total study 
population. A sample size of 300 participants, which is about 7% of the total number, 
was aimed at for the study. The sample size was determined based on the preliminary 
sample surveyed and the level of acceptable error decided on. A review of the available 
sampling techniques (Bailey 1987, Nachimias 1981) has led to the choice of the three 
different variants of the probability techniques which are aimed at making the sample as 
unbiased as possible. The techniques used are simple random, stratified and systematic. 
i).Stage 1: eighteen different clusters of varying sizes and level of consolidation were 
identified in the whole study area. Using a simple random technique, the names of 6 
(1/3) clusters were drawn from a box containing all the eighteen. The clusters picked as 
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shown in Fig. 5.1 on the page 121, are Sll,Sl3,S25,S9,S18 and S20 with a total of 
1,300 plots. 
ii) Stage 2. stratified sampling. Due to the nature of the information required, it was 
necessary to select two different samples for the interview. One sample to be drawn 
from the plot allottees who have not consolidated or completed consolidation in the 
project yet. The second sample to be drawn from beneficiaries of the project who are 
currently living in the project site either in a rented house or in their own consolidated 
houses. This meant that the plots in each of the clusters chosen had to be divided into 
two strata: one representing the finished and occupied houses, and the other representing 
the uncompleted houses and undeveloped plots which have already been allocated. 
iii) stage 3: systematic sampling. In each cluster, the required sample for each category 
was selected by systematic sampling technique. A total of 313 plots, comprising both 
consolidated and unconsolidated plots in the appropriate proportions, were selected from 
all the study clusters on which the questionnaires were administered. 
5.3.2 Pilot study. 
The pilot survey for the study was carried out in January 1992. Using purely simple 
random techniques, the preliminary questionnaire was administered on 75 households. 
The pilot study was undertaken for the following purposes: a). to get more acquainted 
with the layout of the area and understand the street patterns for easier orientation during 
the actual survey, b).to determine how easily understandable and sensitive some of the 
questions were and how to minimise their effect on the respondents. c). to allow for 
proper design of survey strategy and approximate estimate the time required to conduct 
the actual survey, d). to experience some of the problems that may be encountered and 
devise ways of minimising them during the actual survey. 
5.3.3 Final survey 
After the pilot study, the questionnaire was revised and necessary changes were made. 
Some questions were modified or omitted while others were included accordingly. 
Some of the major problem areas discovered during the pilot survey which were taken 
into consideration in the final survey included: 
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a) The language problem. The original questionnaire was designed in English only. It 
was discovered that many beneficiaries could not easily understand nor express 
themselves very well in English. So a translated version of the questionnaire, in the local 
language (Hausa), which is also understood by the researcher and the enumerators, was 
prepared. 
b) Many respondents had a feeling of being used. They said they were fed up with the 
project implementation unit always distributing questionnaires asking about their 
problems and never doing anything about them. So during the final survey, the 
enumerators were instructed to give a clear explanation of the purpose of the study while 
making it obvious that it had nothing to do with the project unit and was totally in their 
interest. Also respondents were reassured that all information would be kept in 
confidence and the investigation was going to be of practical value. Because of this 
problem, no member or staff of the project unit was used for administering the 
questionnaires. 
c) Another important point noted during the pilot survey was the lack of credibility of 
some enumerators. It was discovered from one of the of students who had been 
involved in administering questionnaires for similar surveys, that some questions were 
filled in by them without even going to site. This information was taken seriously in this 
survey. As a result, the enumerators used for the survey were trained and the purpose 
and importance of the study was clearly explained to them. Also the administration of 
the questionnaires was properly supervised. To reduce the temptation of cheating, their 
pay was determined by the hours of work and not number of questionnaires 
administered. Also to make sure that the enumerators actually visited the house, they 
were asked to bring back the paper stickers with numbers used to mark houses prior to 
the survey. 
d) General attitudes to females. Also it was discovered in the pilot survey that people, 
because of their prejudices, generally responded less enthusiastically to female 
enumerators. For this reason, all the four enumerators appointed were males except for 
one female assistant. 
With the help of four trained enumerators, the questionnaires were successfully 
administered over a period of twelve weeks between February and May 1992. 
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5.3.4 Limitations of the survey 
The response rate was very good, up to 90%, but certain problems were encountered 
during the survey which include the following: 
i) Time: It took longer than the estimated time to administer the questionnaires. This is 
partly because most respondents were employed and could not be found at home during 
the day time. Therefore they were only available in the evenings and at the weekends. 
ii) Unreliable addresses. Tracking down the nonconsolidators was difficult. Since they 
were not resident in the project site, they had to be traced to their current addresses. 
Their addresses held by the register of the project unit, mostly give only the general area 
with no street name or house number. To trace them would have been impossible 
without the help of the surveyor of the project implementation unit who knows virtually 
all the beneficiaries personally. With his assistance, 80% of the intended respondents 
were traced to their work places or houses successfully, and interviewed. The other 20% 
accounted for those who have either passed away, migrated or could simply not be 
traced. 
5.4 Methods of data analysis used 
Data analysis involved the translation of the information gathered from the field survey 
into forms amenable to quantitative measurements and comparisons in order to evaluate 
the researcher's propositions and hypotheses. Data analysis usually requires statistical 
techniques which will help the researcher to identify and recognise some patterns and 
regularities in the data. This will in turn enable the researcher to draw meaningful 
conclusions about the data. 
5.4.1 Data form 
The types of data gathered took three different levels of measurements: 
categorical or nominal, ordinal and interval levels. i). Categorical data is that which is 
grouped according to names or categories. Examples of data with · this level of 
measurement are: marital status which has: married, single, divorced and widowed 
categories. The tenure type is also another example of categorical data, categories here 
being renters, owners and squatters. 
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ii) Ordinal Interval data is also classified but, unlike categorical data, is also ranked. This 
implies one class is greater than the other. Income levels classified into high, middle and 
low, is one example of ordinal data. Occupation categories classified from the highest 
managerial level to the lowest clerical, is another example. Although this type of data is 
ranked, it is difficult to assign values at equal intervals to the rankings. 
iii) Interval level of measurement does not only classify and rank, but also specifies by 
how much one rank is greater than another. It gives precise numerical information and is 
often regarded as the strongest level of measurement. It was possible to create ordinal 
data from interval data, and categorical from ordinal, but not vice versa. 
5.4.2 Coding of the data 
Both the categorical and ordinal forms of data gathered were as the phrases and 
statements made by the respondents. To make the data easily readable by the computer, 
the statements were represented by numerical codes. The interval data, which was 
already in numerical form was left as they were. Numbers between 1 and 9 were used. 
The code attached to a statement has nothing to do with its weight, weighting of 
responses was done separately where necessary. 
5.4.3 Data entry and exploration. 
The coded data was entered into a file created in the data entry programme of the 
SPSS/PC+. After the data had been entered, a general exploration was undertaken by 
producing initial frequency tables and crosstabulations to inspect the data and see; (a) 
whether the data have been correctly transcribed, (b) if any variables need modifying or 
transforming, (c) whether some responses need recording, and (d) whether any cases are 
so extreme that they can be considered as outliers and may need to be excluded in the 
data set for final analysis. ( d) The exploration of the data had also helped in modifying 
the hypotheses where this was necessary. 
5.4.4 Statistical analysis. 
The purpose of the statistical analysis is to enable the researcher to confirm whether the 
hypotheses he put forward are acceptable or not, in the light of the evidence provided by 
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the data. The main techniques found to be most suitable to carry out the tasks in this 
study are: frequency distributions to compare the frequencies of certain responses with 
others; the chi-square test of independence to find whether there is an association 
between categorical variable; and the t-test to compare the group means of interval 
variables. 
5.4.4.1 Frequency distribution 
Frequency distribution was the very first analytic technique undertaken. This task was 
used to examine the pattern of responses to each of the variables under investigation. 
Interval variables like income, and ages had to be summarised into categories of equal 
intervals to give a shorter distribution table. The proportions and percentages of the 
distribution in each category permit meaningful comparisons between them. 
5.4.4.2 Chi-square test of independence 
The chi-square test was based on the assumption (null hypothesis) that two variables are 
independent of each other if the probability that a case falls into a given cell in 
crosstabulated tables is simply the product of the marginal probability of the two 
variables defining the cell. 
This statement is either accepted or rejected depending on the chi-square value as well 
as the significance. The significance value of 0.01-0.05 was considered enough to reject 
the null hypothesis. However anything higher than 0.05 led to the acceptance of the 
hypothesis. Where the hypothesis was rejected, it implied that, there is an association 
between the variables crosstabulated. However the degree and direction of the 
association are not revealed by the chi-square. Other chi-square associated statistics as 
Cramers V s were used for this purpose. 
5.4.4.3 T-test for comparison of group means 
The t-test was used to compare the group means of interval variables. The null 
hypothesis for this test was that the difference between the means of two groups is not 
statistically significant. The purpose of the test is either to accept or reject the 
hypothesis. The two different types oft-test generally used are: the paired t-test and the 
independent t-test. Only the independent t-test has been used in this study. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of survey methods and analytic techniques 
Factors Measurements Data Statistics used Level of 
and tests collection Significan 
methods ce 
l.Costof a)actual cost i. Questionnaire t-test 0.05 or 
construction b )affordable cost survey frequency less 
compare a>b ii. Market survey distribution 
A.Size of a)amount given i. questionnaire frequency proportion 
project loan b)amount survey distribution al 
sufficient difference 
compare b>a =or>l0% 
B. Construction a)method i. Questionnaire frequency frequency 
method used assumed survey distribution distributio 
b)method ii. Market survey n 
preferred 
a different from b 
2. Number of a)proposed i. Questionnaire i. T-test 0.05 
rooms in a basic number surveys ii. Frequency proportion 
unit b )needed number distribution al 
compare b>a difference 
Housing compare i. Questionnaire I. t-test 0.05 
characteristics quality a>b survey ii. Frequency proportion 
of cost a<b ii. Observation distributions al 
a)consolidators difference 
b )nonconso- =or>l0% 
lidators 
Socio-economic comparea&b questionnaire i. chi-square proportion 
characteristics for the following: survey -Cramer's V al 
of sample i. Incomes, ii. Frequency difference 
a)consolidators ii. Household distributions =or>l0% 
b)nonconli- sizes 
dators iii. Occupation 
iv. education 
v. marital status 
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5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The methods of testing the hypothesis discussed above were based purely on scientific 
procedures. The secondary data came mainly from the literature review while the 
primary data from a field survey of the project being investigated. The primary data 
which was used directly to test the hypothesis was collected by a questionnaire survey of 
a randomly selected population sample of the project beneficiaries. The data was 
analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSSPC+ ). Both descriptive 
and confirmatory techniques were used. The descriptive techniques included frequency 
distribution represented in the form of tables, charts and histograms. The confirmatory 
techniques used include, a) the chi-square test of independence for categorical and 
ordinal data and b) the t-test for comparing group means mainly with interval variables. 
The findings of the survey are presented in the next two chapters (6 & 7). Chapter six 
presents the general findings on the socio-economic and housing characteristics of the 
surveyed sample, while Chapter seven presents the specific findings of the hypothesis 
test. 
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Chapter 6: Survey findings on Socio-economic and housing 
characteristics 
6.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter (5) covered survey methods and analytic techniques used in this 
study, this chapter therefore presents the general survey findings on the socio-economic 
and housing characteristics of the whole sample. The presentation is in two stages, 
starting with the characteristics and then a comparative analysis of them between the 
groups in the sample. The chapter is in four sections. The first section outlines and 
defines the three different groups comprising the surveyed sample, while the second 
section presents their social and economic characteristics. These include sex, marital 
status, household size, level of education, types of employment, as well as their income 
distributions. Some of these characteristics, namely income and employment influence 
the ability to invest in housing. It is therefore hoped that they will provide supporting 
factors in explaining the causes of the research problem. The third section analyses their 
housing characteristics which include quality of housing. These include; sizes of 
dwellings, standards of materials used, occupancy rate, level of services and running 
cost of housing. The comparison of the housing characteristics of nonconsolidators with 
those of consolidators, will help to reveal the group which is worse off. This will in 
tum provide supporting evidence for the need for urgent intervention. The last part 
summarises the findings and draws conclusions. 
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6.1 Housing categories of the sample 
Table 6-1: Housing categories of the sample 
Housing Status (tenancy) frequency 
No % 
Consolidated house owner 102 36.8 
Renter of project house N onconsolidated 60 21.7 
plot owner 115 41.5 
Total 280 100 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
The above categories resulted from a random selection of two separate samples from all 
of the project beneficiaries. As described in Chapter 5 above, one sample was drawn 
from the nonconsolidating plot owners and the other the occupants of project houses 
(some of who are owners and some renters). 
The overall sample however reflects the actual distribution of the groups in the entire 
project population by nearly 100% (97% ). 
6.1.1 House owner (consolidators) 
These are households who have completed the process of consolidation and are living in 
their houses. For the purpose of this study, the minimum habitable unit is taken as the 
two bedrooms basic house with service core comprising of a kitchen and toilet/bath built 
with the minimum acceptable materials specified by the project authorities. All 
households who have completed and moved into such a unit or a larger one, can be said 
to have consolidated their plots fully. However, in this project various levels of 
consolidation well above the core unit are very common. The house owners constitute 
36.8% (102) of the total sample interviewed. 
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6.1.2 Renters 
These are the tenants in project houses and they make up to 21.7% of the sample 
interviewed. They rent either part of the house, sharing with other tenants, or the whole 
house in the case of larger families. This group apparently turned out to be a large one 
indicating the likelihood of project being commercialised in· the long term. Subletting 
which was encouraged to allow participant get extra-income was not popular at all in 
this project. People either let the entire property and lived elsewhere (absentee 
landlords), or occupied the entire house with the members of their family and other non 
rent paying relatives. 
6.1.3 Nonconsolidated plot owners 
The nonconsolidated plot owners constitute up to 41.5% of the sample interviewed. This 
category refers to those plot allottees in the projects who have not built at all or 
completed the process of building their houses to a habitable level. The 
nonconsolidators interviewed were in two different sub-groups. The first subgroup 
comprises those who were allocated plots in the beginning but later dropped out of the 
project for some reason. The second sub-group are those who held on to their unfinished· 
houses at various stages of construction, but had taken longer time than expected, and 
made very little, or no progress. 
6.2 Socio-economic characteristics 
Jn this section, the general social and economic characteristics of all respondents will be 
discussed first, and then they will be analysed comparatively. The tenure categories 
discussed above are used to distinguish the groups being compared. Crosstabulation was 
used to make the comparison, while chi-square and associated statistics were used to 
determine the association and its significance. The null hypothesis, in each case, is that 
there is no association between the characteristic and the tenure category of the 
beneficiaries. The characteristics to be compared include: sex, marital status, household 
size, level of education, types of occupations and income levels. At-test was also done 
to see whether there is a significance difference in the income means for the 
consolidators and non-consolidators. 
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6.2.1 Sex 
The sex of household heads in this project does not vary much. Up to 95.7% of 
household heads are males while only 4.3% females, out of the population sample 
interviewed. Generally, females in this part of the country rarely own land or property 
because of the dependency role the society expects them to piay. This is partly why the 
proportion of female headed households is very small in this project. Out of the 4.3% 
females who are heads of households, 80% inherited the houses from their dead spouses. 
Only the remaining 20% said they owned the houses from the beginning and are 
independent females undertaken in some kind of trading business. 
6.2.2 Marital status 
An analysis of the marital status of the household heads in the project, as shown in the 
table below reveals that 90.3% (253) of them are married, 8.6% (24) single, while 1.1 
per cent (3) are divorced. Out of the 24 single males, 20 are renters, while the remaining 
are nonconsolidators. 
Table 6-2: Marital status 
Frequency 
Marital status 
No % 
Married 253 90.3 
24 8.6 
Single 3 1.1 
Divorced 280 100.0 
Total 
Source: Field Survey January 1992 
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Table 6-3: Housing category by marital status 
housing Marital status of Household heads 
Category 
Married Single Total 
No % No % No % 
Renter 44 · 15.9 16 5.8 60 21.7 
Owner 100 36.1 2 0.7 102 36.8 
Nonconso- 80 28.9 7 2.5 87 31.4 
lidator 
Dropout 28 10.1 - - 28 10.1 
Total 251 90.6 26 9.3 277 100 
Chi-square = 23.63 Significance= 0.000 Cramer's V = 0.292 
Source: Field survey 1992 
Generally, there are more married than single respondents across all categories: . 
Out of the 102 (36.6%) house owners interviewed 98% (100) are married while only2% 
are single. Also, 80.5% of the renters are married, while only 19.5% single. Similarly, 
92.0 per cent of the nonconsolidators are also married, while 8 per cent are single. 
However, it is important to note here that the renter group, forms the largest group in the 
single category, i.e. 65.6% (17) while house owner and nonconsolidators are only 7% 
(2) and 26.8% (7) respectively. The nonconsolidators, being the second largest group 
may imply that they are not consolidating because they do not have immediate needs for 
house. This is further supported by the fact that majority of those who gave this 
response, are single males without much family responsibility. Lack of any form of 
family commitments, means that there is no pressure to have a private place, and hence 
the reluctance to consolidate a plot even if the resources are available. Furthermore, 
most of the plots belonging to the single males might have been held for purely 
speculative purposes. 
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6.2.3 Household size (Number of people living in the house) 
Table 6-4 : Household size 
Frequency 
Household size 
No 
1 person 25 
2-4 40 
5-7 108 
8 & over 106 
Total 279 
Source: Field Study January 1992 
% 
9 
14 
38.7 
38.3 
100.0 
The sizes of households appear to be generally on the large side in this project as shown 
in the table above. The table reveals that 76.7% of the households have 5 or more 
people, while only 14.3% have 2 to 4 people the remaining 9% are single males, mostly 
renters. The average household size of the beneficiaries is 7 .1 people, well above the 
Bauchi average of 5.6 (Dar AL Handasah 1978), which is in itself large. 
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8 or 
more 
people 
The tendency to have large households could be attributed to the polygamous nature of 
most households in Bauchi generally, and Makarna in particular. 
A further analysis was done by crosstabulation of the size of households and the housing 
status of respondents to see if there is an association between the two variables. The 
results are presented in the following table and illustrated by the fig. 6.1 on page 136 
Table 6-5: Housing category by household size 
Household Size 
Status One 2-4 5-7 8 & over 
person. 
No % No % No % No 
Renter 14 5.1 10 3.6 22 8.0 14 
House 3 1.1 10 3.6 45 16.3 43 
Owner 
Nconso- 5 1.8 12 4.3 26 9.4 44 
lidator 
Dropout 6 2.2 16 5.8 6 
Total 22 8.0 38 13.8 109 39.5 107 
Chi-square= 40.74 significance= 0.000 Cramer's V =0.221 
Source: Field survey March 1992 
% 
5.1 
15.6 
15.9 
2.29 
38.8 
Total 
% 
60 
21.7 
101 
36.6 
87 
31.5 
28 
10.1 
276 
100 
The statistics from the result of crosstabulating housing status (types of tenancy) and 
sizes of households show that there is an association between the two variables with a 
significance of 0.008 and Crarner's V of 0.221. The significance is more important in 
the differences between the renters of plots and the two other categories. This is because 
(as is revealed in the table), the renters of project houses tend to have smaller 
households while the house owners and nonconsolidators have larger. The size of 
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household does not directly help in this case to determine whether a plot allottee will be 
able to consolidate or not. However, from the findings (6.2.3) above, which show that 
the larger families who have bigger commitments are less likely to invest in housing, it 
can be inferred that the nonconsolidators, who have been found here to have large 
households, were unable to consolidate for the same reason. 
6.2.4 Level of education 
Table 6-6: level of education attained by household heads 
Level of education Frequency 
No % 
No formal education 22 7.9 
Primary school 53 18.9 
Secondary school 62 22.1 
College or University 143 51.1 
Total 280 100.0 
Source: Field Survey 1992 
The levels of education of respondents in this project range from no formal education to 
graduate level as shown in the above table. Only 7.9% said they had no western 
education at all, 18.8% had primary education (spending 4 to 7 in school) and 22. l % 
had secondary education (up to 12 years of schooling) While 51.1 per cent had higher 
diplomas and degrees, as shown in the table above. Evidence from these findings shows 
that more than half of the respondents are well educated. The average number of years 
spent in full time education for the whole group is 12 years. It is not therefore surprising 
that most of them were found to have been employed in the civil service and private 
companies, as will be seen later in their types of occupation. However it is very 
important to note that education here was only used to refer to the western education 
with which beneficiaries could easily secure jobs with the government or private sector 
employers. Most beneficiaries had the Quranic education including those who had the 
western education. Some of those who had only the Quranic education were privately 
employed as teachers for charity, took very little, or no, pay and depended on charity for 
their livelihood. 
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Table 6-7: Housing category by level of education attained. 
Levels of education attained by Household heads 
H. Status None Primary Secondary Higher Row Total 
Renter 1 9 15 35 60 
0.4% 3.3% 5.4% 12.7% 21.8% 
Owner 1 10 20 71 102 
0.4% 3.6% 7.2% 25.7% 36.2% 
Noncon- 19 25 21 22 87 
solidator 7.6 9.1% 7.6 8.0 31.3% 
Dropout 5 12 6 4 27 
1.8 4.3% 2.2 1.4% 9.7% 
Column Total 26 56 62 132 267 
10.2% 20.3% 22.2% 47.8 100% 
Chi-square =40.85 Significance= 0.0002 Cramers' V =0.231 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
The above results show that level of education is significantly associated with housing 
status. Education affects the ability to consolidate in a similar way, as shown in the 
findings of the earlier studies discussed above. The higher the level of education, the 
more stable paid jobs plot allottee will be able to secure, and the higher his income. If, 
on the other hand, the level of education is low, he will have to compete for unskilled 
jobs on low wages or engage in some form of unreliable petty trading. 
6.2.5 Types of occupation 
The main Occupation categories identified within the sample surveyed are, civil 
servants, farmers, businessmen, traders and artisans. 
Farmers are those engaged in full or seasonal food or animal production as an 
occupation, while civil servants, are all those employed by the public sector in 
government ministries, parastatals and companies. Business men and petty traders, 
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are the self employed individuals in big or small-time businesses and trading. Artisans 
are the self employed small time repair men, roadside mechanics, providers of services 
like shoe shining, nail cutting, tailoring, domestic servants, watchmen and general 
labourers. 
Table 6-8: Types of occupation 
Types of Main Secondary 
occupation Occupation Occupation 
No % No % 
Farming 8 2.9 76 43.2 
Civil service 
189 71.1 
47 16.0 100 56.8 
Business and 36 9.2 
trading 
Artisans 
280 100.0 176 100.0 
Total 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
Analysis of the household heads interviewed, as shown in the table above, reveals that 
71.1% (189) are employed in the civil services and 16.8% (47) are in business while 
only 2.9% are in full time farming activities. The remaining 9.2% (36) are artisans and 
petty traders. The civil servants are better represented in the project. This is probably 
because their incomes are more stable and easier to verify than those of business men 
or farmers, and also they are better educated, which makes them more able to 
understand fully the idea of the project right from the start. 
It is interesting to also note that most respondents were engaged in more than one 
occupation. At least 62% of the civil servants said they had a secondary occupation to 
supplement their meagre incomes. As shown in the table above, 43.2% did seasonal 
farming while 56.8% were involved in part-time business. Some full time business men 
also engage in farming activities during the rainy season. A comparative analysis of the 
types of occupation is shown in the following tables. 
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Table 6-9: Types of occupation by Housing Category 
Housing Main Occupations of Household heads 
Category 
Farmer civil trader or Total 
servant businessman 
Renter 6 52 2 60 
2.2% 18.8% 0.7% 21.7% 
House 18 78 6 102 
Owner 6.5% 28.2% 2.2% 36.8% 
Nonconso- 29 10.5 45 13 87 
lidator 16.2% 4.7 31.4 
Dropout 5 14 9 28 
1.8% 5.1% 3.2 10.l 
Total 59 188 30 277 
21.4 67.9% 10.7% 100% 
Chi-square = 26.219 Significance= 0.003 Cramer's V = 0.217 
Source: Field Survey: March 1992 
There is an association between housing status and type of occupation, as revealed by 
the statistics above. Also it can be observed from the table that most of the house owners 
(28.2%) are civil servants, as compared to only 6.5% farmers and 2.2% traders. The 
nonconsolidators, on the other hand, form the largest group in both farming and trading 
categories. Petty traders and farmers in this town are generally on less stable and less 
certain incomes than civil servants. The civil servants, who are sure of a definite salary 
every month and can plan their expenditure ahead and will therefore be more likely to 
invest in their house building. 
This is not to say that civil servants earn more, they do not necessarily. Traders could be 
earning more, in many cases, but because of the uncertainty of tomorrow's market, may 
not be willing to commit their money to housing. Furthermore, the requirements of 
proof of income and reliable (formal) employment to qualify for a Mortgage loan, also 
discriminated against the traders and farmers right from the beginning. 
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6.2.6 Income distribution 
The income of the households is a very important factor in their ability to acquire a 
house, therefore the importance of an analysis of income cannot be overemphasised. For 
the purpose of this study however, an analysis of the income levels will be made, 
bearing in mine the income specified levels of the target beneficiaries. The income 
distribution of all beneficiaries is shown first, and a further analysis will show the 
distribution for the two different groups of the sample interviewed, i.e. the consolidators 
and the nonconsolidators. 
Table: 6-10 Income distribution of the household heads 
Frequency 
Income levels 
No % 
201-350 54 19.7 
351 - 500 77 28.1 
501- 800 125 45.6 
800&over 18 6.6 
Total 274 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
As revealed by the above table, only the first two categories of income, representing 
47.8% can be said to have fallen within the specified income (200-500 Naira) bracket of 
the target group. The largest category of beneficiaries is those earning 500 Naira and 
over representing 52.2%, which is well above the target income. 
It is very important to note here that income distribution covered all those interviewed, 
including the project house renters, the house owner consolidator and the plot allottee 
nonconsolidators. When the income distribution was crosstabulated with the tenure 
categories, the result became even more disappointing, as shown in the table below. 
The comparative charts for levels of education, types of occupations and income 
distribution are in figures. 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 respectively. 
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Table 6-11: Income distribution by housing category 
Income Levels 
Status 201-350 351-500 501-800 800+ 
Renter 14 25 43 1 
5.2% 9.2% 15.9% 0.4% 
house 18 6.6% 21 47 15 
Owner 7.7% 17.3% 5.5% 
Nonconso- 29 35 22 1 
lidator 10.7 12.9 8.1 0.4 
Dropout 17 4 2 1 
7.4% 1.5% 0.7% 0.4% 
Total 61 81 112 17 
22.5% 29.9% 41.3% 6.3% 
Chi-square= 39.7 significance= 0.000 Cramer's V = 0.270 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
Total 
56 
20.7% 
101 
37.3% 
87 
32.1 
27 
10.0% 
271 
100% 
The above statistics show that there is an association between the two variables with a 
significant level of 0.000 and Cramer's V of 0.270. The table also shows that the 
majority of the nonconsolidators (23.6% out of 32.1 % ) appear to have come from the 
lowest income group, while the majority of the house owners (23.8% out of 37.3%) are -
from the highest income group. As for the renters, they are more or less spread through 
all income levels. A comparison of the average incomes of the households in the 
different groups by at- test confirms this. 
t-test for Income 
Groups Noof Mean T Probability 
Cases Value 
Consolidators 102 714 
2.23 0.001 
N onconsolidators 87 546 
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Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
The above result shows that the difference in the incomes of the two groups compared is 
statistically significant. The nonconsolidators had a lower average income than the 
house owners. This suggests that income affects consolidation positively. Those with 
more stable and higher paid jobs are more willing and able to invest in housing and 
therefore will readily consolidate given a security of tenure. This conclusion was arrived 
at after it was shown that income can be positively correlated to both levels of education 
and type of employment in this project. 
6.3 Housing characteristics 
The housing characteristics of the respondents to be analysed include the cost of housing 
and its quality for each category. 
The consolidators' houses which are to be examined are the houses that they currently 
occupy in the project area. However, for the nonconsolidators, their current houses are 
outside the project. So firstly, characteristics are presented separately, and then the 
outcomes are compared for the two groups. 
6.3.1 Quality of projects houses 
The quality of housing is generally indicated by the types of materials used in their 
construction, the size of the house and the level of services available. The more 
permanent a building material, the higher the material quality associated with the 
particular house and vice versa. Another indicator for quality is the level of services 
available in the dwelling unit which include: the availability of electricity, and sources 
of water supply, as well as facilities like proper sanitation and waste disposal. Another 
indicator is the size of dwelling. A large and spacious dwelling with an adequate number 
of rooms will be regarded as high quality in terms of size, while on the other hand an 
overcrowded dwelling is of poorer quality. 
6.3.1.1 Quality of building materials used 
The quality of materials is considered both in terms of permanency, safety and aesthetics 
to some extent. The more permanent a material is the better its quality. For instance, 
cement blocks are considered better quality than mud bricks in terms of permanency. 
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So the types of materials used in the different parts of the houses in the project, were 
examined and represented in the following tables. 
Table 6-12: Materials for foundations floors and walls. 
Foundations, floors and walling materials Frequency 
No % 
A) Foundations 
Concrete mix (plain) 130 50.2 
9" Concrete block 108 41.5 
6" Concrete block 20 7.5 
stones and crushed stones 2 0.8 
Total 260 100.0 
B) Flooring Materials 54 25.5 
Concrete 116 54.7 
Earth with cement screed 42 19.8 
compacted earth 
212 100.0 Total 
C) Walling materials 
Concrete blocks (9" & 6") 80 31.7 
Concrete block (6" only) 156 61.9 
Burnt clay bricks 14 5.6 
Mud bricks 2 0.8 
Total 252 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
Half of the houses are of plain concrete foundations and another 41.5% of 9" concrete 
blocks, while only 8.3% are of weaker 6" hollow blocks or stones. Also the majority of 
the houses 80.3% have strong floors, while only 19.8% were found to be of ordinary 
earth. Note the widespread use of blocks for foundations, even though the project 
planners recommended only the use of plain concrete. Many builders said it was cheaper 
to use blocks, and they argued that the money saved from the foundations could be used 
on other parts of the building. The implication of this is that the · use of weaker 
foundations may lead to collapse of buildings, risking lives and property. However, 
there is no evidence of this happening, as at the time this survey was conducted. 
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It was also found that 93.6% of the houses have concrete block walls, 5.6% of burnt 
bricks, while only 0.8% are of mud. The mud houses, it was gathered, are illegal and 
have been given a demolition order by the authorities. 
Table 6-13: Roofing and finishing materials. 
Roof types and finishes Frequency 
No % 
D) Roofing Materials 
Concrete 13 6.1 
Timber roof with Asbestos cover 142 66.6 
Timber roof with Corrugated iron 56 26.3 
'Azara' with zinc/corrugated iron 2 0.9 
Total 213 100.0 
E) Types of finishes 
Plastered & painted, in & out 97 46.9 
Plastered both ways but no paint 72 34.8 
Unplastered and unpainted 38 18.3 
Total 207 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
Most of the roofs (93%) are of timber with either asbestos or corrugated zinc cover. The 
use of asbestos was widespread especially by the early builders (between 1984 and 
1987), because at a certain stage, the prices had dropped. This was probably as a result 
of the increased awareness by the consumers about the controversy over the dangerous 
material it contains. 
Also, 81.7% of the walls were internally and externally rendered with cement plaster, 
and 60% of them were also painted fully and only 18.3% had neither plaster nor paint. 
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Table 6-14: Types of doors and windows used 
Doors and Windows Frequency 
No % 
E) Types of doors 
Wooden doors in steel frames 100 48.3 
Wooden doors in wooden frames 77 36.8 
Corrugated iron on timber 23 10.9 
Temporary cardboard cover 8 4.0 
Total 208 100.0 
F) Types of windows 
Aluminium & glass 4 2.0 
Crittall Hope 36 17.3 
Glass louvers 81 39.0 
Locally made wooden louver 68 32.6 
Temporary cardboard 19 9.1 
Total 208 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
Most of the doors and windows are of high quality permanent materials. Only 4% of the 
doors were made of temporary cardboard and 10.9% of corrugated zinc on 
timber/"Azara". 36.8% are of wood in wooden frames locally made, and 48.3% are of 
wood in steel frames. Similarly, 58.3% of the windows are glass in steel frames while 
32.6% are wooden and only 9.1% are of temporary materials. Note that glass louver 
windows are the most commonly used, though they are a security risk. This is probably 
because they are locally manufactured, prestigious, being glass, and reasonably priced in 
the market compared to other types of glass windows. 
Generally, the project houses are large and of a high quality material. Some examples 
of the finished houses are shown in the following plates. 
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Plates (j.l a&b: Examples of the high standard houses built on 
multiple plots 
Each was built on three combined plots and belong to very wealthy families. Plate ' b', I 
understand belongs to a bank area manager and ' a' , to the Former state commissioner of police. 
Note in the foreground of both plates the abandoned plots belonging to low income households 
who said they could not afford to build even the minimum basic unit. 
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Plates 6.2 a&b : More examples of the high standard houses 
a and b show more examples of the high standard housing which belong to high income non-
target group members. They are also built on multiple plots and are of 6 and 7 bedrooms 
respectively. 
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Plates 6.3 a&b : More examples of expensive houses built on multiple plots. 
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Plates 6.4 a&b examples of rented housing units in Makama Project 
Typical examples of the rented type of houses in the project area. They are built on multiple 
plots and belong to absentee landlords. The landlords, I understand, own several properties in 
the town. Tenants are mostly single people or couples without children. The majority tend to be 
bank staff of various levels from manager down to cashiers and messengers. 
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Plates 6.5 a &b : Project demonstration unit 
It is built with burnt red bricks and has four bedrooms and a sitting room. It is fenced all round 
and has a drive parking space. The completed house has already been sold to a top government 
official. 
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Plates 6.6 a&b : Examples of the type of housing units built by 
legitimate target groups 
The house in Plate a is finished and occupied. The block at the front is the entrance hall (Zaure) 
and the master bedroom. The core unit area was used to build three rooms for the family 
members, while both kitchen and toilet are the open air type. The plot area is marked partly by 
the back of the buildings and partly by connecting walls. The house was built in 1985/86. 
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6.3.1.2 Sizes of housing units 
Table 6-15: Number of habitable rooms in project houses 
Frequency 
Number of rooms 
No % 
1-3 rooms 32 19.7 
98 60.1 
4-6 rooms 33 20.2 
7 rooms and over 
163 100.0 
Total 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
Most of the houses, as shown by the table above, are large in terms of number of rooms 
available. 80.3% have more than the three habitable rooms, including kitchen. Only 
19.7% have three rooms or less, and the mean number of rooms is 4.9. This figures 
suggest large house sizes well above the basic unit (2 rooms). When asked· why they 
needed to build many rooms, most pointed to the needs of their large extended families. 
It is interesting to note that only 32.7% of the house owners said they moved into a 
basic unit and later expanded as the project recommended, but the majority, 67.3%, said 
they built houses which were complete enough to take all their family members, before . 
moving to site. Despite the large houses, the occupancy rate in the project 3.2 is still 
higher than the Makama average of 2.6. The plot sizes also limit the size of the 
dwellings. For this project, three different sizes were predetermined by the project 
planners. The small size being 200 metres square and the largest 300 meter square while 
the medium is 260 metres square. Though not many beneficiaries complained directly 
about the sizes of the plots, as a major problem, it was obvious that most of them 
maximised the available space and hardly left any for circulation. When asked about 
space, many expressed the desire for more space on their plots. Though the plots could 
take so many rooms, there was not enough space left for other things like courtyard, and 
fencing walls with which the beneficiaries are most familiar in their former houses. 
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6.3.1.3 Availability of services and sanitary facilities 
One of the major objectives of this project is to increase access to basic services like 
good sources of water supply, electricity and good sanitation by the low income groups. 
It is therefore expected that the availability of these facilities in the project area will be 
far better than in other low income settlements. When this was investigated, the results 
in the following tables were obtained. 
Table 6-16: Availability of electricity 
Eelectricity and Frequency 
sources of water 
No % 
Electricity 
Yes 144 88.1 
No 19 11.9 
Total 165 100.0 
Sources of water 
Private tap 46 27.9 
Private well 97 59.5 
Public pump 17 10.5 
Water seller 3 2.1 
Total 
165 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March, 1992. 
The survey reveals that 88.1 % of the houses are connected to electricity, and of these, 
28.4% also had a water supply from their private taps, while 59.5% had private wells. 
Only 2.1 % bought their water from a water seller and 10.5% used the communal pumps. 
The level of services here is a great improvement over other low income settlements 
where beneficiaries lived, and where nonconsolidators are still living, as reported by 
most beneficiaries (91 % ). 
Though the pipe born water supplies still remain low in the project, it is better served 
than the average area of the Bauchi town. 
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Plates 6.7 a&b : Examples of road side solid waste dumping 
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Table 6-17: The types of Toilets 
Type of toilet facility Frequency 
No % 
Traditional pit 54 33.1 
Ventilated Improved pit 47 28.8 
Water system 62 38.1 
Total 163 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
The level of sanitation has also improved for most households over what they had in 
their former housing. Thus 28.8% are now using ventilated improved pit latrines (V.I.P) 
while only 33.1 % are still using the traditional pits, and 38.1 % have a water system (WC 
with septic tanks). In most houses (90%), the minimum distances (10m) between wells 
and pit latrines are maintained, which is a very good health precaution. 
Table 6-18: Availability of bathroom and kitchen 
Bathroom Kitchen 
Availability of bathroom & 
kitchen 
No % No % 
Private 110 68.0 122 74.3 
Shared 37 22.3 38 23.3 
None 16 9.7 4 2.4 
Total 163 100.0 164 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
In the project houses, most households (68.0%) have exclusive use of a bathroom, while 
22.3% share and only 2.4% wash in the open. 
Also 74.3% have the exclusive use of a kitchen, while 23.3% share and only 2.4% cook 
in the open. 
188 
6.3.1.4 Drainage and solid waste disposal 
An observation of the area reveals that proper drainage is virtually non-existent. The rain 
water drains started by the project remain uncompleted and are being used as rubbish 
dumps by some residents. When asked about drainage facilities, 90.3% of the 
respondents said they had none and only 9.7% said they had. Rain water runs freely and 
finds its level, while waste water from the kitchens and bathrooms is allowed to drain to 
the open backyards forming breeding grounds for flies and mosquitoes and creating a 
health hazard to residents. 
Table 6-19: Methods of solid waste disposal 
Frequency 
Solid waste disposal method 
No % 
Collected by the Authorities 22 13.3 
Dumping on an empty plot or in an unfinished 96 58.5 
house. 
Burning in the bush 46 28.2 
Total 164 100.0 
Source: Field study, January 1992 
Proper facilities for solid waste disposal were also absent at the time the survey was 
conducted. When asked how they dispose of their solid waste, the above responses were 
given. Most of the households (58.5%) said they threw it onto an empty plot or 
uncompleted building nearby while 28.2% bum in the backyard, and only 13.3% said 
they have an organised collection system. A brief discussion on this matter with the 
older residents of the project revealed that waste collection bins were provided in the 
early stages of the project, but they disappeared and were never replaced. Also the 
vehicles provided for waste collection by the authorities were never maintained properly 
and have long ceased to function. 
6.3.1.5 Cost of houses (recurrent expenditure on housing) 
The cost of houses in the project refers to the running costs of built project houses. This 
includes the monthly building loan repayments (cost of land, land development, project 
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mortgage loans and private borrowing), and the user service charges (water rates and 
electricity charges). The following table reveals the approximate amounts most of the 
house owners said they were spending on housing per month. 
Table 6-20: Cost of Housing 
Cost of housing Frequency 
(In Naira) 
No % 
00-40 12 16.0 
41-60 28 37.3 
61-90 22 29.3 
91 - 120 5 6.7 
over 120 8 10.7 
Total 75 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
As can be seen in the table, the majority (53.3%) of house owners interviewed, spent 
less than 60 Naira on housing, 29.3% spent between 61-90 Naira and only 17.4% paid 
more than 90 Naira. Rough estimates show that the majority did not spend 20% of their 
earnings on housing particularly those in the upper margin of the low incomed, i.e. those 
earning between 350 and 500 Naira per month. These figures appear to be low 
compared to the cost of housing outside the project. 
It is anticipated that the quality of the project houses will be better than houses outside 
the project for the same category of income. The next section examines the quality of 
houses currently occupied by the nonconsolidating category, for the purpose of 
comparison. 
6.3.2 Characteristics of nonconsolidators' housing 
The above results showing housing characteristics concern only the houses built in the 
project, some of which are occupied by just a fraction of the intended beneficiaries. 
However, a larger proportion of the intended beneficiaries, who were allocated plots and 
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could not consolidate, are living outside the project area. This section investigates the 
quality of their housing while trying to compare it with that of the consolidators', to find 
out whether they are better or worse of. 
6.3.2.1 Types of housing tenements 
Table : 6-21 Type of tenement in current housing 
Type of housing Frequency 
No % 
Owner occupied house 48 41.0 
Rented house 65 55.6 
Government low-cost house 2 1.7 
Family house 2 1.7 
Total 88 100.0 
Source: Field Survey January 1992 
It is clear, from the above table, that the majority of nonconsolidators (55.6%) are 
renters of the houses they live in. Only 41.0% said they lived in their own houses, while 
1.7% lived in government low-cost houses, and the remaining 1.7% shared their family 
houses. The renters pay a good percentage of their income towards rent, the amount 
ranges between 35 and 250 Naira per month, as shown in the table below. The cost of 
rent is directly proportionate to the level of services provided, number of rooms rented 
as well as the quality of materials used to build the house. 
Table 6-22 Cost of houses rented by the nonconsolidators 
Monthly rent Frequency 
(in Naira) 
No % 
00-40 9 13.4 
41 -80 38 56.7 
81 - 120 17 25.4 
over 120 3 4.5 
Total 67 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
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It is therefore not surprising that the majority, (86.6%) pay over 40 Naira toward their 
rents monthly. Only very few (13.4%) said they pay less than 40 Naira, in these cases for 
only one room in a shared compound. Those who rented more than one room paid in 
multiples of 40 or less depending on the quality of the house and level of services 
provided. It was shown that 65% of them are actually renting more than one room, 
because of the need for their large families, and had to pay higher rents. When this is 
added to the mortgage commitments, which some of them have, it raises the total cost of 
their housing higher and makes things difficult for them. It is not surprising therefore 
that many of them complained bitterly about the financial difficulties they are facing. 
6.3.2.2 Quality of building materials 
Table 6-23: Nature of building materials 
Type of housing 
Temporary 
Semi-permanent 
A mixture of temporary and permanent 
All permanent materials 
Total 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
Frequency 
No % 
31 27.2 
29 25.4 
48 42.1 
6 5.3 
114 100.0 
Table 6-23 above shows that presently, the majority of nonconsolidators live in houses 
built of locally available materials. More than half (52.6%) of them are of temporary or 
semi-permanent materials, walls are of mud plastered and painted bot~ internally and 
externally. Foundations are mostly of stones and broken blocks. Only 42.5% were of a 
mixture of permanent and temporary materials. Walls were usually of either concrete 
blocks or burnt bricks, while roofs are of azara/timber and corrugated iron covers, with 
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some windows and doors temporary. Most houses, however, did not have ceilings. Note 
that only 5.3% of the houses are made of all permanent materials. 
6.3.2.3 Size of dwellings 
When the size of the dwellings of the nonconsolidators, (measured by the number of 
rooms for their exclusive use) was investigated, the results reveal that nearly half 
(44.6%) of the nonconsolidator lived in two rooms or less. Another 39.3% lived in three 
and four rooms, while only 16.1 per cent lived in over 5 roomed houses as shown in the 
table below. Most of those living in one room or two also complained of space 
problems, overcrowding and lack of privacy. Those living in rented compounds also had 
to share toilets and kitchens with other tenants. 
Table 6-24: Number of rooms in nonconsolidators' houses. 
Number of rooms Frequency 
No % 
2 or less 50 44.6 
3-4 44 39.3 
5-7 12 10.7 
Over? 6 5.4 
Total 112 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
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6.3.2.4 Level of services and sanitation 
Table 6-25: Availability of water supply, electricity and good sanitation 
Electricity, Water and Sanitation Frequency 
No % 
i. Availability of electricity 
Yes 73 83.0 
No 15 17.0 
ii. Source of water supply 
Private tap 29 33.0 
Private well 44 50.0 
Water seller 15 17.0 
iii. Sanitation type 
Traditional pit latrine 44 50.0 
Ventilated Improved Pit 31 35.2 
Water system (septic tanks) 13 14.8 
Source: Field survey March 1992 
Table 6-25 above shows that although the majority are served with electricity, provision 
of pipe water appears to be a problem. The major source is private wells which are 
found in most homes. It is important to note that most of these wells are seasonal and 
dry up when the rainy season is gone. So for a good part of the year, they do not provide 
enough water for the households. 
The major type of toilets used are traditional pit latrines which are often shallow and are 
filled up in a short time necessitating digging another. Another problem associated with 
this type of toilet is contamination of well water. If a minimum distance ( of usually 
10m) is not maintained between the pit and a well, seepage may occur, thereby 
contaminating the water. 
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6.3.3 Housing category by housing quality: a comparative analysis. 
In the section above, we have seen the results of the investigation of the housing 
characteristics for each of the categories of respondents. 
A comparison of two of the categories of households (consolidators and 
nonconsolidators) is presented below. The main elements compared are the quality of 
building materials, the level of services available and the sizes of the dwellings 
measured by number of rooms, source of water supply and types of sanitation. The 
comparison of these elements is presented in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 opposite. 
The charts reveal that the nonconsolidators have less access to good sources of drinking 
water, electricity and proper sanitary facilities. It is important to note that although most 
of them also lived in houses built of temporary and semi-permanent materials, they did 
not seem to mind that as much as their lack of access to basic services. 
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The comparison for the number of rooms and the cost of housing is done by at-test and 
presented in tables 7.26 & 7.27 below.(See also figs. 6.9 & 6.10) 
Table 6-26: t-test for the number of rooms 
Groups No of Cases Mean t Probability 
Value 
Consolidators 102 5.06 
3.73 0.001 
Nonconsolidators 78 3.42 
The mean number of rooms for the consolidators is also higher than those for the 
nonconsolidators with a probability of 0.001. As we have seen in the earlier analysis, the 
house owners mostly built rooms to suit their needs while the nonconsolidators, most of 
who where still renting, could not rent as many rooms even though they required them. 
The cost of renting was just too high for them. Most of them shared the compound with 
other renters. It is not surprising that more than 50% of them complained of a lack of 
sufficient space as one of the major problems they faced in their current housing. 
Table 6-27: t-test for cost of housing 
Groups No of Cases Mean T Probability 
Value 
Consolidators 52 76.82 
2.50 0.014 
N onconsolidators 88 108.11 
The cost of housing here refers to the amount of money spent on housing by the 
respondents each month. For the consolidators, the amount of mortgage repayment was 
used, while the cost of rent plus the mortgage (where applicable) was used for the 
nonconsolidators. 
The mean monthly cost of housing for the nonconsolidators (108.l)was found to be 
significantly higher than for the consolidators (76.8) with a very low probability of 
0.014. This is not surprising because as we have seen earlier, most of the 
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nonconsolidators said they were paying high rents as well as mortgage repayment while 
their houses remained uncompleted. 
It is clear from the above comparison that the housing situation of the nonconsolidators 
was worse both in terms of quality and cost. They have less access to basic services like 
a good source of water supply, electricity and proper sanitation. Though they do not 
seem particularly worse off in terms of quality of materials of their houses, it is 
important to note that most of them are renting, while the consolidators own the houses 
themselves. This means that facilities like kitchens and bathrooms are being shared, 
while the house owners have exclusive use of these facilities. 
The houses in the project also have more rooms than the average houses in the area. In 
addition, the owners of the houses have security of tenure and more peace of mind than 
those who are not able to consolidate their plots and are still renting. The 
nonconsolidators were mostly complaining of economic hardships that they have 
experienced from having to pay rents, as well as a mortgage on their unfinished houses. 
The house owners on the other hand, have only to worry about the mortgage 
repayments, the maximum of which is less than the average rents paid by an average low 
income family in the area. These findings therefore lead to the rejection of the 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the quality of housing for the two groups. 
6.3.4 Access to community facilities 
A detailed analysis of the access to community facilities by the two groups was not 
undertaken, however, informal discussions with individual households suggest that their 
access to schools for their children and medical care has greatly improved, particularly 
in terms of travel distances to the facilities. 
Five schools and five health clinics were provided by the project in the Makama area. 
This means that mothers can walk to the nearest clinic with sick babies in a few minutes 
and at no travelling cost. This will lead to greatly improved clinic attendance and 
increased care. 
Some families expressed their worries about the prohibitive cost of treatment in the 
health clinics provided. However this is the same throughout the town and the project's 
objective was only to provide the facilities and not subsidise the cost of using them. 
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On the other hand, in the non-project area, access to medical clinics and schools is still a 
problem. Some children still travel up to two kilometres to the nearest school. Many 
people still pay a great deal for transportation to and from the nearest health clinics. This 
discourages attendance at both schools and hospitals. 
6.4 Summary and conclusion 
The above findings have helped to demonstrate that the nonconsolidators are 
economically weaker, have less stable jobs and generally earn less than the 
consolidators. The findings also show that, as a consequence of their lack of 
consolidation, their housing situation is worse. They pay higher rents and have less 
access to basic services and community facilities. Those who have successfully 
consolidated are already reaping the benefits of better access to services and community 
facilities. They also have only the monthly mortgage instalments to pay while the 
nonconsolidators were found to be also paying rents where they currently lived in 
addition to this. Many of them have complained about the economic hardship this is 
causing them. The serious consequences of this problem for the affected groups suggest, 
the need for an immediate solution. To this effect, the causes of the problems were 
investigated and the findings presented in the next chapter (7) as the specific findings of 
the study. 
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Chapter 7: Hypothesis Tests Results 
7 .0 Introduction 
The previous chapter (6) was on the general survey findings where the results of the 
comparative analysis of the socio-economic and housing characteristics of the sample 
were presented. This chapter is therefore on the specific findings of the hypothesis tests, 
where the findings on each test are presented and discussed. It is in three sections; the 
first section presents the findings on the lack of affordability for the cost of building 
basic a unit with project specified building materials. These findings include the prices 
of the project specified building materials, prices of alternative materials, sufficiency of 
project loans, access to other sources of borrowing, availability of savings and the, 
methods of construction used and cost of hired labour. The second section is on the size 
of the basic unit, including findings on the number of rooms specified by planners and 
the number needed by target beneficiaries. The last section summarises the findings and 
draws conclusions. 
7.1 Findings on the lack of affordability for the cost of building a basic unit 
There are two different types of cost involved in consolidation, the capital and the 
current costs. The capital cost, include, the cost of land, building materials and labour 
for construction, while the current costs, are the mortgage repayments, charges and rates. 
Full running or current costs usually begin to apply when the house owner has 
consolidated his plot and occupied it, So they are less relevant to this study. This study is 
more interested in the cost involved during the process of consolidation, which is the 
capital cost. 
7.1.1 T-test For the cost of building a basic unit 
It was hypothesised that the actual cost (in Naira) of building a basic unit is significantly 
greater than that which the target group can afford. This was tested by a t-test and 
presented below. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the two costs. 
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Table 7-1: T-test for the cost of building a basic unit 
Groups Mean(in Naira) t-value significance 
Group A 6829 
+4.96 0.01 
groupB 4185 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
The result of the t-test shows that the difference between the two means is statistically 
significant at 0.01 level. Therefore the null hypothesis that there is no difference is 
rejected. 
A further investigation, achieved by asking the target group why they could not 
consolidate, revealed supporting evidence for this finding, as shown by the following 
table. 
Table 7-2: Reasons for lack of consolidation 
Reasons for lack of consolidation Number % 
High cost of building to the required standards 96 84.l 
Lack of access to a project loan 14 12.2 
Dislike for the basic unit concept 5 4.7 
Total 115 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1994 
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It is clear from the above table that, the majority of the affected group attribute their 
problem to the cost of building. This response represents 84.1 % of the reasons given. 
Other reasons, which include lack of access to a project loan and dislike for the basic 
unit concept, represent 12.7% 4.7% respectively. Note that only 4.7% said their dislike 
for the basic unit concept was the cause of their problem. Though this does not seem to 
be a significant proportion, observations of the common practices of this group, 
presented in a later section, reveal interesting findings. 
For this project and the purpose of this study, the cost of land, building materials, and 
labour constitutes the total cost of building a basic unit. The prices of each of these 
components directly affect the overall cost of the consolidation. 
When the nonconsolidators were asked why the cost of consolidation was high, the 
following results were obtained. 
Table 7-3: Causes of high cost of construction 
Causes of high cost of building Number % 
High prices of required building materials 37 45.8 
Inadequate amount of project loan 18 20.6 
High cost of hired labour 28 33.6 
total 83 100.0 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
As shown in the table above, high prices of building materials represented 45.8% of the 
causes given. A further 33.6% said it was due to high cost of labour, while the remaining 
20.6 per cent said it was due to the small size of loan they were given by the project 
authorities. 
Each of these factors is discussed in the following subsections. They are discussed in 
more details to identify their specific roles. 
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7 .1.2 High prices of required building materials 
This is the most important cost factor given by the respondents. A market survey of 
some selected materials, which include the required ones, has shown that prices are not 
only high, but keep rising over the years. Fig. 7.3 opposite illustrates the percentage rises 
of the materials over the years. 
Table 7-4: Prices of building materials by year, 
Type of materials Unit of Prices by year (in Naira) 
measure 
1978 1985 1988 1991 
Cement Bag 7.50 10.00 25.00 73.00 
Sand T/load 10.00 18.00 50.00 135.00 
Gravel T/load 40.00 55.00 280.00 900.00 
Asbestos roof 
cover 4"x8"sheet 3.00 2.50 4.50 80.00 
Corr.Zinc SISheet 2.30 4.50 16.00 95.00 
Asbestos ceiling SISheet 2.83 6.00 13.00 30.00 
Hardboard ceiling SISheet 3.30 8.00 28.00 120.00 
Ready made flush Each leaf NIA 11.00 95.00 250.00 
door 
Steel door frame Each NIA 20.00 70.00 90.00 
Nails 13.2kgpk. 9.60 10.00 150.00 250.00 
Oil paint 41.gallon 8.00 12.00 95.00 100.00 
Emulsion paint 41.gallon 6.50 16.00 42.00 80.00 
Piece 6.50 10.00 30.00 40.00 
Timber 
9" concrete blocks Each 0.45 0.69 3.50 5.00 
6"concrete blocks Each 0.25 0.40 2.50 4.00 
Burnt clay bricks Each 0.25 0.30 2.50 3.50 · 
Mud bricks Each 0.05 0.12 0.25 0.45 
Source: Market survey March 1992. 
206 
The materials required are; concrete, concrete blocks or burnt bricks and timber roofs 
with corrugated iron covers. It is important to note that, at the initial stages of project 
planning, it was proposed that low income beneficiaries be allowed to use mud for 
building their walls as long as their foundations were of solid concrete. This idea was 
later dropped and the use of mud was banned. So all plot allottees had to use the 
required materials for foundations walls and roofs, or not build at all. The few who 
attempted to use mud were stopped and given a demolition order. The prices of the 
required materials, which are cement, concrete blocks and their components, as are 
shown by the table below were far too high and have been shown to have been rising 
more quickly than the local traditional materials which most beneficiaries can 
comfortably afford. Take cement blocks for example, in 1978, when the project was 
planned, they cost 45 kobo each, while mud bricks only cost 5 kobo. This means that 
building a unit with mud walls would have meant up to 90% savings on the cost of 
walling, all other things being equal. 
Tue prices of these materials kept rising at an alarming rate over the period of project 
implementation. The percentage rises in the prices of some of the selected materials 
which are most commonly used are shown in the table below, and graphically 
represented in fig 7.3 
The graph compares the percentage increase in prices of building materials between two 
periods; 1) the project planning and initial implementation period, between 1978 and 
1985 and 2) the period when most house construction took place, between 1985 and 
1992. 
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Table 7.5 percentage rise in prices of selected building materials 
Price and percentage increase by year (in Naira) 
Building material Unit 
1978 1985 % rise 1992 % rise 
Cement per bag 7.50 10.00 33 120 1100 
Sand t/load 10.00 18.00 80 162 900 
Gravel t/load 40.00 55.00 38 555 1010 
Iron Rods 1/4"x30 per ton 429.00 781.00 82 3,516 350 
Cone. Blocks 9" each .45 .69 53 5.00 659 
Burnt Bricks 6" each .25 .30 20 3.50 1066 
Mud Bricks Each .05 .12 140 .40 233 
Corr. iron Sheets per sheet 2.30 4.50 95 42.70 950 
Louvers 36"x6" each 1.10 4.20 281 15.50 369 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
When asked whether the local building materials were affordable to them, the majority 
said they were, as shown in the table below. 
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Table: 7-6 Affordability for Local Building materials 
Affordability for local Frequency 
Building materials 
No % 
Affordable 98 85.2 
Not affordable 17 14.8 
Total 115 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
They were also asked if they were willing to use the said 
materials, if they were allowed to do so, the responses vary slightly as follows. 
Table: 7-7 Willingness to use local materials 
Willingness to use local Frequency 
building materials. 
No % 
Very willing 78 67.8 
Reluctant 22 19.2 
Unwilling 15 13.0 
Total 115 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
As shown by table 7-5 above, 85.2% said they could afford to build with the local 
traditional building materials while only 14.8% could not. However, if allowed to use 
them, 67.8% said they were willing to do so, and only 32.2% were either reluctant or 
totally unwilling. 
A further analysis was done to compare the estimated cost of building a basic unit with 
the required materials and with local traditional materials. The results of the analysis, as 
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indicated in the following table, show a very large gap between the two costs, all other 
things being equal. 
Table 7-8: Estimated cost of a basic unit by year 
Year of building 1978 1985 1988 1992 
With local materials 1,235 2,047 3,582 7,164 
With required materials 3,400 6,400 12,000 22,000 
Amount of savings 2,165 4,353 8418 14,836 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
Note from the table, that it is the prices of these required materials that have been rising 
at a very dramatic rate over the last decade. This is also reflected in the rising cost of 
building the units. Although the rise is also observed in the prices of the local materials, 
it is more subtle. 
The local building materials used for this estimate are the commonly used in Bauchi 
town. The materials are foundations of stones, mud brick walls, 'azara' and corrugated 
iron roofing, mostly no ceilings and locally made wooden doors and windows. The price 
of labour in this case is very little. Most traditional houses are either self-built or built by 
local master builders whose labour is generally cheap in northern Nigeria. 
The building materials required by the project authorities on the other hand, are the high 
priced ones (especially cement, concrete, timber and corrugated iron sheets). 
Toe estimated cost of building the unit (with both the local and required materials) was 
arrived at by using standard quantity surveyors' rates for the year. The rates include the 
cost of all work done including site development, materials used and labour. Data for 
the cost of the different components for the different years could not be obtained at the 
time of the survey. This was due to poor record keeping and lack of proper recollection 
by majority of builders regarding the cost. It was therefore no possible to break down 
the cost components. 
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These findings bring two questions to mind. Firstly, why have these prices risen so high? 
and secondly why does the authority insist on the more expensive materials. 
Many factors are responsible for the rising cost of building materials in Nigeria over the 
last decade. Some of the leading factors include inflation (see Appendix fig.I), 
devaluation of the national currency (see Appendix fig.2), scarcity of materials resulting 
from underproduction of industries and the dubious activities of some distributors and 
agents. 
Rising rates of inflation in the developing countries has become a major problem in 
recent years, it pushes up the prices of all goods including building materials. In Nigeria, 
however, the rates have been subtle and bearable until the 1980s when the government 
embarked on the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) with the pretext of reforming 
the economy. This program (SAP) involved many things including the devaluation of 
the Naira (the national currency), a ban on importation of many goods including 
building materials, and a lot more. The implications of this to the building industry are 
that, the ban on importation of building materials means a scarcity of them since the 
country can not produce enough to cater for its need. Also devaluation of the currency 
means that more Nairas are needed to purchase the important components and 
machinery needed to produce building materials at home. 
Both the high cost of production and scarcity of building materials result in high prices 
to the consumers. 
The situation is made even worse by the activities of the agents dealing in building 
materials, distributors make the situation even worse. The materials sometimes pass 
through four different hands before finally reaching the consumer, and in each case, 
prices are pushed up high to maximise profit. Also the agents sometimes create a state of 
artificial scarcity by hoarding the materials to push prices up. It could be recalled during 
this survey, in March 1992, the government decided to lift the ban on importation of 
cement to ease acute shortage in the country. Accordingly, when the cement poured in, 
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the prices fell to less than half of what they were before the ban was lifted. However, a 
few days later all the cement in the markets in most cities disappeared into warehouses 
where they were hoarded. The prices went up again sabotaging the government's efforts. 
This is made even worse if the materials are being transported from a different part of 
the country, for example from the South to the North. The added cost of transportation is 
also transferred to the consumer. 
Note that even the prices of locally produced burnt bricks rose. This is because the burnt 
bricks' industries also use imported technology for production. So that there was a 
situation where a block of burnt brick cost almost as much as a concrete block made 
from imported cement. It is not surprising therefore that most houses in the project were 
of concrete blocks, because builders thought this gave better value for almost the same 
cost. This is despite the fact that the demonstration unit in the project was built with 
burnt bricks. Similarly all the materials popularly used in most parts of the construction 
have risen quickly in price in the same manner as cement and its products. 
Secondly, why do authorities make it mandatory to use certain type of building 
materials? They often do, with the argument about ensuring health and safety of 
residents in the buildings. Although, this argument may be strong in cases where 
materials like thatch is used, which could quickly spread fire and risk to lives of 
occupant, in other cases, however, it is weaker. Mud, for instance, is of no known health 
or safety hazards to the house owners. Mud houses have stood for decades without 
collapsing. The insistence on the use of high priced materials, may have more to do with 
the professional prejudices against the local cheaper ones and their desire to have control 
over decisions. 
7.1.3 Size of project loan and its adequacy 
Although only 20.6% gave this as the cause of their lack of affordability for building, 
about 81.9% of the surveyed sample agreed that the loan was grossly inadequate. 
The amount was not sufficient to pay for the price of land, labour and materials they 
needed to build their houses. The following is a breakdown for the size of loans (in 
Naira) made available according to the size of plot allocated. 
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Table 7-9: Total loan less development charge 
Plot size Total loan Plot cost Balance % 
Balance 
Small subsidised (AS) 3,200 978.65 2221.35 67.41 
Small (A) 3,200 978.65 2221.35 67.41 4,500 1414.50 3085.50 68.56 
Medium(B) 6,000 2232.50 3767.50 62.00 
Big (C) 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
The above table shows not only that the amount of loan given was small, but also more 
than 30% of the loan was used to pay for the cost of serviced plots allocated. Although 
the amount of loan was later increased, that was only a drop in the ocean compared to 
the magnitude of the problems discussed above. 
When the amount of loan is compared to the cost of building a basic unit alone, the 
extent of the gap becomes clearer. (See fig.7.7.) 
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Table 7-10 Gap between amount of loan available and 
the estimated cost of building a basic unit 
Year A v. amount of loan Estimated cost of a basic 
(in Naira) unit (in Naira) 
1978 2,824 3,400 
1985 2,824 6,400 
1988 4,824 12,000 
1992 4,824 22,000 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
The beneficiaries, including those who have fully consolidated were asked about the 
sufficiency of the loan. A majority of 81.9% said it was not sufficient and only 18.1 % 
said it was. When the owners of the consolidated houses were asked where they got the 
extra funding, 65.7% said it was from their private savings while the rest (34.3%) said 
they borrowed from relatives or friends. 
This implies that not only the project loan was insufficient, but there were no other 
formal sources of housing loan accessible to the beneficiaries. Those who did not have 
private savings or friends to borrow from, simply could not afford to consolidate, which 
has been found to be the case with majority of the nonconsolidators. 
When the nonconsolidators were asked about availability of savings and other sources 
for borrowing money, the following responses were obtained. 
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7.1.4 Availability of savings and non-project borrowing sources 
Table 7.11 : Availability of savings and non-project borrowing sources 
Availability of savings Number % 
None 71 81.6 
Yes 16 18.4 
Total 87 100.0 
Sources of non-project Number % 
borrowing 
None 54 62.0 
Friend/relatives 20 23.0 
Community Saving group 13 15.0 
(' Adashe') 
Total 87 100 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
The majority of the respondents (81.6%) said they had none. The few who said they did 
have, received help from relatives and friends and community saving arrangements. 
Hardly any had access to non project formal borrowing like commercial banks. Many 
said their applications were turned down for lack of secure collateral. 
It is also important to note here that the project loan did not achieve full coverage of the 
all plot allottees. Many beneficiaries (21 % ) said they did not secure the loan at all. More 
than half (53%) of them said they could not satisfy the stricter conditions imposed later 
by the Federal Mortgage Bank. 
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7.1.5 Findings on the methods of construction used. 
It will be recalled that 33.6% of the nonconsolidators said the cost of labour was a major 
cause of their lack of affordability for building. It was also hypothesised that 
beneficiaries used paid labour rather than the self-build method that the project assumed. 
The findings are presented in the table below and illustrated by fig.7.8 
The planners assumed that self help labour would be used at no monetary cost to the plot 
allottees. However this assumption turned out to be wrong because the majority of plot 
allottees, for various reasons which will be discussed later, preferred and actually used, 
hired labour for most parts of the construction. 
Table 7-12: methods of construction used 
Method of construction used Frequency 
No % 
Self built method 8 9.3 
Mutual labour method 7 8.0 
Hired labour 70 80.4 
contractor built 2 2.3 
Total 87 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
Only 9.3% of the house builders said they used the self-built method. The majority 
(80.4%) have used and intend to continue using hired labour for the entire building 
process apart from the supervision, which most of them did personally. Only a few 
about 2.3 per cent are using the constructor built method for everything, but they are not 
a concern of this investigation because their incomes are above the target group. When 
asked why they chose to use hired labour, the majority (70%) said they had no spare 
time because they were fully employed, and about 26.5% said they did not know how to 
build with the modem materials, while only 3.5% said they could afford to pay for the 
cost of labour. This means that the majority of the plot allottees were fully employed and 
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could not afford the time to engage in self built labour. It is very important to note here 
that, although similar findings were reported by the World Bank evaluation studies of 
earlier projects in Lusaka, Philippines and El Salvador (Bamberger et al. 1982), the same 
false assumption was repeated here. This means that no lesson is being learnt from the 
evaluation exercise. The response regarding the lack of technical skill is also very 
important. The same authorities who imposed the use of modern materials did not 
bother to give any technical assistance to enable them to be used. So they had no choice 
but to use hired skilled labour. Even some of those who said they had no time, might be 
shying away from confessing their ignorance. As Richard Martin has rightly put it in the 
case of Lusaka project, "The reason for lack of attempts by householders to build their 
own houses was more a lack of confidence than lack of time." May be, if they had had 
the technical knowledge they would have found the time, at weekends or evenings, to 
build, thus saving the money paid for labour to be put towards purchasing more 
materials and hence increasing their progress. 
The cost for paid labour has been found to account for 20% of the total cost of building 
houses in this project. This cost, which was not anticipated by the project authorities 
adds to the total cost of consolidation, which then becomes greater than the assumed 
affordable cost. The beneficiaries, particularly the low income earners who are normally 
not found to either have income surpluses or another source of money to supplement the 
project loan were not able to afford the total cost. So they used up the loan to buy 
materials and pay for labour up to a certain level of consolidation, mostly below the 
habitable stage, and then stopped when the money ran out. This implies that the level of 
fully consolidated houses will remain low as long as those houses remain uncompleted. 
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7.2 Findings on the size (number of rooms) of the basic unit 
It was hypothesised that the number of rooms which the target beneficiaries 
needed in a basic unit is significantly more than that specified by the planners. The 
survey findings were revealed both by the responses given, as well as observation of the 
beneficiaries building practices. When they were asked to state the number of rooms 
which they needed, the following results were obtained (also illustrated by fig.7.9 facing 
page). 
Table 7-13 : Number of rooms needed by the target beneficiaries 
Number of rooms Frequency 
Number % 
1-3 23 20 
4-6 68 59.1 
6 and more 29 20.9 
Mean: 5.9 Median: 6 Mode:6 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
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The majority of the beneficiaries (about 80%) said they needed more than three rooms, 
while only 20% needed less. The mean number of rooms needed was 5.9 and the mode 
6 rooms. Their claims were further supported by the observation of their building 
practices. The number of rooms proposed in the uncompleted units were investigated 
and the following results obtained (illustrated by fig.7.10). 
Table 7-14: Proposed number of rooms in the uncompleted units 
Proposed number of rooms Frequency 
No % 
1-3 22 25 
4-5 54 60.2 
6 & over 13 14.8 
Total 88 100.0 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
Only 25% of the started houses had less than three rooms while the majority (75%) 
aimed at larger houses with four or more rooms. This means that only 25% of them 
attempted to build the minimum unit recommended. 
7 .2.1 The gap between beneficiaries needs and project proposals 
The t-test is not very appropriate here because one of the groups (specified number of 
rooms) has no variance. So the proportional difference was observed and level of 
significance was decided upon. 
The basic unit specified by the Planners consisted of two bedrooms and a parlour. The 
above results have revealed that the average number of rooms required by the target 
beneficiaries is 5.5. Therefore the gap is the difference between the 3 rooms proposed by 
the project and the 5.5 rooms required by the target beneficiaries. This is significant 
because the difference is about 40%. 
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Fig 7. I I Reasons for rejection of the basic unit concept 
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7.2.2 Why the beneficiaries needed more rooms than proposed by the project 
planners 
The target beneficiaries needed more rooms in a basic unit than that specified by the 
project planners, in order to accommodate all their household members. 
Although, according to the project proposals, the idea behind the basic unit was to allow 
families to move on to sites as quickly as possible, while they carry on with the required 
expansions to meet their needs, this, for the majority of families was not feasible, 
because the two bedrooms specified were not even sufficient at the start. As we have 
seen in the socio-economic analysis, most target beneficiaries have large polygamous 
households. To cater for their families, the majority of the beneficiaries rejected this idea 
and had started building bigger units to suit their needs. The following table reveals their 
reasons for rejection. 
Table 7-15: Reasons for the rejection of the basic unit concept of consolidation 
Reasons for rejection of the basic unit concept of Frequency 
consolidation 
No % 
Inadequate number of rooms 70 60.8 
Lack of privacy and security 
38 33.0 
7 6.2 
Can afford a bigger unit 115 100.0 
Total 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
Note that only 6.2% said they did not adopt the basic unit because they could afford to 
build bigger units. The majority, 93.8%, had reasons connected with the dislike for the 
basic unit concept, mostly the size of the unit and its lack of privacy for the needs of 
their large families. When we confronted some of them with the suggestions that had 
they adopted the basic unit (which cost less to build by virtue of its size), they would 
have completed their units by now and moved in. Most of them responded by saying 
that they would not move at all until they had enough rooms to accommodate everybody 
in the family. That is why they did not contemplate accepting the basic unit. What this 
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means is that most people were not ready or willing to make do with the two bedrooms 
basic unit specified contrary to the assumption of the planners. They are also ready to 
wait for as long as possible to meet their housing requirements. The problem here is that 
as long as they can not afford to complete the construction of the bigger houses they had 
started, the level of consolidation will remain low. In view of the current economic 
situation in Nigeria vis-a-vis the state of the beneficiaries' incomes (analysed in Chapter 
6), this will not happen in the near future, at least not for the low income target group, 
unless some drastic measures are taken. This conclusion was supported by the response 
given by the nonconsolidators, who are still holding on to their uncompleted houses, 
when asked about the possible date of completing their houses. Only 28.7% said they 
were likely to complete within one to three years and 14.9% up to five years, while 
25.3% could not put a date on it and the remaining 26.4% and 4.9% were going to lose 
their plots through sale and revocation respectively. 
Of the total sample of the nonconsolidators (115), 43% (50) can be said to have failed to 
consolidate as a result of their attempt to build bigger units instead of adopting the basic 
unit method of consolidation. This category of nonconsolidators had spent more than 
the amount of money required to complete the basic unit on the construction of the 
bigger uncompleted units so far. 
Further investigation of the beneficiaries' preferences for house design by asking them, 
reveals the following result. 
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Table 7:16 Project beneficiaries' preferences for house design 
Preferences in housing design Number % 
Large size of house 80 41.7 
High quality of building materials 14 7.8 
High level of services 27 14.1 
Security 20 10.4 
Privacy 50 26.0 
Total responses 192 100 
Source: Field Survey March 1992 
Toe above responses indicate that the preference for bigger units was the most popular 
response (41.7%) followed by the need for privacy (26%) in the house. The use of high 
quality materials, surprisingly scored the least, which was only 7.8%. This is quite 
contrary to the general belief and to the findings of the evaluation of earlier projects (in 
Senegal and Kenya) regarding the target beneficiaries' desires and aspirations to use 
high quality building materials. 
Investigation of the completed units in the project has also shown that the majority 
(80.0%) of the houses had more than the two bedrooms specified in the basic unit. 
Further analysis revealed that most (67.7%) of them were built bigger than the basic unit 
right from start. Only a few (32.3%) of house owners said they had built a basic unit and 
expanded later. 
The above findings mean that the majority of the beneficiaries rejected the basic unit 
method of consolidation. Note that the project planners argue that the adoption of the 
basic unit concept was not a requirement, but a recommendation. This makes it 
almost a requirement rather than a recommendation. A recommendation would give 
choice and allow the adoption of other options which are totally absent here. 
For those who could afford to build the bigger units to suit their immediate needs, the 
outcome was very good. What is worrying, however is that the majority of these people 
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are not the legitimate target group members, as shown by their income distribution, 
presented in Chapter 6. Although the legitimate groups have the same social needs and 
requirements for bigger units, they are often not successful in their attempts to achieve 
them due to their weak economic status, as discussed earlier in chapter 6 above. They 
end up with abandoned uncompleted units. 
7.3 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has tested the hypotheses put forward by the study. It was found that the 
actual cost of building a basic unit was higher than what the target beneficiaries could 
afford. The high cost of building resulting from the rising cost of the required building 
materials, unanticipated cost of hired labour (which majority of beneficiaries had used), 
insufficiency of the project loans and absence of assumed savings and other sources of 
borrowing, has made the target beneficiaries unable to build or complete their houses 
thereby keeping the level of consolidation low. It was also found that the target 
beneficiaries needed more than the two sleeping rooms specified in a basic unit to suit 
their social and cultural needs and life styles. In an attempt to meet these needs, they 
started bigger units which they could not afford to complete given their weak economic 
status. They have also been found to express preferences for the use of local materials 
and build bigger units. 
The above findings have provided strong evidence for accepting the hypothesis that the 
false assumption made by planners in estimates of affordability, needs and preferences 
of the target beneficiaries, has caused the low level of consolidation in the Makama 
Project. 
The next chapter covers the summary of the findings, discussions and conclusions. 
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Chapter 8: Summary of findings, Discussions and Conclusions 
8.0 Introduction 
The survey findings were presented in the two preceding chapters (6&7). The purpose of 
this chapter is therefore to summarise and discuss the findings and draw conclusions as 
to the possible solution to the research problem based on the findings. This chapter is in 
two sections. The first section summarises the general and specific findings of the study, 
while the second discusses their policy implications and draws conclusions of the whole 
thesis, with suggestions of some possible solution to research problem, and the focus of 
future similar studies. 
8.1 Summary of the general findings 
The comparative analysis of the socio-economic and housing characteristics of the 
sample surveyed revealed a number of interesting findings which have offered 
supporting evidence for some of the hypotheses tested. The socio-economic 
characteristics analysed included, marital status, household sizes, incomes, level of 
education and types of occupation. 
8.1.1 Findings on socio-economic characteristics 
8.1.1.1 Social characteristics 
Most of the household heads interviewed were males (95.7%) between the ages of 30 
and 55. Most of them (90.3%) were found to be married to one or more wives. The 
household sizes were also found to be generally high in both groups compared with an 
average of 7 .1 people per household. The implication of these findings on consolidation 
is that the nonconsolidators with large families may be less likely to be able to 
consolidate quickly .. Although no relationship was established by this study between the 
two variables, expenditure patterns of most households suggested that they needed to 
spend most or all of their incomes on food and other family expenditure ~d will be left 
with none to invest in housing. Their demonstrated lack of surplus income or savings 
further confirms this. In some cases project loans for house construction went into 
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families' most urgent needs (for example food and health care), thereby jeopardising the 
progress of consolidation. 
8.1.1.2 Economic characteristics 
It was found that most of the successful consolidators (62.4%) were from a higher 
income level, earning above the target maximum income of 500 Naira specified. On the 
other hand, most nonconsolidators (73.9%) were earning below 500 Naira. Also at-test 
has revealed a significant difference between the income averages of the two groups 
showing that there is a positive association between income levels and consolidation. 
The higher the income of target beneficiaries the more likely they are to consolidate 
faster and vice versa. Those with higher incomes have also been found to be better 
educated and in more stable and permanent jobs. For instance, 85.3% were found to be 
in the civil service. On the other hand the nonconsolidators were mostly engaged in 
petty businesses with unstable incomes. 
This finding implies that those who are better educated and with higher paid jobs are 
more able and willing to invest in housing. Furthermore, it was also demonstrated that 
those with stable jobs were better qualified to receive a project building loan. The 
unemployed and self-employed, on the other hand, could not provide secure enough 
collateral to qualify for a project loan. 
8.1.1.3 Housing characteristics 
A comparative analysis of the housing characteristics of the surveyed sample has shown 
that the nonconsolidating households are living in a worse housing situation than the 
consolidators. They live in a more crowded situation and have less access to basic 
services and community facilities. They have also been found to be paying more towards 
their housing than the consolidators thereby causing them economic hardship. 
These finding stresses, significantly the problem and points to an urgent need for 
intervention to rescue the affected group. During the survey, they were asked to suggest 
ways they thought they could be helped, and they came up with various ideas. Some of 
the popular ones included: an increased project loan, being allowed the use of local 
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building materials, and the project authorities to take over and complete units and 
recharge the cost to them. Majority of the nonconsolidators were reported to have said 
they were willing to repay the cost of the completed units over an agreed period of time. 
8.1.2 Summary of Specific findings 
The specific findings are those on the hypotheses test results. The results revealed that 
the low level of consolidation in the project can be associated with two main factors: i) 
the target group's lack of affordability for the high cost of building with specified 
building materials, and ii) the unsuitability of the basic unit concept for the target group. 
The lack of affordability for the high cost of building has been found to result from the 
mandatory use of high cost building materials, unanticipated cost of hired labour which 
beneficiaries preferred and used, the weak economic status of target group and lack of 
access to sufficient project loan and non-project borrowing. 
Unsuitability of basic unit refers to mainly to its size which has less number of rooms 
for the beneficiaries' needs and social requirements. 
8.1.2.1 Findings on lack of affordability for the cost of building 
It has been found that the majority target beneficiaries could not afford the cost of 
building a complete basic unit, this was revealed both by at-test and their responses. 
The t-test revealed that the actual cost of building is significantly higher than the cost 
which the target group could afford. It was also shown that 92.8% of the beneficiaries 
said they did not consolidate because they could not afford the cost. A further analysis 
has also revealed that their lack of affordability was associated with high prices of the 
required building materials (72.4% ); added cost of labour (paid labour 11. 7%) used by 
the majority; and inadequacy of the Bank's construction loans (12.2%), coupled with 
lack of other supplementary sources of finance. 
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8.1.2.1.1 High prices of project required building materials required by the 
project 
It was shown, from the mark7t survey, that the prices of building materials have sky 
rocketed over the period of the project implementation. Some materials like cement, 
roofing sheets, and steel went up by several hundreds percent as a result of external 
factors which the project had not foreseen. These factors include, the rising rates of 
inflation, devaluation of the Nigerian national currency (Naira) and the dependence on 
importation of building materials. Economic forces of supply and demand also played a 
role. It has been widely reported (Kunle Abdul W ahab 1990, Fed. Govt. NHP 1991) that 
the Nigerian building materials industries can not cope with the demand for their 
products, because they are too few in number and often produce below their capacity. 
This creates shortages which push prices up. The activities of the long chains of agents 
in the marketing of these materials only exacerbate the problem. They artificially create 
scarcity in some cases and force prices up to maximise the profit. The attempt to reduce 
shortages by importation of such materials leads to higher prices in the end. 
These factors became more critical in the mid 1980s when the structural adjustment 
programme was introduced in the country with the pretext of reforming the economy. 
The structural adjustment does not only affect building materials but all commodities 
and services. The prices of food items, school fees, hospital bills etc., became 
unbearable. This meant that the cost of basic living needs, such as food and health 
services could in many cases be taking up all the income, nothing was left to invest in 
housing. 
It is important to point out here that most of the factors described above hardly affected 
the prices of locally available materials like mud because they need very little processing 
and are found in abundance in most parts of the country. In the building materials price 
table in Chapter Seven, it was shown that, the rise in the price of mud was very subtle 
and could easily be borne by beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, the traditional building practice of the target beneficiaries· demonstrated 
clearly their preference for the use of mud for building large compounds. The housing 
survey of the Makama area done before the project, revealed that 93.1 % of the houses 
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were built with mud walls and most of them rendered with cement plaster. Also when 
some of the target beneficiaries were asked, during the survey in 1992, whether they 
were willing to use the local materials if allowed, the majority (67.8%) of them said they 
were. Given their limited resources, they often go for something more realistically 
priced for them by making trade-offs. For instance given a choice between building 
many rooms with traditional materials and fewer with high priced modern materials, 
they would often go for more the former. This was further demonstrated by the fact that 
of all the non-consolidators interviewed, none complained of the standards of materials 
as a problem in their current housing, though many lived in mud houses. The most 
common complaints were lack of services (35%), over crowding (44.5%) and lack of 
security (20.5%). Also when respondents were asked about their preferences for a house 
design, the results revealed that materials quality had the least response(7.8%), while 
large size of house was highest (41.7%) followed by privacy (26.0%), high level of 
services (14.1) and security (10.4%). 
Why then did the project authority insist on the use of concrete, concrete blocks and 
burnt bricks? The professionals who make decisions on behalf of the housing 
authorities insist on the use of high quality modern materials for a number of reasons: 
firstly, their prejudices against the use of local traditional materials, lead many to regard 
any materials other than concrete and cement as not good enough. It is important to note 
that at the inception stages of the Makama project, the original idea was that those on 
low income could be allowed to use the local mud if they wanted. When the project took 
off, the use of mud for any part of the building was banned. When the project architect 
was questioned on this issue, he simply said that if they allow people to use mud, they 
will only be creating another slum. 
Secondly, the professionals are reluctant to let go the power of decision making because 
it feels good to the professional to tell the poor people what they can or can not do. The 
idea of letting the poor make decisions about not only how much they want to invest in 
housing, but also how and with what they want to build, is seen by many professionals 
as a threat to their authority. 
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8.1.2.1.2. Inadequacy of the project loan and lack of savings and non project 
borrowing sources. 
The majority of the target beneficiaries have been found to have relied totally on the 
project loan for both purchasing of land and building their units. They had no savings or 
other sources from which to borrow money. Therefore the size of the loan they had was 
very crucial to them. During the survey, 80% of those interviewed said the amount of 
loan they were given was insufficient for building the basic unit. Furthermore, when the 
cost of building a basic unit was compared with the amount of loan made available, a 
wide gap was revealed. The analysis also showed that 21.7% had not received the loan 
at the time of survey. 
While the average amount of loan available to the low income beneficiaries (including 
money to cover the cost of land), was 4,500 Naira, the cost of building the basic unit 
with the required materials was 6,400 Naira in 1985, when most beneficiaries started 
building. This rose further to 12,000 Naira in 1988, and 22,000 Naira by 1992. Although 
the loan was increased by about 20% in 1990, the amount did not significantly narrow 
the gap. 
There is a limit to how much the loans c~ be increased, because the project resources 
are limited, and also the amount has to take into account the beneficiaries' ability to 
repay. 
It was also assumed by project planners, that the target beneficiaries would have non-
project sources of finance and savings to supplement their loan, this assumption was 
found not to hold. The majority had no other sources of borrowing or income surpluses 
for savings. 
8.1.2.1.3 Cost of hired labour for construction 
The cost of labour, which in most cases amounted to nearly 20% of the total cost of 
building was not anticipated, because the project planners assumed free self-build labour 
was to be used by the allottees. As has been shown, 78.1 % of the nonconsolidators 
claimed they were using, or intended to use, hired labour. This was because most of 
them were fully employed and could not afford the time. Also they did not have the 
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technical knowledge to build using the modem materials required. It is important to note 
that earlier studies in Lusaka, ·Philippines, and El Salvador (Bamberger 1982) revealed 
similar findings regarding the use of hired labour. The World Bank acknowledged these 
findings and even went a step further by reflecting them in its wider definition of a self-
help. The wider definition now includes the use of hired labour and self supervised 
labour as a method of self-help building. However, the practice in the later projects did 
not reflect this because planners still assumed the use of labour would be free, and 
excluded that in the estimate cost of consolidation as was the case in the Makama 
project. Hence the low income target beneficiaries, who neither have income surpluses, 
nor other sources of finance, to supplement the loan, could not afford the total cost of 
full consolidation. 
8.1.2.2 Findings on the size of the basic unit 
It was shown that only 32.3% said they adopted the basic unit concept of consolidation, 
while the majority (67.7%) did not. Also, 75% of the nonconsolidators started building 
bigger units which they were unable to complete, leading to the low level of 
consolidation. As was shown in the analysis, the majority of the beneficiaries said they 
did not adopt the basic unit because it was unsuitable for their housing needs and 
requirements. The number of rooms were too few to meet their families' immediate 
needs and their design lacked the elements for privacy and security which they required 
to suit their life styles. 
The analysis of household sizes, which showed that 77% of the total number of 
beneficiaries interviewed had 5 or more members in the household, and only 23% had 
fewer, supports this claim. It is important to make it clear that although there was no 
obligation on the households to start with only a basic unit, the project was only 
prepared to support them on that basis. Most families confessed even if they had started 
with a basic unit, they would still not have moved to the site until they are able to 
expand it to take their large families. Some of those who were unable to complete the 
bigger units they had started sold them to buy bigger compounds in a traditional area or 
to improve their current traditional houses. The higher income groups who bought them 
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built rental units, and lived in their other houses outside the project area. It is important 
to note that most of the rental accommodation is built of high quality materials and fully 
serviced. Also some of the high incomed, who bought plots, built high standard private 
houses to live in. Some typical examples of such houses were shown by various plates, 
in Chapter 3. 
The prospects of being able to build high standard houses on cheaper serviced urban 
land has increased the interest of the high income group in the project. Furthermore, the 
project unit had also, at a certain stage of the implementation, embarked on a plot 
revocation exercise. At the time of Survey (1992), the unit had revoked plot allocations 
from nearly 400 of the original allottees who could not consolidate. Most of the revoked 
plots were allocated to people who are believed to have been from a higher incomed 
group. 
8.2 Discussions and Conclusions 
All the above findings point to the existence of a planning error which leaves a gap 
between what the project planners proposed and the actual affordability, housing needs 
and requirements of the target groups. 
The existence of these gaps implies that the planners lacked an understanding and 
consideration for the target groups' housing needs, requirements and preferences. 
These requirements and preferences are the necessities and realities of the way of life of 
most of the target group, and can not easily be compromised. For instance, the need for 
bigger units is necessary to cater for large families, and the need for security and privacy 
in the design layout, are required to maintain their traditional and religious values. 
The basic unit concept proposed was found to be incompatible with the beneficiaries 
housing needs and requirements in a number of ways: firstly, the planners proposed a 
two bedroom basic unit, and the target beneficiaries needed more than that. Secondly, 
while the common building practice of the target groups revealed their preference for the 
compound type design style, with courtyards and a fencing wall to cater for their needs 
for privacy and security, the planners proposed a single block unit with neither fence nor 
courtyard. 
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It was also found that the planners have failed to make the cost of building affordable to 
the target beneficiaries. The type of building materials that were insisted upon by the 
project authorities is not affordable to the target group. The target beneficiaries have 
been found to be able and willing to use locally available traditional materials like mud 
which the Project authorities were not prepared to allow. The target groups' preference 
for cheaper local materials is an expression of their economic reality and not a dislike 
for permanent expensive materials. 
It was also shown that the amount of loan made available for consolidation is far less 
than what is actually required. The target beneficiaries had neither savings nor other 
sources of loan to supplement the project loan, contrary to the Planners assumption. 
Also the target groups preferred the hired labour method of construction contrary to the 
self-build methods assumed by the planners. 
8.2.1 Discussions 
8.2.1.1 The need for convenience and privacy 
Although this aspect is not one of the major focus of the study and therefore not 
analysed in great details, it is thought worth mentioning. This is because some of the 
target beneficiaries had expressed these needs, and also the available secondary data on 
the area suggest the need by the group. 
The need for privacy is rooted in the traditional and religious values of the 
predominantly Muslim community of Makama. Most households (56%) were found to 
have 2 or more wives and many children. It is the requirement of both Islamic religion 
and traditional custom that each wife has a private room(s) to share with her children 
and the head of household his own room where the wives can visit in tum. This means 
that any household with more than one wife needs at least three sleeping rooms to start 
with. The basic unit offered two rooms and parlour. In the traditional housing 
settlements, people who are not economically strong enough to meet these requirements 
make certain trade off, for example bathing and cooking in the open and the use of 
cheaper building materials, etc., to enable them to afford the extra sleeping rooms which 
they consider more important. The project's proposals might have been based on the 
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assumption that even if beneficiaries needed more rooms, they can manage in the 
beginning with fewer before they can afford to expand. However their special 
circumstances, as discussed above, make it virtually impossible to do so. It is more than 
just a case of a large family with many children, the polygamous nature of the family 
complicates matters. 
Furthermore, the important design elements (courtyards and fencing) for privacy and 
security were also neglected in the basic unit house design proposed. The courtyard is a 
very important element of design for the people's way of life. It is used for various 
activities including washing, cooking and sleeping when the weather is hot, which it is 
more often than not. The fencing wall is also needed for privacy, especially of females 
who should traditionally to be shielded from the public. It is also used as a deterrent to 
intruders and thieves. The courtyards and fencing wall are part and parcel of the Hausa 
architecture, and are valued highly by the people. This is reflected in most of the 
traditional housing in Bauchi. In fact, the very first step towards any house building is 
usually to put a fencing wall around the plot. Even in modem buildings, both courtyards 
and fencing walls are incorporated. Although no correlation has been made between 
these elements and consolidation by this study, beneficiaries have been reported to have 
expressed the desire for them. So for any design proposal in that part of this country not 
to consider these elements is a serious mistake. 
It is very important to note that the planners and the architects, who made the proposals, 
are not unaware of the needs and the requirements of the people discussed above. 
For instance, the social and traditional housing surveys conducted by the Dar Al 
Handasah consultants (1978) for the purpose of the project planning revealed findings 
that suggest the need for these requirements. The survey found that 91 % of the 
household heads in Makama were Muslims, 56% of who were married to more than one 
wife, with the average household size of7.1. Also 81.8% of women expressed the desire 
to have more children to add to the ones they already had, implying the likelihood of 
even larger household sizes. 
The survey of the traditional housing designs and sizes also reveals that 80.5% of the 
houses in Makama were of the compound types with fence and courtyard, and 54.6% of 
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the compounds had more than three rooms. It was also found that 93.1 % of the walls 
were of mud of which 54.4% were plastered with cement, and only 6.1 % were of 
concrete blocks. 
These findings were, however, taken for granted and not considered in the planning of 
the basic unit proposed 
8.2.1.2 Material quality versus size of houses 
The fact that the majority of households built larger houses with traditional materials 
expresses their preference for size over structure. It is also interesting to discover that a 
few of those who dropped out of the project by selling their plots and uncompleted 
houses bought compound houses built in traditional materials in other areas. 
The project planners, on the other hand were more concerned with keeping the standards 
of materials high and the size of unit to the minimum. However if we recall the analysis 
of the peoples' preferences in house design discussed earlier in Chapter 7 (Table 7:14), 
very few (only 7.8%) mentioned high standard building materials. The majority 
expressed preference for bigger unit. This further demonstrates the gap between the 
planners' assumptions and the peoples' actual preferences and requirements. It is very 
interesting to discover that peoples prejudices for the use of local materials, which have 
been formed during the oil boom, are beginning to give way to the economic realities of 
their situations. However this is not to say that people do not like high standard 
material. They do, but they prefer to deal with what they consider as most important to 
them first given their limited resources. The point here is that if these preferences were 
taken into consideration in the planning of the project, the use of a certain standard of 
materials would not have been imposed. This meant people would have built their 
houses to their requirements using the types and standards of materials they could 
afford. The duty of the project would have been only to ensure those materials were not 
a health or safety hazards to the builders ( e.g. thatch), and the resulting consolidation 
problems would have been minimised. 
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8.2.1.3 Implications for the Aided Self-help Strategy 
Aided self-help, among other things, was meant to solve the problem of the 
incompatibility of low income housing with the target group by allowing the 
beneficiaries the freedom to build by themselves, however, the findings above proved to 
the contrary. A basic unit was recommended and the type of materials to be used 
specified, denying the plot allottees the freedom of choice. Though the planners argue 
that adoption of the basic unit was not a requirement but recommendation, in practice it 
was almost a requirement given the size of loan and the type of materials required. This 
is in defiance of the principles of self-help housing put forward by J .F.C. Turner. The 
beneficiaries were neither allowed to decide for themselves nor involved in the decision 
making process. While the project planners were concerned with controlling standard 
and keeping the cost to a minimum, they went for a basic unit. The plot allottees, on the 
other hand, showed their preference for bigger units, even if these had to be in 
traditional materials rather than smaller units in modem materials. 
It is important to note that the incompatibility between the housing provided by the 
planners and the requirements of the low income earners, has always been one of the 
main problems with the public direct construction system of housing. The proponents of 
aided self-help housing like J.F.C Turner was hoping that the problems would be 
eliminated by giving the people freedom to build their own houses to their needs and 
requirements. All evidence point to the fact that the 'freedom to build' is not happening 
yet. 
8.2.1.4 Conclusions and contribution to knowledge 
The specific findings have provided strong evidence for accepting the hypothesis that 
the low level of consolidation in the Makama project was caused by the inaccurate 
planning estimates and assumptions regarding the housing affordability, needs and 
preferences of the target beneficiaries. 
The general findings have also led to the confirmation that the target beneficiaries are 
living in a worse housing situation as a consequence of their lack of consolidation. 
Their weak socio-economic circumstances also mean that they are unable to help 
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themselves out of this dilemma and therefore need an urgent intervention. Although 
earlier reports have pointed to the existence of the consolidation problem, no empirical 
investigation of the causes of this problem is known to the researcher. This study, it is 
hoped, has helped in filling this gap in knowledge about the causes of the problem, 
through empirical investigation. Suggestions as to the measures, which should be taken 
to contribute towards rectifying the problem have been made. These were based on the 
findings of the study as well as the knowledge of existing workable solutions to similar 
problems. The measures suggested are focused on eliminating the problem, as well as 
preventing its occurrence in similar future projects in Nigeria, and elsewhere in the 
Developing World. Such measures include: the promotion of the use of local building 
materials and lower design and construction standards; the mobilisation of sources of 
finance for housing; reformation of existing planning and building laws, to make them 
more responsive to current situations; encouraging the participation of the target group 
in planning, and implementation of future projects. 
i) Promotion of the use of local building materials and lower construction 
standards for low income housing. 
It was found, by the study, that the target beneficiaries lacked the affordability for the 
cost of building housing units to the standards required by the project. The major 
constraints were also found to be the mandatory use of highly priced building materials 
and the lack of sufficient funds for construction. 
One of the most interesting findings of this study is the fact that most people interviewed 
were willing to use local/traditional building materials, particularly mud, for building 
their houses. The facilitation and encouragement of the use of local materials should 
therefore be desirable. Locally available or locally produced materials like mud, clay and 
limestone are not only cheaper but also durable and aesthetically good, and are found in 
abundance in most parts of the country. (a) Mud, for instance, is about the most 
abundant and widely used building material in Nigeria. It has been, and· is still being, 
used in traditional housing in most parts of the country. Mud is relatively cheap, needs 
little or no technology and skilled labour to be used, and is suitable for the warm 
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climatic conditions in most part of the country throughout the year. It also helps to 
maintain the traditional character of the housing environment. The major disadvantages 
of mud are that it needs more regular maintenance because of its inability to withstand 
weathering, it also will not cover a long span and is not suitable for multi-storey 
construction. However, as Hassan Fathy (1975) has pointed out in his experiment with 
mud architecture in rural Egypt, if the walls are made adequately thick, and stones are 
used as foundations, the mud house can withstand any kind of condition. Mud can be 
used with stones for foundations, flooring, walling as well as flat, domed or vaulted 
roofs, as observed in many traditional houses in Northern part of Nigeria. It can be made 
into sun dried bricks, or just mixed with water and used as it is. Traditionally mud is 
mixed with straw to increase its elasticity and strength. These days, experiments have 
shown that adding lime also improves the strength of mud. This has been used in 
countries like India to improve the strength of soils used for low-income housing and 
has been found effective. They have been able to achieve up to two-storey constructions 
with mud that is strengthened with lime. This can also be exploited in some parts of 
Nigeria where lime is found in abundance. (b) Clay, also found in abundance in most 
part of the Nigeria, has already been widely use in the country, mostly in form of factory 
processed clay bricks. The government of Nigeria, having realised this as a valuable 
resource of building materials, has made many efforts to exploit its potential. In 1977, 
for instance, seven factories of clay bricks were established across the country. Factories 
produced all varieties of bricks and tiles which were being used for decking, walling, _ 
tiling and roofing, as well as paving. Local and state governments also embarked on a 
number of projects, including housing, to demonstrate and encourage people to use clay 
bricks. However, the problem, as has been discussed earlier, is the high production cost 
owning to use of sophisticated technology. 
The production cost was automatically transferred to the consumer which made the 
bricks difficult for the poor people to afford. Those who could afford the bricks could 
also afford to buy concrete blocks, and they see it as more progressive- to build with 
cement. So there was a situation where factories were piling warehouses high with clay 
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bricks with nobody interested in buying them. Some had to cut down their production 
while others even closed down. 
The new approach should therefore be directed towards exploiting the local resources of 
both local raw materials and technology in the production and distribution of building 
materials. This approach should not only provide cheaper materials, but is also more 
sustainable. Small scale locally based factories, rather than large scale central factories, 
should be preferred. Government should both assist and encourage private investors in 
establishing such small locally based factories producing building materials, by directing 
commercial banks to give lending priority to those investors. 
The government should encourage the creation of local co-operative societies for direct 
production and distribution of local building materials on behalf of their members. Such 
societies should be provided with access to loans through the Federal Mortgage Bank of 
Nigeria. Also the government should intensify and fund research into the exploitation, 
development, production and the use of local building materials. Such research 
activities, in addition to investigating the low cost mansory materials like clay and mud 
mentioned above, should also look into the possibility of using petroleum residues, 
plastics and some agricultural waste such as sugar cane and bamboo. 
An institute for housing, vested with the responsibility of research into housing and 
building materials for housing, should be established. The institute should undertake 
extensive research on materials, and demonstrate easy methods of using them. It should 
also develop cheap and durable materials economically viable for production in small 
scale local factories. The institute should get its funding partly from the government 
budget and partly from possible grants from foreign aid agencies to enable it to 
undertake its task. 
The government should set up a separate building materials research institute for the 
country, similar to ones established in Kenya and India Its responsibility should 
primarily be to exploit the potentials of local materials and find ways to improve their 
strength and durability. There are a number of similar studies and research being 
undertaken in the building departments of universities and technical colleges in the 
country at the moment. The problem is that there is a lack of sufficient funding and co-
245 
ordination with the building industries. Studies often get no further than the lab and are 
purely academic, with little or no practical value. 
The work of this institute should therefore be co-ordinated with the construction 
industries, which should bear some of the burden of its funding. 
The aim is for Nigeria to be self-sufficient in the production of building materials. 
Although, it was revealed in the survey that people's attitudes towards local materials 
are changing, due to economic realities, the professional (architects and planners) 
authorities are still heavily prejudiced. 
Government should not only allow the use of local materials but also encourage people 
to use them by demonstrating them in public projects. The housing professionals 
especially Architects and Planners, should re-educate themselves and face the reality of 
the situation, while bearing in mind that their services will fail unless they satisfy 
people's needs and requirements. A traditional housing design module has been 
introduced in the majority of the Schools of Architecture in Nigeria. This is a good 
practice and should be continued and extended to colleges of building technology. 
Finally, there is a need to reform the Nigerian building bye-laws and standards codes. 
Laws restricting the use of certain local materials should be reviewed, with the 
possibility of changing them, in so far as they do not contravene health and safety. Mud, 
for instance should be made a legally acceptable material for construction. In the 
Makama project for instance, it was noted that a few houses were started with mud walls 
but were later discontinued and have served demolition orders by the project authorities. 
The planning regulations and building bye-laws, which have been inherited from the 
colonial masters, are still in use today in Nigeria with very minor or no modifications at 
all (Mabogunje 1978). 
Planning regulations should be dynamic, changing with the circumstances and situations 
in society at any given time. The current situation in the country is such that the majority 
of the low income earners Nigerians can not afford the type and nature of the building 
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materials insisted upon in the regulations. The new regulations should make provision 
for them to use the type of materials they can afford. 
Anticipated outcome if locally produced materials are used 
(a) Better relationship between costs and income: the target low income beneficiaries of 
the self-help and other low income housing projects will be able to afford the cost of 
materials for full consolidation of their plots. This may also encourage house building 
activities outside the project area thereby increasing the stock of housing generally. 
(b) Control of project invasion by a higher income group. If the use of local materials is 
allowed in low-income housing projects, it will discourage the invasion of the project by 
higher income groups who are ambitious and can afford to build with imported 
materials. This means that the low income earners will have more chances of benefiting 
from their project with the absence of the high income competitors. 
( c) Employment generation. The local production of bricks for the project in an on-site 
factory will provide temporary employment and a source of extra income for the 
beneficiaries of the project as well as other local labour. 
(d) Control prices of other materials. If the local materials have become officially 
acceptable for housing, more people will build with them and this will reduce the 
demand for other materials like cement, forcing the prices to drop. Also fewer materials 
will be imported, thereby saving substantial amounts of valuable foreign exchange that 
could be used to purchase more essential things like medical equipment and drugs. 
( e) Larger basic units can be achieved using local materials with the same amount of 
money needed to build using the required materials. This means that the target 
beneficiaries will have more chance to achieve their spatial requirements with the same 
resources. 
ii) Mobilisation of housing finance 
The lack of sufficient money for construction has hindered the consolidation process in 
most cases, as has already been shown. Contrary to the assumption that the target group 
would have other sources of money to supplement their loan, the majority of the low 
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income target group interviewed had none. Furthermore, they do not qualify for, and 
cannot afford a housing loan from commercial banks because of the secure collateral 
and high interest rates demanded. Therefore the following measures should be taken to 
facilitate finance for housing in general, and low income housing in particular. 
1) Nigerian Government should expand the capital base of the Federal Mortgage Bank 
above the current limit in order to cope with the increasing demand for mortgage loans. 
The bank should also devise strategies to encourage private savings by individual, such 
as incentives like qualification for a housing loan by saving so much money, as some 
commercial banks are already doing in Nigeria. The loan should be at a low interest, 
with longer (20-25 years) amortisation period to increase affordability by the poor 
groups. 
2) Employers of labour should be actively involved in facilitating loans for housing to 
their employees. This can be done through compulsory monthly savings deducted at 
source from wages and saved into a general fund that can be made available for loans 
towards housing. This may not be welcome by many employees, but if they are properly 
educated as to the benefits of the scheme many would be glad to join. 
However, this applies to formal employees. Those in the informal sector, should be 
encouraged, and given assistance, to form their own local co-operative societies and 
saving schemes to build up funds that can be used for housing. 
A National Housing Fund was set up in 1989 for government employees on grades 1 to 
4. They make a compulsory monthly contribution of 4% of their incomes to the fund. 
This should be enlarged to include those in higher grades, thereby increasing the size of 
funds available. 
3) Co-operative societies: many such groups already exist among local traders and some 
female groups, but only on a very small scale called 'Adashe' in the local language. 
Usually, these savings are drawn out by members, in tum, to be used for marriage and 
other ceremonies. If these were expanded, with the assistance of the government, they 
would provide a very viable source of housing finance. Most people have problems 
saving on their own, but are ready and willing to contribute to the group savings in order 
not to be looked down upon by other members. The society members can also help in 
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providing mutual help labour in building their houses, especially where there are some 
skilled members like masons and carpenters. 
iii) Participation of target beneficiaries in planning and implementation of their 
projects 
In the Makama project, the beneficiaries had rejected the basic unit concept proposed to 
them by the planners because it was incompatible with their housing needs and 
requirements. This was because they were neither involved in preparing the proposals 
nor given the freedom to express their priorities and preferences. It is therefore 
recommended that in planning similar future projects, the target beneficiaries should be 
given the freedom to build their houses in their own local styles, while the project 
provides technical assistance to them. 
The target beneficiaries should be actively involved in the planning and implementation 
of the project through the following channels: 
1) Prior to project planning, an extensive housing survey of the intended beneficiaries 
should be undertaken by project Planners and Architects to investigate the peoples' 
requirements, needs and preferences in housing. The information should be analysed 
and used in the planning and design of the new housing projects. It can be used to 
estimate the size of units (number of rooms) the beneficiaries will require, and the type 
of materials which will be realistic to the particular group being catered for. With this in 
mind, the probable cost of building can be estimated. It is not necessary at this stage to 
propose a prototype design to the beneficiaries because they will have different priorities 
and preferences depending on their particular circumstances. 
2) The individual beneficiaries who are eventually allocated plots should work together 
with the project Architects, who are local and understand the culture of the people, to 
plan and design their houses to their requirements. The project unit should provide the 
architects' services to the beneficiaries as part of the project's technical assistance. Most 
people will know exactly what they want in their future houses, such as the elements 
they want to be included, the different positions of their rooms and how they should 
relate to one another. What they would not know is how to translate that into a design on 
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paper. Some people may tend to be over-ambitious, the professionals with the 
knowledge of the resources available should be able to give them useful and realistic 
advice on this matter. 
A design produced this way will therefore reflect people's requirements, needs and 
values. 
iv) Improvement of the socio-economic status of the target beneficiaries. 
The major economic factors found to be affecting consolidation are income and 
employment. Those with low incomes were less able to consolidate than those with 
higher. Also those with stable employment and a definite monthly wage were more 
willing to invest in housing than those without. It is therefore essential to raise the level 
of incomes one way or another. It is true that when incomes are raised, prices of 
commodities go up, but it is not necessary to raise income directly. By creating more job 
opportunities and encouraging local businesses, the incomes of people can be raised 
indirectly. 
(a) Employment and income. More local industries should be created in the project 
town and area to provide increased source of income for the beneficiaries. Also training 
schemes for crafts and local technology should be established as part of the housing 
schemes. It is usually mentioned in the World Bank's documents that employment 
creation is part of a self-help housing scheme, but this element rarely exists in practice. 
For instance in the Makama project, an industrial estate to provide employment 
opportunity for the beneficiaries was supposed to be part of the housing scheme. The 
estate was later converted to residential plots which are being allocated to the higher 
income group. The project authorities assumed, and expected that private entrepreneurs 
would buy plots and establish local industries. No one showed any interest, contrary to 
the assumptions. In future, the government should invest in establishing local industries 
that will provide employment for the local people as part of the project. A local building 
materials industry, for instance, would be very useful in such an area. This will not only 
provide employment, but also a ready source of supply of building materials for the 
project. 
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(b) Adult education and family planning: adult education; especially for adult females, 
should be organised as part of the housing schemes. Most women were found to be 
uneducated in this area. They should be given some adult education and local training to 
enable them to work to earn and contribute to the household's income. They should also 
be educated in family planning matters to help control the size of their household, and 
ease the financial burden on the household heads. People should be properly educated 
about the importance of this, and not just be issued with pills without understanding why 
they should be using them. If they properly understand, they will even do it by choice 
without being advised to do so. 
v) Improvement of the quality and quantity of the project implementation staff 
It was obvious during the survey that the project unit was understaffed, with very few 
professionals. There is only one architect, one planner and a surveyor to handle the 
project. This is very inadequate for the amount, and quality, of service required. Also the 
unit was not entrusted with full responsibility for the implementation of the project. 
Most decisions on project matters had to be referred to the state Ministry of Lands, 
thereby causing unnecessary delays. This was also a major source of delay in the 
implementation of the project. To avoid this in the future, 
(1) It is recommended that the project unit be adequately staffed with properly trained 
and experienced professionals who will be able to handle the implementation efficiently. 
Project planners and architects should be local, and if possible indigenous to the region. 
This will help in solving the problems of lack of understanding and appreciation of 
beneficiaries' culture and values which should be reflected in their housing designs. The 
use of foreign professionals should be completely discouraged. 
(2) The staff of the unit should be given autonomy to take decisions without having to 
refer to the state ministry, especially in matters regarding plot allocation. This will 
reduce unnecessary delays and save time during implementation. 
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vi) Facilitating the supply of more middle and high income housing. 
It is also recommended that the supply of middle and high income housing should be 
facilitated. It was very obvious that there is an acute shortage of middle income housing 
in Bauchi. Although this study has not shown any empirical evidence to demonstrate 
this, it has been gathered from discussions with housing experts that it is the case. The 
shortage was believed to have led to the middle income invasion of a low income 
project. The majority of the middle income earners who were found to be benefiting, 
said they had no other choice. They could neither afford the et price of plots, nor 
commercial loans at a high interest. 
Future low income projects should be planned along side middle income ones to 
everyone an opportunity, and increase the chances of the poor benefiting from projects 
meant for them. 
8.2.2 Conclusions 
It is hoped that the findings of this study have helped to fill the gap in knowledge about 
the causes of the low level of consolidation in the World Bank Aided Sites and Services 
Projects. It is also hoped that the suggestions made will contribute towards eliminating 
the problem in the Makama project and other similar project in Nigeria, and elsewhere 
in the world. It is also hoped that the findings and the suggestions made will help in the 
planning and implementation of future sites and services projects. 
However, this study, because of the limitations of its scope, is not exhaustive of the 
problems in Sites and Services Projects. It is recommended that more studies be carried 
out to test the validity of the above findings in similar projects in other locations. Future 
studies are needed to focus on other aspects of the project which are not covered by this 
study. These aspects include: 
(a) Commercialisation of the Sites and Services project. A detailed study is required to 
investigate the effect of the commercialisation of the project on the · beneficiaries. 
Preliminary investigations by this study already point to the fact that the project might be 
commercialised by the alarming proportion of renters and absentee landlords on the 
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project site. However, because this is not a major focus of the study, no further 
investigation was undertaken. 
(b) Further studies are also needed to investigate the plot allocation procedure, how 
efficient it was, the methods used to verify information provided on applications, and 
whether or not the process was just and fair. 
(c) The impact of the Makama project on the land and housing market in Bauchi town. It 
would be interesting to investigate how the project has affected the land and property 
market. 
The overall conclusion from this study is that the aided Sites and Services Strategy, 
despite all its bottlenecks, is a viable solution to the low-income problem. With the 
current situation of land and housing markets in most developing countries, it seems to 
the researcher that the strategy provides the only possible way that the homeless low 
income earners can realise their dreams of owning a plot and building their future 
homes. Although neither the results of this study nor of others warrant this optimism, the 
strategy is still in the trial stage in most countries, and lessons learnt from mistakes can 
be corrected in the future. Many will be affected by the mistakes, but it is a worthwhile 
venture and should not be abandoned. It is definitely a step in the right direction. It is 
therefore strongly recommended that the Sites and Services Schemes be expanded in 
Nigeria and other Developing Countries. However, new projects must take into 
consideration the continuous findings and informed suggestions made by researchers 
and observers regarding ways of making the strategy more effective. 
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APPENDIX iii 
Questionnaires administered to the beneficiaries of the World Bank Assisted Makama 
Sites and Services Project 
Greet the respondent and introduce yourself explaining to him the purpose of the study and 
how important it is to get his co operation. Also reassure him that any peace of information 
provided will be treated in strict confidence. 
1. What is your marital status? 
a) Married 
b) Single 
c) Divorced 
d) widowed 
2. What is the is the size of your Household? 
3. What is your main occupation? 
a) Farmer 
b) trader/businessman 
c) Civil servant 
d) Teacher(private) 
e) Artisant 
4. What is your total Income per month (in Naira, N 17=£1)? 
5. Do you Own the house you live in? 
a) Renter 
b) Owner consolidator 
c) Owner non consolidator 
If the anwer to questioin 5 is a), proceed upto question 9 and then continue from question 21 
upto 30. But if answer is either b) or c), continue from question 10 upto the next instruction. 
6. How much is your monthly rent (in Naira)? 
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7. Do you Know your Land Lord very well? if yes what is his 
occupation (where applicable)? 
a) Farmer 
b) trader/businessman 
c) Civil servant 
d) artisan 
e) Other Please specify 
8. Did you Know about this project when it was started? 
a) Yes 
b)No 
9. If you Knew about the project, why did you not 
participate ? 
a) failed application (give reasons for failure) 
b) can not afford the cost of building so did not apply 
c) dropped out of the project. 
d) Not in Bauchi at the time 
e) didn't have a need to own a house at that time 
10. How did you acquire your plot? 
a) Allocated by the project 
b) bought from an original allottee 
c) given by a friend or relative 
11. Can you remember the date /year you got the plot? 
12. Did you start the construction immediately? 
a) yes 
b) no 
13. What caused the delay (where applicable)? 
a) Lack of initial funds 
b) delays in obtaining Mortgage loan 
c) delays in installation of services 
d) used the initial loan to further business 
e) reluctance to move from former area 
f) Other please specify 
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Have you consolidated (completed your house and is living in it)? Yes/no 
If the answer to above question is yes, continue up to question 31 and if no Proceed from 
question 34 to the end. 
14. How long did it take you to complete the house? 
15. What method(s) of contruction did you use to build your house? 
a) Self-help 
b) Hired labour and self supervised 
c) contracted 
d) a&b 
e) Other 
16. Can you estimate how much it cost you to build the house (in Naira)? 
17. Where did you get the money to build the house? 
a) Mortgage loan 
b) private savings 
c) private money lenders 
d) donations from relatives & relatives 
e) Compensation from the project unit 
f) Other 
18. If you took mortgage loan was it sufficient ? 
a) yes 
b) no 
19. How much (in Naira) is your monthly mortgage repayment. 
20. At what stage of construction did you move in? 
a) core unit 
b) completed house 
21. How many bedroonms do you have in the house? 
22. Are sub-letting any part of the house? 
23. If yes, how many rooms are to the exclusive use of your family 
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24. What type of materials did you use in building the following 
parts of your house? 
a) Foundation 
b) Walls 
c) Floors 
d) Roof 
e) ceiling 
f) doors 
g) window 
h) finishes 
25. Do you have Electricity in the house? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
26. What is the source of your water supply 
a) Private Tap 
b) private well 
c) Communal tap 
d) communal well 
e) Water seller 
27. What type of toilet system do have in the house? 
a) Ordinary pit laterine only 
b) V.I.P. pit laterine 
c) Water system 
d) no laterine yet 
28. In what type of housing were you living 
prior to this project 
a) Own house 
b) rented accomodation 
c) Shared accomodation 
d) In a government housing. 
29. How much rent were you paying every month? 
( where applicable) 
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30. Do you think your housing situation was made 
better by this project or not? 
a) better 
b) worse 
c) no difference 
31. Can you please list the range of benefit if any you 
accrued from this project?(in order of their importance to you) 
32. What are the major problems you currently 
experience in the project? 
33. What changes if any Do you wish to 
see implemented in the project or in similar 
future projects if you were to participate? 
questions 34 to the end are for non consolidators only 
34. How far have you gone with building your house? 
a) Have not started any construction 
b) construction upto DPC (damp proof course) level 
c) block work upto lintel 
d) roofing stage 
e) finished but unoccupied 
35. how many habitable rooms do you propose in the 
uncompleted house? 
36. What type of materials are you using or intent to 
use for building the following parts of your house? 
a) Foundation 
b) Walls 
c) Floors 
d) Roofs 
37. Do you wish to complete your house and live in it? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
38. If yes to question 35, Why have you not done so yet? 
(give reasons inorder of importance). 
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39. When do you think you can possibly complete it? 
a) In less than a year 
b) 2--3 yrs. 
c) 3--5 
d) Don't know, untill the economy improves 
e) Other specify Please 
40. Where do you live at present? 
a) Own house 
b) rented room & parlour 
c) Family shared house 
d) government low-cost quaters 
41. How much rent did you pay every month (in Naira)? 
42. How many habitable rooms do have in the house? 
43. What type of Materials were used to build your house 
(also observe)? 
44. What basic services do you have in the house? 
a) Electricity & pipe water 
b) Electricity but well water 
c) No electricity & no pipe water 
45.What type of laterine do you use in your house? 
a) Traditional pit laterine 
b) V.I.P. laterine 
c) water system 
d) no laterine at all 
46. What are the major problems you currently experience 
with your housing condition? 
a) Lack of services 
b) Lack of privacy 
c) insecurity 
d Poor structure 
e) insufficient space 
f) Cost of rent is too high 
g) other please specify 
47. What do you think if any could be done to help you finish 
and move into your house faster? 
48. What are the major benefits if any would you say you got from this project 
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APPENDIX iv 
Questionnares for the Officials of the World-Bank 
assisted Makama Project. 
A. Personal Data 
1. Name of the Ofiicial.. ................................................ . 
2. Occupation ................................................................ . 
3. Responsibility held ....................................................... . 
B. Selection of Beneficiaries 
4. Could you please state the minimum and maximun income brackets for the 
participants in this project? 
a. Minimum .................................................................... . 
b. Maximum .................................................................... . 
5.What are the criteria you used in selection of beneficiaries? 
a ........................................................................... . 
b ........................................................................... . 
c ........................................................................... . 
d ........................................................................... . 
e ........................................................................... . 
6.Do you have the records of all the plot allottees since the beginning of the project? 
(collect register if available). 
7.Have been mornitoring the project beneficiaries? 
8. If yes, are they the original allottees of the project? 
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9. Do you think the original allottees are being turned over? 
10. Could you please show me the most current plot allocation register. 
C. House Design and building Materials standards 
11. Did you set any minimum and maximum for building or materials 
for the housing units? if yes please specify what they are. 
Size of the unit. ........................................................................ . 
Types of materials required for the following parts of the house 
a. Foundation 
b. Walls ..................................................................................... . 
c. Floors .................................................................................... . 
d. Roofs ..................................................................................... .. 
e. Finishing ............................................................................... . 
12. Could you please explain how these standards were arrived at. 
······································································································· 
······································································································· 
······································································································· 
13. Are the standards acceptable to the target beneficairies? 
·········································································································· 
14. Are the standards affordable to the target beneficiaries? 
If yes please explain how and if no state why ................................ . 
········································································································ 
278 
D. Consolidation of plots 
15. Are you satisfied with the level of consolidation in the project? 
........................................................................................................................................................................................... 
16. If no, what do think the problem is? 
············································································································· 
........................................................................................................................................................................ 
17. Did you provide any form of assistance to the plot allottees towards 
consolidating their plot? ......................................................... . 
18. If yes state the nature of assistance ............................................... . 
············································································································· 
............................................................................................................................................................................ 
E. Mortgage Loan 
19. When did you start issueing the building materials loan ................. . 
20. Could you please show me the register of loan bebneficairies showing 
the amounts of loan and dates issued? 
21. What are the conditions for your loan qualification: 
························································································································· 
·················· .. ······· ......................................... -........................................................ . 
22. Were the target groups able to meet these conditions?.yes/No 
23. Were you able to give all beneficairies the loan? Yes/No If no 
please could explain why not. ........................................................................ : 
························································································································· 
··························································································································· 
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F. Cost Recovery and Replicability 
24. When did the loan repayment begin? ........................................................ . 
25.What is the situation of the repayment? Are there many peolpe 
in areas? 
26. Do you still have plans to expand the project in other towns in 
the state? ...................................................................................................... . 
27. In View of the cost recovery situation you have just explained, do 
you think the project is capable of replicating itself? explain why ............ . 
···························································································································· 
····································································································································· 
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Appendixv \ 
Area Manager · 
-· Federal JV!ortgage Bank of Nigeria 
Yandoka Road 
Bauchi. 
Dear Sir 
Urban Development Pr~ject 
World Bank Project Unit 
P. M. B. ·086 
Bauchi. 
t . I c::;;,. - O'- 19 ':•<'6 Da e. • .~ ••. • •• , • • .- .J ••••• 
JVTAK AJ'iA LOv·.1 COST I-TOUSING PROJBCT 
-LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
• ' ' ~,-•" ."\ • \ l ' ,. .:;... • 
rt is hereby :~ert:.fied that: ___ ..:.;.:.._.;;. _____ ;__~ ... ------------
/ , 1"•· ~ .,. ; ... r. _. s \ • .. -"!' 1 ·. ·-. · . ..l. . ·. _ · , , ~ · .. -. ·. i ..... . t t l \ ,, 
------- ..---------------------- ______________ _.... _______ J. _________ _ 
.,,.,. ____ .,.. ____________________________________________________ , 
is a plot benef~ciary in T,'a\ama Proj~ct Sites and Services. 
The beneficiary 1 t Certificate of Occupancy is ready and has 
been delivered tn the Froj <?et TTni t •. _other necessary details 
concerning. t_he .a :'"="l are as foll0"'1s, ___ : 
PLO'T TYP•,: 
PLOT cosr: J.,\ 
. ..j- .• ·-· .. ) 
INCot,~r.;;: .::i . .. . . , , 
SAVIN( · ACCOUNT: ~- 1t -~--
-·, 
Copies cf the approved building plan and the Certificate 
of Occupancy_ aro ..::i:t:tachedo .. 
Thapk y)u ~ery much. 
Yours faithfully 
for: PROJECT MANAGER-
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-4 
_ _._,;.· _;!I 
./ , 
r a Manager 
eral Mortgage Bank of Nigeria 
. ad 
U~ban ~•v•lo,m8nt Frej&et 
Worl~ Bank Preject 
P • r'I • B • 086 . 
Bauchi. _,,_ ,:£ / _ Date:l'(y·•p/~•~--
D&ar Sir 
MAKAMA Lt,W COST HOU,c:;ING PROJECT 
CfflER OF INTRODUCTION 
It is ..-w ce~tified that:~~~--(d.-~~7=ft:t,-~e-
, --- ~ ,__ ) Y?--:..llaE...~_:_4-~E~T- ~1-ER;.Z 
-12-, ,ti.-t , ( ,\--±-, ·= '• . __j ' .• - -=-- . . . . 
.............. ~~~~~~- --~--..::::::1-~\-;-;.~-~-~------~--~-~-•-·~----P•·•-
. . ' :; 
i~ a pltt b•n•fieiary in Makama Prtject Si~~ an~_e,r111itt·• 
· The b•nefic·iary' s Certificate of Occupancy is r-~pr ::-ar;ia ~s 
. . , ... 
. . 
been deliver.ed t• the Project Unit. Other. ne~essary ••tttls 
··-. : 
c~ncerning the area are"s foll~ws:-
/ 
PLOT 'l'Y~) 
PLOT f7'0 : / 23C> : LxJ 
INC0~.3(.SITT): t]J 
SAVING ACa)lJNFr- 32 _, r.?q31v. _, 
,. 
c,pies •f the appr@v•d building pla11 ant 'the Cert_ifiij~W 
,1 tccupancy are attached. 
Thank YtU VQ~Y much. 
Y.urs !~1thfully 
~ ,I 
APPENDIX vii 
Methods of Affordability calculations used for the World Bank projects 
The accessibility of any project will depend very much on its affordability. The World 
Bank defined a certain level of services as being affordable if the amount of monthly 
income that a household is willing and able to pay for shelter related expenditure is 
enough to pay for the cost of providing the services. In most of the World Bank projects, 
this amount is assumed to lie between 15% and 30% of the household income. An 
equation 'ayi=cj', where a is the proportion of monthly income, cj is the service level j 
and yi is the monthly income of a household of income level i, was derived. Jimenez 
(1979) describes two most popularly used methods in assessing affordability. The first, 
is to examine the assumptions implied in the original estimates of the cost of projects, 
the proportion of their income they are able to devote to housing and estimate of the 
income itself to see if the assumptions made are valid or not. The second method is to 
monitor certain developments and indicators of affordability like population turnover, 
rate of defaults of payment of instalments etc. He recommends that both methods be 
used together for a better assessment. All the World Bank sponsored studies employed 
these methods in evaluating affordability of the projects to the target population. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Level of Consolidation By Cluster 
CLUSTER ST AGES OF PLOT DEVELOPMENT OF ALLOCATED 
PLOTS 
Total No. No. Advanced Foundation Undevel-
of plots Completed stage Stage oped plots 
S5 72 55 13 2 0 
S9 88 51 22 3 4 
SlO 92 42 30 21 36 
Sll 129 70 12 12 8 
S12 102 204 63 11 5 
Sl3 229 8 6 5 3 
S15 22 65 19 0 0 
S17 84 40 5 1 2 
S18 49 110 28 12 7 
S19 159 123 18 9 0 
S20 150 41 30 14 4 
S21 97 132 18 2 8 
S22 159 132 48 17 0 
S25 201 114 25 9 6 
S26 154 15 6 4 0 
S27 25 41 29 18 44 
S28 132 - - - -
Total 1944 1243 372 139 127 
Source: Field Survey, March 1992 
Comments 
Note that some of the clusters in the project site are included in the table. This is because 
they are newly demarcated and no work at all has been started. In some of them the plot 
allocation process was just starting. They are additional clusters mostly behind the city 
wall and the project boundary. The new clusters are meant for the higher income group 
and therefore, the plots are larger and more expensive. The project unit is still trying to 
convince the State Urban Development Board to extend essential services to the area. 
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